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ABSTRACT 
 
Defined as the probability of a threat of damage, injury or loss, risk is a combination of 
hazard and vulnerability. Without hazard there is no risk. Without vulnerability there is no risk. 
Vulnerability – the predisposition to damage – is precisely what determines the impact of a 
particular hazard. Both hazard and vulnerability are necessary to create disaster. Guarding 
against hazard by reducing exposure is one approach to averting or preventing disaster. But it is 
only part of the security equation. Vulnerability reduction is the other. While the interaction 
between hazard and vulnerability is recognized in the literature as fundamental in shaping 
disaster risk, the solutions that emerge in practice tend to focus on the hazard. Most rely on 
large-scale infrastructure to reduce physical exposure to hazards. But these solutions rarely 
address the social, political and economic factors that make people vulnerable in the first place.  
Taking the case of Santa Fe, Argentina – a city with a long history of floods – to illustrate 
this point, this dissertation explores why people in the city remain vulnerable despite the 
government’s responses to risk. It is not that the city’s infrastructural solutions have failed to 
reduce risk. Rather, the solutions themselves are also part of the problem: they occlude social 
and political causality on the vulnerability side of the risk equation. I argue that the complex and 
non-linear relations between people and government, rather than the hazards themselves, 
produce the most damage precisely because they shape access to the physical, social and political 
protections that structure vulnerability. These relations also shape responses to risk and govern 
access to resources that could facilitate adaptation (but tend to produce maladaptation).  
Rather than focus on the flood events themselves, this study analyzes the way risk is 
framed and the solutions that emerge from that framing. These solutions are predominantly 
physical infrastructure, which have produced, both materially and discursively, unequal flood 
risk. For over a century, the state has engineered the floodplain by constructing a variety of 
infrastructure including canals, stormwater drains, bridges, embankments and pumping stations 
to cross the rivers or to prevent floods. Through their materiality, infrastructure carved out spaces 
in the city, designating the organized and “moral” spaces for the wealthy and middle classes and 
the disorganized and “immoral” spaces for the poor and lower classes. They created a distinction 
between riskier and more protected areas, shunting the poor into neighborhoods more exposed to 
flooding. Not only did these infrastructure physically transform the urban landscape, they also 
shaped society through discourse, which reinforced and normalized the uneven distribution of 
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risk. By routing residents’ affective responses to the city’s risky and safe spaces through a 
discursive field defined by high modern ideals, those who settled on low-lying land were labeled 
as inferior and immoral. This study highlights the invisible power of discourse which results in 
the non-questioning and normalization of risk. By centering my analytical focus on how 
infrastructure are powerful material, social, political, discursive and relational agents, I show 
how infrastructure both produce and are produced by people’s (both government and individuals) 
notions of what and who is at risk. Crucially, I argue that the discursive production of risk 
becomes part and parcel of the construction of the material and social world by projecting 
framings of risk that shape vulnerability and belonging in the contemporary city. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
Introduction: Framing Risk in Santa Fe  
 
1.1 The Solution is the Problem: The Politics of Framing 
On April 29
th
, 2003, the city of Santa Fe, Argentina suffered one of the worst floods in its 
history. The flood left one third of the city was underwater. Eighty thousand residents had to 
evacuate, leaving their homes for months, some even for years, and many had nothing to return 
to at all. Twenty-three lives were lost in the flood and hundreds more perished in the months and 
years that followed. Four years later, the city was hit by another devastating flood; heavy rains 
overwhelmed the city’s drainage infrastructure. In the months that followed the second flood, 
there was a foreboding sense of doom. People’s livelihoods were lost, infrastructure was 
destroyed and people’s trust in the government was swept away. Many people living at the city’s 
peripheries bore the burden of risk and felt a sense of abandonment – a lack of social and 
political protection. Later that year, residents took to the polls and, in the most basic form of 
sanction, voted the ruling party out. After 24 years of Peronist municipal administrations since 
the return of democracy in 1983, the Radical Party took office.  
Santa Fe’s newly elected leaders announced their vision to improve the city’s system of 
flood protection. In response to flood risk, they created an Office of Risk Management, built a 
bulwark of infrastructure, and set aside part of the municipal budget to fund both large and small 
infrastructure projects, from the extension of the embankment to stormwater drain construction 
and canal cleaning. Since then, Santa Fe has become the darling of flood risk management. In 
2010, Santa Fe joined the United Nation’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) Resilient Cities Campaign, in 2011 it won the UN Sasakawa Award for Disaster Risk 
Reduction , in 2014 Santa Fe’s mayor won UNISDR’s ‘Champion’ Award for his political 
commitment to vulnerability reduction, and in 2015 the city became one of Rockefeller 
Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities. Experts are celebrating Santa Fe as a model for risk 
management, leading the way in reducing vulnerability. But these facts do not adequately convey 
the complexity of vulnerability in the city and, despite the government’s efforts, local citizens 
remain vulnerable (Arrillaga, Grand, and Busso 2009; Viand 2009). 
Over the last decade, research on vulnerability has burgeoned (Wisner et al. 2004; Adger 
2006; Gallopín 2006; Thomalla et al. 2006; Füssel 2007; O’Brien et al. 2007; Vogel et al. 2007; 
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Giddens 2009; Adger et al. 2011; Although the new research demonstrates, according to Adger 
(2006: 273), “the full range of research traditions,” current research focuses primarily on 
measuring vulnerability and articulating impacts (Cutter et al. 2003; Luers et al. 2003; Hay and 
Mimura 2006; Nicholls et al. 2008; Yusuf and Francisco 2009; Mustafa et al. 2011; Tate 2012). 
Despite the plethora of research on climate-related vulnerability, there is little progress in the 
bridging of science and practice to effectively reduce people’s vulnerabilities. The case of Santa 
Fe helps us to understand why translating science into practice is so difficult.  
Defined as the probability of a threat of damage, injury or loss, risk is a combination of 
hazard and vulnerability. Without hazard there is no risk. Without vulnerability there is no risk. 
Vulnerability – this predisposition to damage – is precisely what determines the impact of a 
particular hazard (Blaikie et al. 1994). Both hazard and vulnerability are necessary to create 
disaster. Guarding against hazard by reducing exposure is one approach to averting or preventing 
crisis or disaster. But it is only part of the security equation. Vulnerability reduction is the other. 
While the interaction between hazard and vulnerability is recognized in the literature as 
fundamental in shaping disaster risk, the solutions that emerge in practice tend to focus on the 
hazard. Solutions that rely on large-scale infrastructure to prevent damages by reducing physical 
exposure to hazards are extremely important. But they stop short of addressing the social and 
political factors that make people vulnerable in the first place.  
Taking the case of Santa Fe to illustrate this point, this dissertation explores why people 
in the city remain vulnerable despite the government’s responses to risk. It is not that the city’s 
infrastructural solutions have failed to reduce risk. Rather, the solutions themselves are also part 
of the problem: they occlude social and political causality on the vulnerability side of the risk 
equation. In lieu of focusing my analysis on the flood events themselves, I analyze the framing of 
risk through the history and evolution of the solutions that emerge from that framing – the 
physical infrastructure which have produced, both materially and discursively, unequal flood 
risk. For over a century, the state has engineered the floodplain by constructing a variety of 
infrastructures, including canals, drains, bridges, embankments and pumping stations to cross the 
rivers or to prevent floods. But infrastructure are not just material. Not only did these 
infrastructure physically transform the urban landscape, they shaped society by “giving sense to 
things and by legitimating actions” (Rebotier 2012: 392). By centering my analytical focus on 
how infrastructure are powerful material, social, political, discursive and relational agents, I 
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show how infrastructure both produce and are produced by people’s (both government and 
individuals) notions of what and who is at risk. Crucially, I argue that the discursive production 
of risk becomes part and parcel of the construction of the material world and social order of the 
contemporary city.  
Broadly, this dissertation aims to engage those interested in the political economy of the 
urban environment. Through it, I aim to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the 
causes of urban vulnerability, how citizens and government officials perceive and frame risk, and 
what solutions emerge from those framings. It follows a lineage of geographical scholarship that 
traces the causes of vulnerability to deeply historical and social factors (see Blaikie et al. 1994; 
Hewitt 1997; Pelling 1999; Ribot 2014). Many vulnerability scholars consider the relations 
between people and government critical, but what remains vague in the literature is how that 
relation shapes people’s protections and vulnerabilities. Contributing to the originality of this 
dissertation, my approach incorporates the exploration of people’ perceptions of vulnerability 
into an analysis of causal structure around themes of inquiry at multiple scales – from local 
citizens to high-level decision makers. In doing so, I pursue two sets of questions. The first 
concerns causality. Why are people vulnerable in the face of floods? The second is interested in 
how people respond to risk. What do people do to reduce risk, who does it, and why? What are 
the factors that shape government and individual responses to floods and flood risk? How do 
infrastructure projects configure the relations of power between and among citizens and the 
state? And, why and how are politicians and residents complicit in sanctioning them?   
How risk is framed and how we perceive it shapes our actions in response to it. For 
example, the political scientist Shanto Iyengar studied the effects of framing on the public’s 
views of events. His research found that if poverty is framed as a specific event or instance of a 
poor person, then it resulted in the attribution of responsibility to that particular individual. But if 
the story is framed by a more integrative account of an event, such that a person’s poverty is the 
result of a general mix of social forces, then it led to a different understanding – people assigned 
responsibility to society-at-large (Iyengar 1994). Drawing on Iyengar’s example, I argue that the 
way people attribute cause and responsibility for an event, such as a flood, largely depends on 
how it is framed. If a flood is framed as an extraordinary event due to an unexpected rainstorm, 
then people will attribute cause and responsibility to the conditions in the sky. But if that same 
flood event is framed as the combination of heavy rains and government negligence in failing to 
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protect its citizens, it leads people to a more complex set of causes and attribution of 
responsibility to the government or to society in general. The difference in framing proves 
fundamental to the way people think about the world (Orum and Dale 2009). Hence, it is crucial 
that we understand how framing of risk shapes the selection and implementation of solutions – 
adaptive (and potentially maladaptive) measures – that can reduce or deepen vulnerability. 
Little academic research to date (with the exceptions of Jeffers 2011 and Ribot 2014) has 
probed the politics of framing risk, what and who is involved and the implications of this 
process. Orum and Dale (2009: 276) define frames as “schemes and templates for organizing 
experience according to certain rules and strategies.” Thus, framing is the way that scientists and 
decision makers selectively identify and organize a set of variables and relations to convince 
others that their view of an issue is more accurate and salient than the views of their opponents. 
Framings matter significantly because they may lead to actions that have the power to alter 
policy arrangements and, ultimately, people’s decisions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). In the 
process of framing, scientists and decision makers privilege some variables and relations over 
others, which has the power to alter perception of an issue. As Ribot (2014: 695) argues, 
“Framing trains attention on different observable variables and relations among them. It is not 
that one is wrong and the other is right…Each frames different realities for different objectives 
with different implications.” Framing is fundamentally unavoidable and therefore, we need to 
recognize what variables and relations each framing trains our attention on so we can have as 
complete an understanding as possible. 
In addition to shaping what we see, framings shape what we do. Following Braun and 
Whatmore (2010: xxi), I argue that frames can be “combined and deployed in relation to 
countless other elements, gestures, practices, and institutions,” such that they have the capacity 
to radically redefine possibilities, particularly with respect to people’s relations with government 
and their relations with each other. Framings also generate new relations that shape what is 
occurs at any given moment. In that sense, framing is overtly political. Framings shape how we 
see cause and in so doing directs how people attribute responsibility for outcomes related to 
climate hazards. Frames, therefore, provide a very powerful lens for how we actually think about 
and react to our world. Before proceeding to explore the central concern of this dissertation, this 
political point must be recognized and unpacked. The ways in which risk is conceptualized and 
framed has important influences on local policy and practice (Jeffers 2011). However, the 
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literature has not made it clear how important this may be and what factors shape these framings. 
Advancing our understandings of how risk and hazards are framed and understood, and how 
knowledge about risk is produced and used in local policy and practice is crucial to reducing 
vulnerability (ibid).  
This dissertation focuses on two approaches to vulnerability, which differ primarily in 
how they frame risk. Both approaches have made significant contributions to vulnerability 
research, which I elaborate in the next section. At their core these approaches are framed around 
different questions. The first approach frames risk in terms of the hazard and seeks to “identify 
who is vulnerable rather than why, indicators rather than explanation, fixes rather than causes” 
(Ribot 2014: 669). The goal of this framing is to control or reduce risk by estimating the impacts, 
such as monetary loss or property damage, of a single hazard or stressor. Importantly, it assumes 
that hazard is the only cause of risk. The second approach frames risk in terms of vulnerability, 
asking why people are susceptible to damage and what makes them unable to avoid undesirable 
outcomes. The goal here is to explain causality, and the framing considers multiple causes of a 
single outcome. For instance, poverty, aging infrastructure and the lack of planning combined 
with a flood event can lead to the undesirable outcome of displacement. My objective is not to 
deny or evaluate the appeal of either framing of risk. Both framings reflect a real world and true 
particular objectives. Rather, I wish to emphasize that the framings of risk lead scientists and 
decision makers to ask different questions, which inevitably lead to different solutions. And 
those solutions have significant material impacts on people’s lives.  
 The opposition of the two approaches forms the basis for a politics of framing risk 
with which we can understand why certain factors become more salient than others. In the 
history and present of Santa Fe, engineers, technocrats and politicians have provided solutions to 
flood risk by promoting the development of infrastructure. These solutions, which reduce 
exposure, stem from a framing that conceptually locates risk in the rivers and the sky. From this 
framing emerges technological fixes, like infrastructure, which are organized around scientific 
principles of risk management and, hence, are viewed as apolitical and objective. But 
infrastructure are not actually apolitical. Nor are they holistic solutions to risk reduction precisely 
because they fail to address the broader set of social and political-economic causes. This framing 
of risk turns away from the contentious nature of addressing political and social causality 
precisely because it avoids linking damages to human agency and allows decision makers to 
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divorce themselves from responsibility. The flood of 2003 is a case in point because causality 
can be traced back to government of Santa Fe’s negligence for not closing a known gap in the 
city’s flood embankment. Eschewing the contentious nature of cause, government officials 
would rather blame nature, infrastructure failure, and the flood victims themselves than admit 
their responsibility for the production of risk. Admitting responsibility in causing the damages 
and pain endured by thousands of Santafesinos is a necessary step citizens deeply desire to 
redress vulnerability – a step that has not yet been taken.  
In this dissertation, I argue that responses to risk never exist in a “pure” state outside of 
politics. The framing of risk is, in itself, political, which makes the solutions that emerge part of 
the problem: they result in unequal flood risk, benefiting classes and neighborhoods unevenly. In 
taking a historic perspective, four interrelated factors reinforce the framing of risk. The first 
stems from an obsession with the rivers that surround the city: the Paraná River in the east and 
the Salado River in the west. The city was resettled in its current location precisely because 
colonial administrators believed that the Paraná and Salado Rivers would buffer the city from 
attacks by indigenous tribes. The rivers also provided early residents with fertile soils to grow 
crops and allowed Santa Fe to grow into one of Argentina’s main port cities. Santafesinos have 
long had an intimate relationship with the rivers. But the very rivers that provided so many 
benefits to the city and its citizens also posed many challenges for its growth and security. Due to 
recurrent flooding as a result of land use changes, infrastructure development, and extreme 
weather events, the rivers soon began to be viewed as threats. Since the mid-seventeenth century, 
there have been about 30 “extraordinary” floods that affected the city (Ullberg 2013). Hence, the 
constant focus on the rivers created an insatiable drive to reduce risk through exposure by 
building infrastructure to block, cross and gain land from them.  
The second factor is the reliance on engineers for risk reduction solutions. In order to 
build infrastructure, the city government relies on the engineers from the National University of 
the Litoral (Universidad Nacional del Litoral) or UNL – Argentina’s foremost university for 
hydraulic engineering. Engineering experts are taught to frame risk in technical, probabilistic 
terms. Because they calculate risk by estimating probabilities, they can only propose solutions 
that fall within their repertoire and capabilities (Li 2007). They are not trained in social, political 
and economic processes and thus do not account for such causes in assessments of risk. The 
factoring out of the social is not intentional. It simply falls outside of their bounded, technical 
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domains; thus the range of responses to risk (and their success) is limited to those they can 
calculate through formulas and models (Mitchell 2008). Zimmerman (1995: 175) also highlights 
this occlusion of social causality, stating “Too many of us blithely assume that we need not deal 
with the base causes of our environmental problems because soon-to-be-discovered 
technological solutions will make those problems obsolete” (cited in Wisner et al. 2004). 
Although technocratic approaches to risk reduction have received increasing criticism over the 
past decade, as Wisner et al. (2004: 24) notes, “faith is simple technological fixes is still 
pervasive.” Part of the reason behind the confidence in infrastructural solutions is that they are 
touted for being rational, value-free and apolitical, and the engineers and architects who develop 
them are regarded as devoid of political corruption and championed as the bringers of order and 
rationality to the city (Graham and Marvin 2001). Their knowledge, like all knowledge as 
Haraway (1988) reminds us, is situated and, therefore, never value or context free, the result of 
which is a technical solution to risk: infrastructure. 
Third, the politics of the infrastructural solutions are critical in reinforcing the framing of 
risk in the hazard. The solutions that emerge from the framing of risk are not just technical 
solutions. They are inherently political. Through the politics of visibility – the practice of 
conjuring, codifying, promising and utilizing the visibility of infrastructure projects to influence 
citizens and maintain political dominance – infrastructural solutions add their own dynamics to 
the relations that constitute social and political life. Those in positions of power find 
infrastructure politically convenient and expedient in visibly demonstrating that the state is 
protecting its citizens. While the technocratic framing of risk produces solutions that are visible 
to engineers and technocrats, politicians also use a select set of solutions that are visible to them 
– or those they can make visible (through discourse and labor) for their political purposes. They 
use the visibility of those infrastructural solutions precisely because they can articulate and 
extend the terms of a more materialist politics attune to the sheer power and necessity of 
infrastructure – through the creation of order, mobility and security. Furthermore, politicians 
focus on the convergent registers of affectivity and event, particularly through visibility, to 
engage citizens and shape their “collective attachment and the political import of the ways in 
which this power is engineered and harnessed” (Braun and Whatmore 2010: xxiv).    
The fourth and final factor is the recursive citizen-state relations that reinforce the 
framing of risk in the hazard. Ultimately, because the state’s investment in infrastructure goes 
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towards protecting everyone, infrastructural solutions are viewed as the legitimate and most 
effective solution for risk reduction. They become a crucial way for the government to legitimate 
itself. Meanwhile, the pains of vulnerability, such as lack of access to jobs, exploitation and low 
wages, are treated through the clientelist relations – a quid pro quo between individuals or groups 
of unequal standing that mediates selective and temporary access to resources (Roniger 2004). 
Clientelism essentially picks up where infrastructural solutions leave off – in the parts of the city 
where people are already susceptible to damage. I argue that clientelism further reinforces the 
technocratic framing of risk by cultivating desires and “configuring habits, aspirations and 
beliefs” within residents that will lead them towards the ends desirable to government: 
infrastructure (Li 2007: 5). It is through these recursive relations that the infrastructural bias is 
reinforced, which allows for the framing of risk to permeate deep into the overarching structures 
of the state and society, perpetuated by political and media discourse, institutionalized in schools 
and embedded in the imaginaries of everyday citizens. 
Framing matters. It is chosen for its political powers. The narrow focus of the 
technocratic framing of risk casts a double shadow on vulnerability. First, by directing attention 
to the biophysical phenomenon of the hazard, the framing obscures the vulnerabilities that reside 
within society. Second, the solutions that emerge from the framing – the infrastructure – occlude 
other social and political causes of vulnerability and hence potential vulnerability reduction 
strategies, such as utilizing elevated lacustrine-style houses, restricting settlement in certain 
areas, or the creation of neighborhood risk management and advisory panels. The idea here is not 
necessarily to change the frame. Rather, the goal is to first to understand variables and relations 
that framing trains our attention to in order to generate fully integrative solutions, combining risk 
mitigation with vulnerability reduction, to forge more socially, politically, economically and 
environmentally secure and equitable outcomes.  
This dissertation finds that the present framing of risk results in a disconnection between 
the promise and materiality of vulnerability reduction. The short-term political goals that train 
attention on large-scale infrastructure and protection from a hazard fail to comprehensively 
respond to the desires of local people, who want recognition as citizens worth serving with social 
and political protections in addition to the physical protections of infrastructure. However, as the 
favored fix for flood risk reduction, the government builds large visible infrastructure, which 
results in unequal flood risk. The distribution of security and risk is normalized via the blaming 
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of poor for moving onto risky lands – despite the fact that it was the active politics of 
government to allow their settlement. Infrastructure literally channeled problems from one group 
to another justified by its protection of some. In this sense, the focus on infrastructural fixes 
obscured government’s own role in producing vulnerabilities that could have been avoided by a 
mix of more rigorous land-use and zoning policies and a broader scope in infrastructural design. 
Further, the dissertation found that the plight of the more vulnerable segments of the population 
was politically regulated through a system of clientelism – that provided a level of anodyne 
support to the most affected populations. Through an analysis of the framing of risk that focuses 
on the citizen-state relation as a critical, yet underdeveloped part of the causal structure of 
vulnerability, this dissertation aims to show that a more integrative response to risk is possible. 
In the sections that follow, I lay out the theoretical engagements and contributions of this 
dissertation, explain my methods, and provide a brief overview of the relevant political-
economic history of Argentina since the turn of the 20
th
 century.   
 
1.2 Theoretical Engagements 
The central theoretical engagements of this research are three distinct but related 
conversations among geographers, anthropologists, political scientists and scholars of urban 
studies. First, this research advances theories on vulnerability and risk, particularly in urban 
contexts. Research on vulnerability has emerged from a number of different traditions and 
disciplines in the physical sciences and social sciences, including the subfields of disasters 
research, political ecology and global environmental change. Each tradition employs different 
literatures, theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches (Cutter 1996; Adger 2006; 
Eakin and Leuers 2006; Leichenko et. al. 2010). Despite calls for greater integration, the field of 
vulnerability studies remains polarized between two approaches: the risk-hazard approach and 
entitlement/livelihoods approach (Füssel and Klein 2006: 305; also see Adger 2006; O’Brien et 
al. 2007; Jeffers 2011; Cardona et al. 2012; Ribot 2014).  
The risk-hazard approach (also known as conventional hazards theory), which emerges 
from the physical sciences, focuses on explaining disasters as natural phenomena that are caused 
by hazards. This approach analyzes vulnerability to natural hazards by focusing on the 
biophysical elements of exposure, probability and impacts of hazards. These biophysical 
elements formed the basis of this tradition, which became the predominant mode upon which 
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society dealt with disasters, particularly in terms of emergency response and post-disaster 
reconstruction. Disasters caused by floods, for instance, were described in terms of climatic 
factors such as size, frequency, incidence rate and other geophysical, hydrological or 
meteorological data (Hewitt 1994). Geographer Kenneth Hewitt argued that the bulk of disasters 
research carried out by social scientists in the 1970s and early 1980s served to reinforce what he 
called the “geophysicalist” view, which overlooked the “main sources of social influence over 
hazards” (1983: 7). Other scholars of human ecology (see Watts 1983; Cutter 1996 and Cutter et 
al. 2003) argue that the risk-hazard approach shows only part of the problem, failing to engage 
with the underlying structural causes that lead to the damage characteristic of a disaster (Hewitt 
1983).  
 The entitlements/livelihoods approach emerges from attempts to explain why some 
people suffer more than others when facing the same environmental hazard. Because different 
groups suffer differential losses, these scholars explained vulnerability through social and 
institutional factors aim to explain difference while downplaying the more uniformly distributed 
ecological or physical stresses. As Adger (2006: 270) notes, this approach helped give a socially 
rooted explanation for “ food insecurity, civil strife and social upheaval.” Sen (1981), Watts and 
Bohle (1993) and Bohle et al. (1994), for instance, sought to explain vulnerability in the face of 
hunger and famine through entitlements – the resources available to individuals based on 
people’s own production, assets or reciprocal arrangements used to secure their basic needs. 
Another prominent example is Blaikie et al. (1994) who identify root causes, which translate into 
dynamic pressures and result in unsafe conditions. Taking the entitlements/livelihoods approach 
further, Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999) emphasize the importance of institutions in 
mediating vulnerability. They posit that institutions shape access to resources, thereby enabling 
people to obtain, transform and exchange their ‘endowments’ in ways that translate into 
contributions to well-being. Agrawal (2008) also highlights the role of institutions’ influence on 
vulnerability, particularly in the ways they structure impacts, mediate between collective and 
individual responses, and govern access to resources.  
 Emerging as critiques of conventional hazards theory, the human ecology (or political 
ecology) and entitlements/livelihoods approaches contribute to the growing literature that 
directed scholars’ and practitioners’ attention to processes that lead to disasters instead of what 
happens their wake. They began to place greater importance on the ways in which society builds 
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or creates the conditions for disaster and explore the multiple factors that determine the degree to 
which peoples’ lives and livelihoods are put at risk (Davis 1978; Hewitt 1984; Blaikie et al. 
1994). The distinct research traditions have translated into scholarship that now recognizes that 
vulnerabilities are influenced by biophysical factors in conjunction with social, political and 
economic conditions (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wilches-Chaux 1998; Lavell 2001; Cutter et al. 2008; 
Cutter 2006; Adger, 2006; Eakin and Luers 2006; Füssel and Klein 2006; Marino and Ribot 
2012; Dooling and Simon 2012). These approaches have pushed scholarship to consider diverse 
contextual processes including the interplay between drivers of human-environmental change, 
vulnerability outcomes and a multitude of societal responses (Simon and Dooling 2013).  
Still, the disciplinary difference in origin has led to differing interpretations of 
vulnerability and the ways in which it should be defined (Jeffers 2011). If people, groups of 
people, places or systems are considered to vulnerable to climate hazards or events, then the 
analysis may focus on the nature and probability of those hazards. But if people or groups of 
people are vulnerable to being harmed, then analysis may productively examine the damages and 
their multiple causes. While contemporary scholars of vulnerability agree that the concept 
focuses on the range of factors that make people, groups, places or systems more susceptible to 
damage, there is an assortment of perspectives regarding where they place the burden of 
explanation – or where they locate risk. The key difference between the two aforementioned 
approaches is that the risk-hazards approach traces a linear causal relation back to the climate 
hazard itself, while the entitlements/ livelihoods approach tends to trace cause to multiple social 
and political-economic factors (Ribot 2014). The risk-hazard approach, which defines 
vulnerability as a “dose-response relation between an exogenous hazard to a system and its 
adverse effects” (Füssel and Klein 2006: 305), is concerned with predicting the ‘impact’ of a 
single climate event, like a flood. Scholars of this approach are concerned with predicting the 
aftermath of that event and estimating the increment of damage, such as monetary loss, property 
loss/damage or human mortality, caused by an intensification of normal climatic conditions. 
They consider people vulnerable to hazards – locating the risk in the hazard itself. They are 
largely concerned about the degree of human exposure to extreme events provoked by a hazard 
and locate risk external to society.  
The entitlements/livelihoods approach, on the other hand, considers people to be 
vulnerable to the negative outcomes of a hazard, such as the loss of a valued asset, hunger, or 
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displacement (Ribot 2014). They consider multiple causes of a single outcome. So, for instance, 
the combined causes of poverty, poor infrastructure, lack of planning combined with a flood may 
result in a given outcome: displacement. The hazard – the flood – is just one among multiple 
causes. Scholars of this approach place the burden of explanation in social and political-
economic structures. They locate risk within society, emphasizing the properties of a social 
system (the assets, protections, institutions, and relationships) that mediate the outcome of the 
hazard event and influence the capacity to adapt in the face of climate events (Adger 2006; 
Duarte et al. 2007; Ribot 2013a, 2014). Like framing, the motivation for unraveling causalities is 
a political one associated with questions of social justice and human rights, that is, to give 
vulnerable people a voice (Voss 2008).  
Integrative approaches link the risk-hazards and entitlement/livelihood approaches, but 
not without problems (Ribot 2014). They characterize vulnerability as having both external 
(exposure) and internal (adaptive capacity) dimensions, but where they draw the line between the 
two depends on what they are analyzing. Integrative approaches include resilience theories, 
which integrate the social into system analysis. But by taking the a systemic approach, resilience 
theories with few exceptions (see Beymer-Farris et al. 2012) miss some of the complexities of 
vulnerability and avoid addressing root causes, which results in reifying risk by de-socializing its 
meaning (Rebotier 2012). The results of these efforts have not always assisted in the providing 
clarity to the concept of vulnerability. Considerable disagreement remains. Multiple 
interpretations of vulnerability continue to be employed by researches across and within several 
disciplines (Jeffers 2011). In recent years, several other issues have also emerged. Relating to 
debates within the climate change arena is the conceptualization of ‘vulnerability as outcome’ 
and ‘contextual vulnerability’ (Kelly and Adger 2000; O’Brien et al. 2007). The distinctions 
between vulnerability as an outcome, a status, or as a process are significant, particularly with 
respect to research methods, especially current efforts to measure it (Luers et al. 2003; Mustafa 
et al. 2011). Adding to the diversity of interpretations,  Kuhlicke (2010) argues that vulnerability 
has phenomenological and causal dimensions. He posits that political-economic conditions may 
be an outcome of vulnerability, rather than a cause and that the difference is not always clear. 
While this may be the case, Watts (1991) reminds us of the recursivity of vulnerability analysis 
by exploring the ways in which vulnerable people shape the political economy that shapes their 
precarity and security (see also Ribot 2014).   
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While taking into consideration the views of the aforementioned approaches, my research 
uses a causality-based integrative approach that views vulnerability as a process, which can help 
unravel the complexity of vulnerability in the urban environment. Following Turner et al. (2003) 
and Ribot (2013a), this integrative approach avoids this boundary problem by tracing the causes 
of vulnerability from specific instances of risk at a particular spatial scale – the neighborhood 
(see also Blaikie 1985 and Watts and Bohle 1993). This approach is particularly useful for 
analyzing vulnerability in urban contexts precisely because the complex interactions between 
social, political, economic and infrastructural variables with biophysical events make cities 
important sites of action for understanding the production of risk and the relations between 
people and government that can reduce or deepen vulnerability. Right now more people live in 
cities than any other time in human history and that trend is likely to increase, especially in cities 
of the Global South (UN DESA Population Division 2012). But urban growth is not happening 
evenly; much of it is occurring at the peripheries.  
Urban peripheries are where land is available, life is somewhat more affordable and the 
law often more flexible and negotiable (Ranganathan 2014). Rapid urbanization accompanied by 
spatial expansion into hazard-prone peripheral areas has important implications for urban risk, 
which has become a key issue in the climate change literature (Pelling 2003; Rebotier 2012). In 
cities located near rivers or coasts, this urbanization trend increases the risk of flooding due to 
greater exposure to overbank flows, heavy rains, sea level rise and storm surges (Church et al. 
2013). Urbanization at the peripheries also concentrates infrastructure and impervious surfaces 
on land that was once open and able to drain runoff, which increases the risk of pluvial or rain-
related flooding. In contrast to fluvial or coastal flooding, which tends to be limited to areas close 
to rivers and coasts, rain has a somewhat indeterminable range of impact, making it difficult to 
predict and provide adequate warning times (Houston et al. 2011). Furthermore, scientists predict 
that increases in rainfall and runoff combined with increases in extreme rainfall events in the 
coming decades may have important impacts on the frequency and intensity of river flooding 
(McGrath and Lynch 2008; Steele-Dunne et al. 2008). This is particularly important for cities 
located along rivers, like Santa Fe, which frequently experience their worst flooding when 
riverine and rain-related flooding are combined as in the case of the 2007 flood.  
Urban peripheries also concentrate socio-economic disparities and social fragmentation 
that in turn result in unequal flood risk (Pelling 2003). In many cities around the world, the 
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peripheries are where poverty, socio-economic polarization and marginalization combine to 
produce neighborhoods that are both exposed to environmental hazards and lack the resources to 
cope with the disruptions to their livelihoods that extreme weather and climatic events. In a study 
at the US-Mexico border, Collins (2010), however, found that socio-economic disparities and 
marginalization does not sufficiently explain the production of unequal urban flood risk. While a 
long lineage of critical geographical scholarship has been invaluable in emphasizing the social 
and political roots of risk (Blakie et al. 1994; Watts and Bohle 1994; Pelling 1999; Ribot 2013a; 
Rebotier 2012), the factors that influence the production of risk tend to be assumed rather than 
fleshed out in the literature (Ranganathan 2015).  
An important contribution of this dissertation lies in demonstrating how both the state 
and its citizens are implicated in the production of unequal flood risk. By tracing the causes of 
vulnerability and triangulating complex urban interactions between the state and citizens, among 
individuals in different social and political groups, and relations surrounding access to 
resources,
1
 this dissertation illustrates how the analytic and perceptual placement of risk 
influences the responses of government and individuals. I link analytic framing to the kinds of 
responses that people and governments perceive and implement. Kuhlicke (2010) posits that the 
perceptions of risk can be altered when people are ‘radically surprised’ by an event that exceeds 
their previously established routines or stocks of knowledge. This implies that any fundamental 
analysis of vulnerability needs to take into account how people perceive and frame risk and 
construct their own vulnerability. I address this developing area of research by incorporating 
people’s perceptions of risk and vulnerability into an analysis of causal structure, which leads to 
the next theoretical engagement.  
My second major theoretical engagement is with the geographic literature on 
knowledge, infrastructure and the production of risk. This engagement unpacks the crucial 
relationship between nature, people and risk, particularly in the way people talk about 
infrastructure in the reduction and production of risk. Central to this line of inquiry is James C. 
Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998), which centers on the “high modern state,” its confidence in 
the ability to design and operate society through scientific devices like surveys, plans and 
censuses, and the unintended effects of those devices. Scott (1998) posits a dichotomy between 
                                                          
1
 Drawn from analysis of the ‘Space of Vulnerability’ (see Watts and Bohle1993).  
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the simplified and abstract knowledge of the state and the textured and everyday knowledge of 
citizens. Robbins (2000a, 2000b) adds nuance to this dichotomy of state and local knowledges by 
arguing that, in practice, the difference between local producers of knowledge and state 
bureaucrats is often quite murky. Robbins further argues that the production of knowledges is 
closely linked to the political-economic position of the people who are producing them (Robbins 
2000b).  
While the study of risk, hazards and vulnerability has focused on scientists and 
technocrats, incorporating local perceptions of risk and social imaginaries are also important to 
understanding vulnerability outcomes. Following Scott (1998) and Robbins (2000), I rely on 
Marxist approaches and invigorate them with Gramscian historical-geographical materialism to 
demonstrate that people and places ‘at risk’ are materially and discursively produced by the state 
and local citizens and, importantly, the relations between them. This dissertation engages with 
this literature first by arguing that flood risk is perceived and framed in a way that addresses the 
hazard and obscures the vulnerabilities that reside in society because of the political expediency 
and visibility of infrastructure. By framing flood risk in a technocratic way, technocrats and 
decision makers render the solutions that emerge from the framing – the infrastructure – 
apolitical and value-free. However, as this dissertation shows, infrastructural solutions are highly 
political and never value-free.  
Another contribution of this dissertation lies in the conceptualization of infrastructural 
solutions as charged arenas for struggles over the right to belong. Infrastructure are the 
fundamental physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of society. They are 
central to the life of cities (Thrift 2004). The notion of a ‘‘modern infrastructural ideal” 
developed by Graham and Marvin (2001) is convincing insofar as it refers to the enduring 
preference for ‘‘bundled” infrastructure and service provision (Coutard 2008). However, in-
depth studies of infrastructure, particularly in cities in the Global South, tell a different story. 
Infrastructure, which have coevolved over time with social and political formations, are never 
truly universal (Karvonen 2011; McFarlane 2011; Björkman 2014; Ranganathan 2015). Instead, 
they result in social and spatial inequalities. They draw a material and discursive line between 
the haves and the have nots. In this dissertation, I highlight two paradoxes surrounding 
infrastructure. The first paradox, which was first identified by Gilbert White in the 1930s, 
describes the paradoxical production of risk whereby the infrastructure aimed at reducing risk 
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has actually increased it. I add nuance to this paradox by arguing that flood control infrastructure 
has not increased risk for everyone. Rather, the paradox results in what I call an immoral hazard 
because the infrastructure creates a set of protections that redistribute risk unevenly, transferring 
a disproportional burden of risk on to the poor and marginalized, who inevitably bear the brunt 
of human suffering from the failures of the infrastructure meant to reduce risk.  
There are two reasons for the first paradox through which infrastructure makes the poor 
more vulnerable. First, infrastructure development and planning organized the city around risk. 
Through these material practices, the state carved out different spaces in the city by servicing 
some neighborhoods with infrastructure and allowing the middle class to settle there, while 
consciously allowing the poor to settle on land not serviced by infrastructure and/or at exposure 
to flood risk, such as floodplains, riverbeds or stormwater channels – until that land was deemed 
“developable” by flows of capital. In other words, they placed people vis-à-vis the riskiness of 
space and provided infrastructure in the interest of those who are already less at risk. But this 
was not only a physical practice. It was premised on the discourses of the state, which, reinforced 
and normalized the uneven distribution of risk between the organized and “moral” spaces of the 
modernist project and the disorganized and “immoral” spaces of the city. Both materially and 
discursively, the government produced ideal modern subjects in the “moral” spaces they created 
and risk subjects by allowing people to settle on low-lying land at risk of flooding.  
The second reason infrastructure renders the poor more vulnerable is that the unequal 
power relations manifest in state infrastructure development and planning practices result in a 
discursive move to blame the victims. My findings demonstrate that the groups historically 
marginalized and deprived of the physical protections and secure land, are also those most 
exposed to flood disasters and get blamed for them. The inequality deepens in the city, with 
some protected (the Candioti Class with their political-economic connections, for instance) and 
others at greater risk (those who rely on political clientelism for access to resources), while being 
covered by a discourse that blames the victims (and the beneficiaries) for choosing to live in 
risky (and secure) areas. But social inclusion and exclusion in the city was not only produced by 
the state. It was also co-constituted by the discourses of residents themselves as subjects of 
government (Rose 1996). By routing residents’ affective responses to the city’s risky and safe 
spaces through a discursive field defined by high modern ideals, those who settled on low-lying 
land were labeled as inferior and immoral. Using the Engelsian concept of false consciousness, I 
17 
 
argue that the invisible power of discourse created a false consciousness among both the risk 
subjects as well as the modern, ideal subjects, which, in turn, led to the non-questioning and 
normalization of risk (Kilminster 1979). 
From their privileged vantage point sitting in municipal and provincial offices, 
technocrats and decision makers believe that people would be better off if they were “protected” 
which does not necessarily equate with “less vulnerable.” Rather than change the broader 
political-economic structures, it is politically effective for decision makers to blame those who 
settled on low-lying land as being inferior, having made bad decisions of their own, or are “used 
to” flooding. And since people believe the discourse of government, risk appears natural and risk 
subjects responsible, rather than the state. As a result of the blaming the victim, the poor end up 
in a discursive realm that is shaped by the location of infrastructure with respect to the “at risk” 
people and normalized so that their risk is made less visible and more acceptable. By examining 
the paradox of risk and its effects, I expose the political desire of government officials to have 
power over a territory for their own political projects, create and control subjects, and blame the 
victims for putting themselves at risk.  
The second paradox in this dissertation is that of the infrastructural fix. I argue that 
despite citizens’ experiences of infrastructure failures, they maintain an unwavering belief that 
infrastructure will protect them from flooding. The tendency to glorify infrastructure as the 
solution to flooding is not unusual for Santa Fe: this emerges directly from the framing of risk. 
What this crucially shows, however, is that while people want to perceive risk accurately, 
infrastructure has changed the context of risk, which consequently shaped their vulnerability 
outcomes. In a very real sense, then, the physical transformation of spaces in the city through 
infrastructure not only redefined notions of risk, it also reconfigured the boundaries of belonging. 
By contextualizing the paradox of the infrastructural fix in the ideological, philosophical and 
psychological realms, I show that people’s beliefs in science and its experts, their beliefs in the 
solutions that emerge from science – the technology – as the rational way of solving problems, 
and their desire to be right, which is layered with affective response, provide the underlying basis 
for the paradox of the infrastructural fix. I draw on Herbert Marcuse (1941), who argued that 
modern capitalist civilization has made technology so pervasive that man approaches it with a 
“matter-of-factness” which is similar to what Star (1999) calls infrastructure’s “taken-for-
grantedness.” Marcuse (1941: 143) posits that “business, technics, human needs and nature” are 
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molded together so that the matter-of-fact attitude dissolves into “not only perfectly rational but 
also perfectly reasonable” norms.  I show that using infrastructure to reduce risk has become 
something so “matter-of-fact” that it results in the non-questioning of infrastructural solutions.  
Another major contribution of this dissertation concerns the politics of visibility. In this 
dissertation, I show that people want to be recognized and that infrastructure can enable, 
transform or inhibit ways of recognition (Mitchell 2014). One way that infrastructure recognizes 
people is by connecting them to a larger operation of society, thereby authorizing a form of 
residency-based citizenship. Another way that infrastructure enables recognition is by cultivating 
affect, making them feel acknowledged and protected by the state. In that sense, infrastructure 
are very much affective technologies (Thrift 2008). People want belonging and security. They 
want not to be damaged when floods occur and they put a great deal of affective significance in 
infrastructure: pride, joy, anger, fear. This is a political reality. Another political reality is that 
politicians and political officials want credit for infrastructure and they garner it through the 
politics of visibility – that is, politicians choose solutions that are ‘visible’ or solutions they can 
make visible (through discourse and labor) in order to obtain or maintain political dominance. 
They utilize the affective ties people have with these non-human elements because when they 
visibilize infrastructural solutions, people feel recognized, made visible, by them. In this sense, 
infrastructural solutions are not only a way for the government to legitimize itself, but also a way 
for them to cultivate affect between citizens and the ruling party.  
Embedded in the politics of visibility is a false dichotomy between the visibility and 
invisibility of infrastructure. While no infrastructure is completely invisible, it has an “invisible 
quality” if it is working properly (Star 1999). Because of the “matter-of-factness” and “taken-for-
grantedness” of infrastructure, we expect it to always work quietly and invisibly in the 
background, providing potable water, distributing electricity and gas, and facilitating the mass 
movement of people, energy and goods (Mitchell 2014). But, as Stephen Graham (2010) argues, 
contemporary discussions about infrastructure often focus on its failures; these actually reveal 
much about the “normal” working of infrastructure. For, only when infrastructure fails does the 
normally invisible quality of infrastructure becomes visible; when according to Star (1999: 382) 
“the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout.” I argue that besides 
surpassing residents’ existing stock of knowledge, the flood of 2003 was so devastating because 
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the infrastructure failure was extremely visible both in the physicality of the infrastructure and in 
the effects.  
Politicians like using large-scale, very “visible” infrastructure like embankments to 
reduce risk because there is an immediate effect. That is, it looks like they are productively 
managing risk; that government is working for the people. A big challenge for politicians is to 
sustain a long-term vision –and, over the short term, the political benefits of reducing 
vulnerability are considerably more difficult to capture than the benefits of building 
infrastructure. Constructing an embankment or a pumping station is meant to solve the 
government’s problem of flooding (or shortage of land) over the short term, not the long-term 
problem of vulnerable residents. Spatially, too, the politics of visibility positions infrastructure in 
places it will be seen, which is typically the urban core where politicians have a greater, not to 
mention wealthier, constituent base. But that does not mean that only ‘visible’ infrastructure like 
embankments and pumping stations matter. By focusing on stormwater infrastructure as both a 
set of materials (the drains, pipes, culverts, canals and ditches) and a “discursive object in urban 
government” (McFarlane 2008:  415), I conceptualize ‘invisibility’ not so much as a material 
reality, but rather as a discursive tactic to talk about drainage infrastructure as an important part 
of the fabric of the city. In many cities in the Global South, there is no such thing as ‘invisible’ 
stormwater infrastructure – the jumbles of pipes, drains and culverts both under and above 
ground make them a very visible and vital part of the city. I contend that while stormwater 
infrastructure is not really invisible, people talk about it as invisible. 
By bringing the attention to the discursive-political manipulation of visibility/invisibility, 
I demonstrate that invisibility is invoked to juxtapose this infrastructure from previous periods of 
‘monumental’ high-modern – and indeed more visible – infrastructure as well as to discursively 
draw a line between Peronist rule and Radical rule. Citizens, too, discursively use the 
infrastructure to designate belonging; if they are not serviced with this ‘invisible’ yet much 
needed infrastructure, they, too, feel invisible and neglected by the government. Recognizing 
how citizens feel when they lack the requisite infrastructure, then delivering that infrastructure in 
a very powerful way to makes citizens feel included, acknowledged and protected by the state. I 
also show that the government uses infrastructure provision to cultivate affect between citizens 
and the infrastructure that serves them as well as between citizens and the governing political 
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party. Crucially, this dissertation invigorates thinking about urban infrastructure as a major 
crucible for citizen-state relations.  
I argue, then, that the politics of visibility may be part of the production, maintenance or 
reduction of vulnerability. This dissertation shows that in order to redress vulnerability, people 
desire recognition as citizens worth serving with the social, political-economic and physical 
protections that form the basis for their long-term security. The government responds along lines 
that they think will enhance their political legitimacy: in one case, stormwater infrastructure. 
This political tactic could very well be part of the reduction of vulnerability. But the assessment 
of vulnerability and how to treat it is clearly framed by the political necessity of government to 
reproduce itself. I demonstrate that the Peronist Party lost to the Radicals for failing to protect 
“their people” from risk. Perhaps the Radical Party will be more successful by introducing a 
broader understanding of the causes of vulnerability into this political logic – to create a more 
flexible set of responses that, accompanied by the right discursive rationalizations, could help 
them demonstrate that they are responsive – by both looking like they are acting on behalf of the 
people and by demonstrating that risk has been reduced. 
Finally, this dissertation engages the theoretical insights on citizen-state relations and 
political clientelism. Scholars of vulnerability most often define it in relation to disasters, 
environmental hazards and climate events and variability. An important, but underdeveloped 
aspect of vulnerability in the literature is the relation between people and government 
(Appadurai 1984; Drèze and Sen 1989; Watts and Bohle 1993; Leach et al. 1998; Bebbington 
1999; Sen 1999; Ribot 2014). I argue that the complex and non-linear citizen-state relations, 
rather than the hazards themselves, produce the most damage precisely because they shape 
access to the physical, social and political protections that structure vulnerability outcomes. 
These relations also shape responses to risk and govern access to resources that could facilitate 
adaptation (or maladaptation).  
This dissertation interrogates the relation between people and government through 
political clientelism, which is an underexamined causal factor of vulnerability. Political 
clientelism or simply clientelism is a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals or 
groups of unequal standing that mediates selective and temporary access to resources like goods, 
food stuffs, or jobs (Roniger 2004). With the exception of Nelson and Finan (2009) and Kenny 
(2002) who show that the policy programs designed to mitigate drought in Northeastern Brazil 
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actually contribute to underlying vulnerabilities because of the persistence of patron-client 
relations, clientelism is given little attention in the vulnerability literature.   
Clientelism has, however, received a lot of attention in the political science literature (see 
Roniger 2004; Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2009, 2011). James C. Scott’s 1972 article, in which he 
posits that the key characteristic of clientelism is reciprocity, forms the cornerstone of early 
scholarship on patron-client relations. The patron uses his influence and power to provide 
protection and benefits to the client and the client, in turn, supports the patron. While Scott 
(1972) views clientelism as a social security system, in later decades, political scientists drew our 
attention to how it linked the poor masses with political elites (De la Torre 1992 and 1998; 
Stokes 2005) and how it has become a form of social and political control (Fox 1994). With the 
exception of Scott (1972), what this literature had in common prior to the 2000s, was the belief 
that patron-client relationships would eventually disappear as democracy was established, 
reestablished or consolidated, particularly in the Global South. While few scholars such as Scott 
(1972), who argues that clientelism serves positive functions, like a social security system built 
on a moral economy,  much of the political science scholarship portrays clientelism in a negative 
light (Orac and Rinne 2000). In addition to its portrayal as something negative, it was also 
conceptualized as “an archaic phenomenon particular to traditional and agrarian settings” 
(Roniger 2004: 4). 
But research has shown that clientelism is not an outmoded political mechanism. In fact, 
it thrives under contemporary democracies (Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2009, 2011; Hicken 2011). 
This is because, according to Gay (1990: 654), clientelism is a mechanism that “is tailored to the 
very structure of society itself.” Hence, I contend that we must first understand the relation 
between people and government and how clientelism plays into this relation, if we are to 
understand the causal factors that shape vulnerability. Without examining clientelism or 
patronage politics as a key political-economic and social process, any analysis of vulnerability in 
Santa Fe will be incomplete. The central contribution of this dissertation lies in the 
conceptualization of clientelism as an access-granting institution – one which shifts and adapts to 
social and political-economic conditions because of its ability to provide access to goods and 
services. Following Agrawal’s (2008: 5) definition of institutions as mechanisms that “structure 
and shape outcomes through the actions of individuals and decision makers associated with 
them,” I argue that it is this access-granting ability that makes clientelism a successful institution 
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in configuring and reconfiguring to different societal conditions. Crucially, then, access is 
essential in that it allows the individuals and decision makers associated with clientelism to first 
recognize needs and then the benefit from the goods and services they provide to meet those 
needs. Access theory, which explains the ability of people to benefit from things, provides 
broader empirical analytic of what people are able to obtain and use (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
The access to good and resources – mediated by political brokers with rules and social relations 
that protect some actors and subordinate others – create unequal power relations that often result 
in increasing stress on those who are already vulnerable (Ribot 2014).  
By framing vulnerability as a question of access to material benefits and social and 
political protections and situating it within wider debates on political clientelism, this dissertation 
makes a major contribution to the literature on vulnerability. Adger (2006: 270) argues that 
“Vulnerability is the result of processes in which humans actively engage and which they can 
almost always prevent.” But embedded power asymmetries, a lack of representation, and the 
marginalizing tendencies of powerful interest groups play an important role in the production of 
vulnerability (Simon and Dooling 2013). I argue that the contingency of clientelist relations – the 
electoral strings attached that differentiate clientelism from other forms of political patronage – 
makes the reduction of vulnerability particularly difficult. Ribot (2014) argues that social 
protections have their own context-contingent causal chains. In the context of clientelism, 
Hicken (2011: 291) states that access to a good or service “on part of both the patron and the 
client is contingent on the reciprocal benefit by the other party or the credible promise of such a 
benefit” (see also Robinson and Verdier 2003; Roniger 2004). Hence, it is this contingency that 
shapes access to the resources not only to meet the clients’ needs, but the patrons’ needs for 
political dominance as well. On one hand, by shaping access to resources, the contingency of 
clientelist relations limits the choices available and constrain clients’ agency in making demands 
on government. On the other, that same contingency also helps cultivate affective ties between 
patrons and clients by allowing clients to rely on political brokers, the gatekeepers of access, 
when they have a problem.  
In contrast to the literature which conceptualizes clientelism as a social security system 
(Scott 1972), this dissertation shows that clientelism as an institution that reduces security by 
enabling government to get away with making small investments in neighborhoods without 
having to deal with the redistributive issues. Because the nature of clientelist relations – 
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recognizing needs and vulnerabilities and providing short-term temporary assistance – 
clientelism enables government actors to temporarily dull the pains of vulnerability without 
fixing the underlying causes. Clientelist relations shape security because people become 
embedded in an institution through which they can claim and receive support and assistance, but 
that same institution simultaneously limits the choices and protections available to them.
2
 There 
is a direct link between the increase in political competition and the growth of political 
partisanship, which reduces security through the making and remaking of political boundaries. 
This, in effect, makes clientelist relations less stable and “political flipping” – changing political 
party affiliation to adapt to the shifts in the political landscape – more prevalent. I also show that 
by obliging clients to give up some of their political rights in exchange for access to material 
benefits or jobs, clientelism limits the exercise of citizenship rights. Finally, it constrains clients’ 
agency to effectively hold politicians and political parties accountable for their behavior in 
office, and instead, leaves them accountable for their actions by politicians (Hicken 2011).  
Through clientelist relations, government actors gain the support of clients by offering a 
narrow set of palliative options, rather than undertaking the more politically difficult tasks of 
reallocating real investments in settlement and resettlement policies and in less-prominent 
infrastructure that could result in a more-equitable distribution of risk. That does not, however, 
extinguish people’s desire for the physical protections of infrastructure. In this dissertation, I 
show that even clients who do not receive the physical protections of infrastructure still believe it 
to be the most effective response to risk. To explain this, I draw on the exceedingly insightful 
analysis of Antonio Gramsci, who, while writing in the context of the Fascist regime in Italy, 
questioned why people were not voting for the communist party if it served their interests. 
Gramsci’s notion of contradictory consciousness is useful to explain how domination by elites in 
society required the consent of the masses (Gramsci 1971:12). First, by cultivating desires and 
“configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” within residents, government actors create a 
collective will – a kind of “buy in” that leads people towards the solutions desirable to the 
government – infrastructure – and limits the other choices available to them, such as relocation 
                                                          
2
 Indeed, the same can be argued for Scott’s (1972) peasants – they are made more vulnerable by a system that 
pretends to be taking care of them while extracting the surplus that they may have been able to invest in their own 
assets and security, and then only investing a small fraction of the extracted surplus back in the well-being of 
community. Scott’s positive reading of this system can easily be inverted. But, what the promise of security does do, 
as Scott observed, is to get peasants to accept the taxes (share cropping arrangements) through which they are 
exploited. It legitimates ‘government’. 
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(Li 2007: 5). Second, the visibility of the infrastructure solutions – as something that people can 
see, touch and experience – also promotes the material and discursive realignment of citizens’ 
needs and aspirations with those in power. Finally, since the state’s investment in infrastructure 
ostensibly goes towards protecting everyone, infrastructural solutions are viewed as the 
legitimate and most effective solution for risk reduction; this further reinforces the technocratic 
framing of risk. Meanwhile, clientelism allows government actors to pick up where infrastructure 
leaves off – by providing access to resources that temporarily dull the pains of vulnerability. 
 
1.3 Methods 
The main methods for this research were ethnographic and archival. This research was 
conducted over 24 months in the summer of 2010, and the academic years of 2011-12 and 2012-
13. The choice of my research site was initially motivated by a particular interest in urban 
disasters in Latin America. After conducting a desktop review of disasters in urban Argentina, 
Santa Fe stood out. But it was not only the two floods in the last decade that made the case of 
Santa Fe particularly intriguing. It was also the city’s historical and political conditions that 
made it an ideal site of inquiry to study vulnerability.  
First, Santa Fe has a long history of floods that dates back to the 1600s when the city was 
resettled due to flooding and erosion. State experts have long used infrastructure, such as 
embankments and pumping stations, to tackle problems of flooding. Second – and rather 
ironically – Santa Fe is home to Argentina’s foremost university for hydraulic engineering, the 
National University of the Litoral (UNL). I wondered how a city full of world class hydraulic 
engineers continuously suffer from severe flooding. Third, Argentina is a major site for research 
on political clientelism, but most research on the subject is conducted by political scientists and 
sociologists in or around Buenos Aires. Santa Fe, however, with its firmly-rooted clientelist 
practices, twenty-four years of one-party rule and economic crisis coupled with flood disasters, 
proves an attractive case from a political-economic point of view.  
After three months of preliminary dissertation research, my interests quickly crystallized 
into trying to understand the complex and multi-scalar interplay between the social, political and 
economic processes that interact to produce and reproduce vulnerability. Why are infrastructure 
projects routinely deployed if experience has shown that they fail to reduce vulnerability in the 
face of floods? Why does the government continue to rely primarily on infrastructure projects? 
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Why and how are local political actors and residents complicit in sanctioning them? How do 
residents, particularly the urban poor, experience floods?  How do they view risk? How do they 
experience clientelism? These are the questions with which I began.  
My first months grappling with these questions led me to quickly realize that conducting 
a household survey, which I initially set out to do, would not get at the complexity and depth that 
the study of vulnerability and the relations between government and people – particularly with 
respect to the sensitivity surrounding clientelist relations – required. I also recognized that 
conducting this research in Santa Fe would require moving beyond just one part of the city. 
Thus, the approach I adopted insists on interconnections between a variety of sites: the offices of 
bureaucrats, technocrats, consultants, and politicians, the hallways of the UNL, the municipal 
district offices, the embankments and pumping stations along them, project inaugurations, the 
provincial archives, vecinales (neighborhood associations), schools, churches, the vote-sorting 
floor of the provincial electoral commission, and four different neighborhoods in Santa Fe.  
These neighborhoods are separate, yet interlinked nodes in socially produced space that 
participate in and shape the discourses and materialities of risk and vulnerability (Hart 2004). My 
research method, then, became translocal, whereby I drew from a variety of different settings 
across the same city with no directly visible link, but whose narratives, practices and identities 
help constitute urban space as not just of separate localities, but also an interconnected whole 
(Ullberg 2013). In contrast to multisitedness, the principal characteristic of translocality is 
relationality or interaction across localities (Hannerz 2003). Translocality is typically associated 
with globally mediated processes that take place in multiple locations in a world system (Marcus 
1995). Following Ullberg (2013) in her study of urban flooding and memory in Santa Fe, I 
adapted translocality to the urban context of Santa Fe as it is extremely varied and complex, yet 
interconnected. As Ranganathan argues (2010: 16), “What you might lose from not having a 
prolonged, intimate engagement with any one village or city neighborhood, you gain from an 
examination of the trans-local movement and translation of particular objects, metaphors, and 
stories.” The different settings of my fieldwork are all located in the same city, but it is 
imperative, especially in the urban context, to be conscious of how a locality is defined and 
where the spatial boundaries to other localities are drawn (Ullberg 2013).  
My core methods involved open-ended and semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats, 
engineers, architects, social workers and other experts in their places of work and on their rounds 
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in the field; politicians in their party offices; and residents and vecinal representatives in their 
neighborhoods, locales and homes. I combined these methods with participant observation and 
archival research. I started at the level of state government. Through interviews at the Provincial 
Ministry of Water, Public Services and Environment, Ministry of Security, Ministry of the 
Government and State Reform, and Ministry of Social Development I acquainted myself with 
their institutional histories and the changes they underwent over time, but especially since the 
flood of 2003. A few of them had undergone two or three structural changes, while the Ministry 
of Security changed its name completely (from the Ministry of Civil Defense) and the Ministry 
of Government and State Reform was established only recently. This aided in identifying and 
later interviewing government officials from those institutions that were responsible for the flood 
and risk management of the city. I also noted their connections and collaborations with the 
municipal government, particularly in relation to flood risk mitigation projects and social 
assistance programs.  
Additionally, I made use of an office for social workers in the Ministry of Social 
Development. This proved to be an invaluable resource for gleaning the textual framing of work 
crews since about one third of the municipal work crews were also registered with this provincial 
ministry. While utilizing this office space, I noticed that many of the leaders of work crews 
whom I had interviewed were coming to the Ministry. They brought with them a list of their 
work crew members – ‘their people’ – so that they could obtain social assistance. Not only were 
they attempting to obtain an income from two different sources (the municipal and provincial 
governments), they were bypassing the social workers whose job it was to evaluate whether or 
not ‘their people’ were indeed in need of social assistance. Instead, the work crew leaders would 
arrive at the Ministry and immediately visit the office of a politically appointed official. Based 
on my observations, there was complicity between the work crew leaders and public officials. 
The officials need the work crew leaders to know the situation on the ground in the 
neighborhoods. And without the officials’ political weight, work crew leaders would not be able 
to have the clout of the people. They needed each other and their relationship was, indeed, 
mutually beneficial. My observations at the Ministry of Social Development were supplanted by 
personal interviews with work crew leaders and municipal government officials in order to 
develop a deeper account of the work crew program as well as the tenuous nature of social 
assistance.  
27 
 
I simultaneously began to hold interviews with municipal government officials and 
investigate the flood-related infrastructure projects and work crew program at the level of the 
local government and in four different neighborhoods. In particular, I established a relationship 
with the Director of the Municipal Office of Risk Management. He was one of the more 
interesting characters I met at the municipality. In the field of risk analysis which is inclined to 
view risk by way of probability and impact, his view of risk is far less probabilistic than his 
counterparts. With degrees in social development, urban hydrology and sustainable international 
development, he encouraged me to work against the divorce between theory and practice – to 
make sure that my dissertation was not ‘shelved’ among purely academic work. I found the 
Director’s advice refreshing. Further, he assisted me in leveraging access to government reports, 
maps and functionaries at the municipality. He also invited me to municipal drainage project 
inaugurations, school tours of the city’s flood protection system, and neighborhood visits to 
distribute the city’s contingency plans – the latter two being part of their risk communication 
program.  
After interviews with government officials and a review of government flood maps and 
data, I selected four neighborhoods based on the following determination: (i) one neighborhood 
that was affected only by the 2003 flood; (ii) one neighborhood that was affected by both the 
2003 and 2007 floods; (iii) one neighborhood that was affected only by the 2007 flood; and (iv) 
one neighborhood that was not affected by either flood. In that order, these neighborhoods, 
shown in Figure 1, are: Centenario, Santa Rosa, Los Angeles, and Candioti Sur. Not only did 
this method give me four spatially separate neighborhoods with different experiences of flooding 
and infrastructure development, but it also provided an interesting socio-economic mix. 
Cenentario’s population ranged from poor to middle class; Santa Rosa’s inhabitants were some 
of the poorest in the city; residents of Los Angeles were largely lower middle class; and Candioti 
Sur comprised middle-to-upper income residents. Additionally, each neighborhood has very 
different social, historical, political and economic contexts (Hannerz 2003).  
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Figure 1. Map of Santa Fe showing neighborhood field sites in yellow. Source: Author (using 
2011 data from Municipality of the City of Santa Fe) 2015.  
 
Coincidently all four neighborhoods are located at the city’s southern, eastern, western 
and northern peripheries. The more I delved into my fieldwork the more I discovered that the 
majority of municipal funds are actually directed at the city’s peripheries where flood problems 
are frequent. At first glance, this is due to proximity to the rivers, a lack of drainage 
infrastructure, or a combination of the two. Furthermore, I found that the problems of flooding 
came to a head at the peripheries because of a discourse of invisibility that both citizens and state 
agents invoked, particularly surrounding stormwater infrastructure. These four neighborhoods 
provide insights into the framing of risk and proximity to water results in a sanctioned set of 
infrastructural solutions. The peripheries of the city are also where urbanization is ongoing – 
where the city’s future is being forged. It is also here, as Ranganathan argues (2010: 4) “where 
various agents with historical relationships to land are attempting to collectively engage state 
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authorities to negotiate their belonging in the city” – a belonging that would entitle them to 
protections from risk. Citizens use infrastructure to discursively designate belonging such that if 
they are not serviced with the much-needed drainage infrastructure, they feel invisible and 
neglected by the government.  
By exploring each neighborhood’s different social, historical, political, economic and 
infrastructural contexts, I was able to analyze how different places, experiences and statuses 
shape how people identify and understand vulnerability, the actuality of loss, the capacity to 
recover, and the ability to access resources. Interviews of neighborhood residents, in particular, 
show culturally and historically informed understandings of risk and of vulnerability, based on 
struggles, anxieties and stances towards the state. Through repeat visits over several months, I 
was able to develop an ethnographic presence and enough familiarity with municipal government 
employees and residents that they tolerated my questions and curiosities. People began to know 
me as the yanqui
3
 and I quickly became a familiar face in the neighborhood locales. On dozens 
of occasions, I attended neighborhood association meetings as a participant observer, engaging in 
casual conversation with the attendees about their civic concerns and their political strategies. I 
relied on participant observation to listen to my interlocutors’ recount stories of floods, 
neighborhood development and local, provincial and national (and sometimes international) 
politics as well as to participate in their daily and ritual practices. On two separate occasions, 
residents gave me their diaries or written accounts of the flood of 2003 because they could not 
bear the emotional consequences of talking and, thus, reliving it.   
I carried out a total of 80 semi-structured interviews with government officials, private 
consultants, politicians and civil society organization leaders, and 50 open-ended interviews with 
interlocutors in the four neighborhoods. In addition, I engaged in dozens of informal 
conversations with interlocutors from various social categories of class, gender, age and 
profession. I accompanied many of them – usually by foot – as they went about their daily 
activities during which I listened to their stories about different experiences and places. I also 
followed government experts to observe the embankments, pumping stations and stormwater 
drainage projects. I ultimately walked the city a lot, moving frequently from one location to 
another, so I was as much translocal as the field was (Ullberg 2013).  
                                                          
3
 Yanqui is the Argentine Spanish spelling for Yankee meaning a North American.  
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Bankoff (2003: 3) argues that there is a “greater realization of the sequence of events that 
can turn a physical phenomenon into a social crisis, an implied thought seldom explicitly stated 
appreciation of the necessity for a historical perspective.” Following Bankoff (2003) this 
dissertation takes a historical approach for which archival research was critical. This research 
allowed me to trace the city’s expansion over the last century. Figure 2 shows Santa Fe’s 
expansion from the colonial core to the immediate northeast, then to the south, the west and 
finally to the north. As the city expanded towards the rivers, floods began to pose even greater 
risk, as did the political risk of not taking action to protect citizens against flooding. This meant 
that city officials had to respond to the demands of more, safer land of which there was relatively 
little. Hence, the latest expansion northwards.  
I undertook this research at the Provincial Archives of Santa Fe as well as at the archives 
of the local newspaper, El Litoral. I supplemented my archival work with newspaper accounts, 
government documents, reports and policy statements collected the internet. I used both an audio 
recorder to record most interviews and a camera to document key observations. I also took notes 
during interviews and wrote field note reflections after. I used tape analysis to write detailed 
notes and identify key themes and quotations from relevant parts of interviews where meaning 
was most powerful. Before turning to an outline of the remainder of the dissertation, it is 
important to briefly review the modern political-economic history of Argentina. 
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Figure 2. Santa Fe’s expansion from 1884 to 2005. Source: Bacchiega, Bertoni and Maza 2005b. 
 
1.4 Through Crisis and Recovery: A Synoptic History of Argentina  
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, Argentina was one of the most prosperous countries in the 
world. In terms of human development, it is considered to be one of the most developed 
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countries in Latin America, illustrated by a large middle class, a social welfare system that 
includes compulsory and free education, and a strong civil society (Ullberg 2013). Argentina’s 
urbanization rates rivaled those of European countries in the mid-1900s (Hays-Mitchell adn 
Godfrey 2012). With its heavily European ethnic heritage and urban traditions, Argentina is 
viewed as a “civilized society” – a notion that can be traced back to “the state-led ideal from the 
times of modern formation in the late 19
th
 century” (Ullberg 2013: 38). Through literature, wars, 
the media and politics, the country has been imagined and reimagined by statemen and 
intellectuals alike. For instance, the book, Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism, written in 1845 
by Domingo Sarmiento, who later became the seventh president of Argentina, defined the 
parameters for thinking about development, modernization, culture and power. Indeed, the book 
became the driving force for development and became the cornerstone on which “modern” 
Argentina, after several wars, was built. Sarmiento’s dichotomy between the “civilizing” 
influence of the city and the “barbaric” nature of the countryside still permeates the social 
imaginary.  
Until the mid-20
th
 century, Argentina continued to be a prosperous nation at the forefront 
of development primarily due to its agro-exports of wheat and grains to Europe and the United 
States. US policy restricted Argentina’s growth during the rule of Juan Domingo Perón from 
1945 to 1955, which served as the impetus for Perón’s goal of economic independence. Perón’s 
record investments in the nation’s infrastructure continued to modernize Argentina. Perón along 
with his wife, Evita, made great advances in Argentina’s social policy, including housing, 
education, medical care, social security and worker’s pay. But, Perón made a lot of enemies in 
the process, particularly those opposed to the labor movement. In 1955, Argentina witnessed one 
of its most extreme cases of political polarization, which sent Perón into exile. In years that 
followed, a military regime took over and continued until 1983. During the dictatorial rule of the 
country between 1976 and 1983, the military government in power began what was called the 
“National Reorganization Process” (identified in Spanish by the acronym PRN). During this 
period of state terrorism, “military task units were in charge of forced disappearances, torture, 
illegal execution, and appropriation of children born to mothers imprisoned” in illegal detention 
centers (Ullberg 2013: 34). Furthermore, the military government wreaked havoc on the 
economy, completely reversing Perón’s movements towards economic independence. Rather, the 
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military government’s mismanagement of the economy resulted in increased indebtedness and 
the eventual hyperinflation of the late 1980s.  
When the global economy went into recession in the 1980s, Argentina suffered a massive 
debt crisis. To help ameliorate the financial crisis, the IMF stepped in and imposed policies for 
macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization of state enterprises under the 
Washington Consensus in the 1990s. These structural adjustment policies led to a sharp increase 
in un- and under-employment rates
4
 and caused more pronounced socio-economic inequalities, 
on top of the existing inequalities inherited from colonialism (Acuña 1994; Ullberg 2013). 
Paralleling the debt crisis of the 1980s, Argentina experienced explosive rates of urbanization in 
conjunction with substantial rural-to-urban migration, resulting in the enormous growth of cities. 
But the pace of urbanization greatly exceeded urban industrialization processes. Moreover, the 
IMF-imposed policies, notably the opening of the market to international trade, resulted in 
changes in the national labor market. There was marked growth in the informal sector, a decrease 
in full-time jobs, an increase in service jobs, and a reduction of manufacturing industry jobs 
(Sternberg 2012; Beccaria and Lopez 1997). 
President Carlos Menem, who served from 1989 to 1999, pursued an economic 
liberalization policy, which led to financial breakdown of Argentina in 1998. The ensuing 
political and economic crisis generated social upheaval, including street riots and a run on the 
banks. The economic crisis came to a head in 2001 when the state attempted to counter the 
draining of the banking system by freezing accounts and imposing a monthly limit on bank 
withdraws, known as the “corralito” or “corral.” Amidst riots, President De La Rua was forced 
to resign and flee the presidential palace by helicopter in December 2001. Three other presidents 
followed De La Rua in quick succession before the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde became interim 
president in 2002 (Sternberg 2012). Still, the problems inherited were severe and the economy 
was in ruins. In stark contrast to the Argentina at the turn of the 20
th
 century, the Argentina at the 
turn of the 21
st
 century was flailing. In 2002, more than half of the population was considered to 
be below the poverty line (Novick, Lengyel and Sarabia 2009:246). In 2003, President Nestor 
                                                          
4
 Santa Fe suffered extremely high un- and under-employment rates. According to the Provincial Institute of 
Statistics and Census
4
 (IPEC), in 2010 the poverty rate in Santa Fe was at 13.4 percent and with extreme poverty at 
2.6 percent. These numbers show marked improvement since the post-2003 disaster period when almost 41 percent 
of the population was living in poverty and 17.1 percent in extreme poverty (IPEC 2012). Unemployment after the 
2003 flood was at 17.1 percent. In the last quarter of 2010 decreased to 8.8 percent and dropped only slightly to 8.1 
percent in 2013. 
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Kirchner was elected. Kirchner’s presidency began a period of economic and social stability that 
showed that Argentina was slowly recovering from the 2001 crisis. Nestor Kirchner died 
unexpected in 2010 and was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández who, in 2011, won a 
landslide re-election with 54 percent of the votes, the widest margin of victory in a presidential 
election since the return of democracy in 1983 (Ullberg 2013). The Kirchner government, with 
its roots in Peronism, has enjoyed strong support but not without a growing opposition (known as 
“anti-Kirchnerism or anti-K.”’  
Despite federalism being the cornerstone of the Argentine political system, the provinces 
are heavily dependent on the central government funding. Since 2003, the federal government 
led by the Kirchners has enjoyed political support in more than 50 percent of Argentina’s 23 
provinces ruled by governors who support the Kirchner faction of the Peronist Party (Ullberg 
2013). The province of Santa Fe presents an interesting case to study political alignments and 
realignments in relation to fiscal federalism. The province was ruled by 24 years of Peronist 
governments since the return of democracy in 1983. Peronist Carlos Reutemann was governor 
during part of the construction of the famous western embankment and the flood of 2003 and his 
colleague, Peronist Jorge Obeid, who presided over the post-flood recovery, followed 
Reutemann as governor. Both were known for their investment in large-scale infrastructure, such 
as the embankments in the city of Santa Fe. Since 2007 when the Radical Party won municipal 
elections and the Socialist Party the provincial elections. As I show in the forthcoming chapters, 
the particular political structure and partisan configurations are crucial for analyzing citizen-state 
relations. The dynamic relations between people and government has largely shaped how risk is 
framed and perceived, the solutions that emerge from the framing, and crucially, how people 
construct their own vulnerability.  
 
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation consists of six interrelated chapters. The chapters, while highlighting 
specific themes in this research, follow the evolution of the city spatially and temporally, starting 
first with Santa Fe’s early urban history and the development Centenario in the extreme south 
(1910s), then moving northeasterly to Candioti Sur focusing on the modernist projects of Santa 
Fe’s Belle Epoque (1900-1920), followed by the growth of Santa Rosa in the western periphery, 
particularly during the heyday of Perón (1940s-60s), and finally, the city’s northward expansion 
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to the neighborhood of Los Angeles in the 1980s. While these neighborhoods are distinct, there 
are common intellectual, material and discursive threads as well as overarching narratives tying 
them together, and the dissertation as a whole is offered as an intervention into the debates on the 
framing of risk and the production and reproduction of vulnerability.    
I begin in Chapter 2, Risk and the Paradoxes of Infrastructure by narrating the 
history of Santa Fe’s colonial origins and development as a port city. This is a starting point that 
I find indispensable to understanding how contemporary urban planning and risk management 
articulate with the production and stratification of risk. Drawing on government records, 
newspaper articles, maps and other archival material, I historicize the development of the 
Centenario neighborhood, exploring the reasons for its foundation and for whom. I invoke the 
trope of the ‘extreme south’ to underscore that Centenario was as the very southern limits of the 
city, after which there was water. I then historicize the construction of three mega-infrastructure 
projects – the Irigoyen Embankment, the Mar-Argentino Avenue, and the Western Ring 
Road/Embankment – which played a crucial role in the growth of Santa Fe in general and the 
development of Centenario specifically.  
Not only did these projects define the modernity and ideology of the city, but they also 
allowed the city room for expansion, which leads, then, to what I call the paradox of risk. I show 
that although these projects aimed to reduce risk, they actually increased it, and in doing so, 
created an immoral hazard whereby the poor and lower class bear the brunt of human suffering. 
These infrastructure changed the context of risk in the neighborhood. By examining people’s 
actual experiences of infrastructure in Centenario, I show how infrastructure mediates residents’ 
views of risk and experience of disaster – not just as outcomes of natural systems, but in their 
different relations to infrastructure. I demonstrate how people, places, institutions and the natural 
environment are all woven together in their relation to infrastructure – on which different groups 
and different classes have a different vantage point and different degrees of security and of 
separation from the nature that infrastructure was built to tame. We will see that the paradox of 
risk is further reinforced by the paradox of the infrastructural fix, which examines the 
ideological, philosophical, and psychological reasons behind why people still believe 
infrastructure will protect them from flooding despite its proven fallibility – the continued and 
increasing damages associated with floods. This chapter sets the stage for the exploration of 
drainage infrastructure in Chapters 3 and 5.   
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In Chapter 3, Normalizing Discourses: Blaming the Victim in Modern Santa Fe, I 
examine the history of the politics of planning in Santa Fe. I explore how infrastructure 
development and planning practices, both materially and discursively, produce what people and 
places are “at risk.” I argue that in the fields of urban planning and infrastructure development, 
which were key elements in the modernist urban improvement project of Candioti Sur, the 
government assigned the poor to unsafe and marginal areas and rich to the safe areas while they 
assign infrastructure to the rich and not to the poor. In other words, they placed people vis-à-vis 
risky space and provided infrastructure in the interest of those who are already less at risk. This 
shows the non-neutrality of intervention and that government allocations are a cause of security 
and risks. It does not, however, show that infrastructure here does not improve someone’s 
security. 
Discourses blaming victims for choosing risky spaces, then, reinforced and normalized 
the uneven distribution of risk created in these two processes. Thus, the government produced 
risk subjects not only by allowing people to settle on low-lying land at risk of flooding, but also 
by convincing people that they chose their own exposure. Government agencies employed a 
discursive move to blame the victims, which clearly became a discursive production of risk 
subjects. Through discourse, then, government invested in the development of a neighborhood 
on higher ground, in the formation of ideal, modern subjects and affiliated them to expertise, 
while at the same time, they blamed those who settled on low-lying land as being inferior and 
having made bad decisions of their own. On the one hand the state does one thing but says 
another and people by and large believe what the state says. Hence, because people believe the 
discourse of government, risk appears natural and risk subjects responsible, rather than the state. 
As a result of the blaming the victim, the poor end up in a discursive realm that is shaped by the 
location of infrastructure with respect to the ‘at risk’ people and normalized so that their risk is 
made less visible and more acceptable.  
Following a linage of geographical scholarship that traces the causes of vulnerability to 
deeply historical and social factors, I explore the linkages between vulnerability and local 
politics. Much of the literature on vulnerability recognizes this relation is critical. But what is 
less clear is how the relation between people and government shapes vulnerability. In Chapter 4, 
People, Politics and the (Re)Production of Vulnerability, I interrogate this relation with 
respect to political clientelism. I focus on the neighborhood of Santa Rosa, which has long been a 
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prime electoral arena for politicians, the target of state-sponsored social programs and plans, and 
as such has generated incentives for politicians and their political parties to expand their 
influence. Most recently it has been the site of state-sponsored urban improvement projects, 
including street paving, the installation of sewers, and a land-titling project. Yet, despite these 
improvements, the people of Santa Rosa remain vulnerable in many ways – and exposure to 
flood risk is just one of them. Starting with the critical premise that like floods, like other 
physical hazards, are just one of the multiple causes of vulnerability, this chapter provides a 
broader understanding of vulnerability by situating it without wider debates on political 
clientelism. In doing so, I focus on the encounters between people and government in the 
exchange of goods, implementation of infrastructure projects and provision of public services. I 
conceptualize clientelism as an access-granting institution that recognizes the needs of the urban 
poor. The access to good and resources – mediated by political brokers – create social 
stratifications that result in increasing stress on those who are already vulnerable. Crucially, by 
demonstrating how clientelism limits the choices available and constrain residents’ agency in 
making demands on government, I frame vulnerability as a question of access to the material 
benefits as well as social and political protections structured and shaped by citizen-state 
relations. I conclude this chapter and pave the way for the next by explaining that as long as 
needs persist and as long as clientelism recognizes those needs, it will continue by reasserting its 
contingency in new ways.  
In Chapter 5, The Politics of Visibility: Stormwater Infrastructure, Vulnerability 
and Making Visible the Invisible, I turn to the articulations between urban reforms – 
specifically focusing on stormwater infrastructure – and the politics of the Radical Party. I 
theorize the changing role of infrastructure in the politics of visibility. I focus on stormwater 
infrastructure as both a set of materials and a discursive tactic of the Radical administration. In 
doing so, I conceptualize ‘invisibility’ not so much as a material reality, but rather as a discursive 
tactic to talk about drainage infrastructure as an important part of the fabric of the city. By 
bringing the attention to the discourse that labels stormwater drains as ‘invisible’ infrastructure, I 
demonstrate that invisibility is invoked to juxtapose this infrastructure from previous periods of 
‘monumental’ high-modern – and indeed more visible – infrastructure as well as to discursively 
draw a line between Peronist rule and Radical rule. Once the infrastructure is discursively 
labeled as ‘invisible,’ there emerges a political strategy to ‘visibilize’ it. I also show that citizens, 
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too, use the infrastructure to discursively designate belonging such that if they are not serviced 
with this ‘invisible’ yet much needed infrastructure, they, too, feel invisible and neglected by the 
government. What is significant about this case is the Radical’s main method for making the 
‘invisible’ seen: combining both democracy and political clientelism, they created a municipal 
program of work crews to deliver infrastructure.  
Chapter 6, Conclusions, summarizes the key arguments of the dissertation. It further 
discusses the policy and practical implications for vulnerability that emerge from this work.   
 
 
 
 39 
 
CHAPTER 2  
 
Risk and the Paradoxes of Infrastructure 
 
“Problems cannot be solved with the same kind of thinking that created them.”  
   (Albert Einstein) 
2.1 Introduction: Appreciating Risk 
 
The flood left us a message: 
Man has the capacity God gave 
But if you don’t learn to observe natural phenomena  
And give them the value that each has 
Without underestimating their strength 
You will have to suffer to learn 
 
Written by the late mother of one of my interlocutors, this poem provides a good starting 
point in looking at some of the central themes of this chapter. How do people view their 
environment? What have they learned from previous natural phenomena? This poem emphasizes 
the responsibility of “man” to appreciate risk and to do something about it. Natural phenomena, 
like floods, and the crises they are associated with, provide people with an opportunity to assess 
risk. It allows them to know there is a threat and to evaluate why and how they are at risk of 
damage. It is this vulnerability – this susceptibility to damage – that makes natural phenomena 
threatening. It transforms a natural event into a hazard and a hazard into disaster. Without 
vulnerability there would be no hazard – because people would not be susceptible to harm, 
damage or suffering. Without vulnerability there is no risk – because there would be no 
probability of a threat of damage, injury or suffering. Over the last forty years risk has become a 
common metric in the investigation of hazards, particularly with respect to the interface between 
people and nature (Wisner et al. 2004). Still, in risk analyses it is a struggle to bring attention to 
the social and political production and reproduction of risk (Ribot 2014). At what point do we 
move from questioning the naturalness of a hazard to asking how we are implicit in the 
unnaturalness of a disaster? When, as the poem implies, is the responsibility for knowing and 
preparing entirely human and social?   
Society has agency in the production of disasters. Through our actions and inactions, we 
create risk and make decisions that often have the unintended consequence of exacerbating risk 
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and thus increasing vulnerability (see White 1945; Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2004). 
Treating risk – technologically, physically and discursively – can change vulnerability outcomes. 
As illustrated by the case of Santa Fe, the predominant way society treats flood risk is through 
infrastructure – the physical and organizational structures and facilities like buildings, roads, 
power, telecommunications, water needed for the operation of a society (Oxford English 
Dictionary 2015). They use infrastructure to mitigate risk, which as I demonstrate, then create 
new risks (i.e. when embankments fail). But risk mitigation, although it can help prevent 
damages, is not the same as reducing vulnerability. Vulnerability, as Ribot (2014: 696) asserts, 
“resides in the pre-hazard precarity of people.” Infrastructure are powerful risk-mitigating 
technologies that are “simultaneously celebrated and feared [because] they carry with them at 
one and the same time the promise of a glorious future and the threat of a catastrophic end” 
(Braun and Whatmore 2010: xxi-xxii). Because of their ability to wield – often quite visibly – 
state power, people focus on infrastructure’s “promise of a glorious future” rather than “a 
catastrophic end” (ibid). Crucially, infrastructure have a powerful ideological, rational and 
psychological hold on how political officials, technocrats, residents and the media, which shapes 
how they perceive and frame flood risk and the solutions that they propose. This framing, which 
situates risk in the hazards (the rivers and the sky) has positioned nature and infrastructure 
against each other, such that infrastructure has over time mediated the way that residents view 
risk.  
Gilbert White (1975: xviii) argued that flood control infrastructure “…will be of little 
value if the reduction in damages that they accomplish is more than offset by new damage 
potential resulting from additional development in floodplains.” Following White (1975), I 
examine the effects of infrastructure on society – not only how it physically transforms the 
landscape, but also influences beliefs and behaviors “by giving sense to things and by 
legitimizing actions” (Rebotier 2012: 392). While infrastructure are the physical manifestations 
of social, political and economic systems, they are not just material. By centering the analytical 
focus on how infrastructure are powerful social, discursive and affective agents, I show that 
infrastructure is not only an outcome of how society treats risk, but a complex and dynamic 
causal factor as well. Infrastructure both produce and are produced by people’s notions of risk as 
well as their conceptions of nature, social order, and the organization of community (Garcia-
Acosta 2002: 58). Thus, we need to interrogate the role of infrastructure to understand the 
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dynamics and interconnections between the natural and the human, the social and the spatial, and 
the political and the economic.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how people, places, institutions and the natural 
environment are all woven together in their relation to infrastructure – on which different groups 
and different classes have a different vantage point and different degrees of security and of 
separation from the nature that infrastructure was built to tame. I develop two paradoxes 
surrounding infrastructure: the paradox of risk and the paradox of the infrastructural fix. These 
paradoxes, though separate, work in conjunction to show how infrastructure unevenly distributes 
risk onto the city’s poor and most vulnerable and that even despite their suffering due to the 
failures of infrastructure, they still believe infrastructure will protect them from floods. I show 
how inequalities in society are mediated by risk, understandings of risk, and management of risk. 
I provide insight into how infrastructure mediates residents’ views of risk and experience of 
disaster – not just as outcomes of natural systems, but in their different responses to 
infrastructure.  
Following Bankoff (2002: 3), who argues for the “necessity for a historical perspective,” 
I historicize the infrastructure projects built in and around the Centenario neighborhood of Santa 
Fe. By examining people’s actual experiences of infrastructure and their effects on the people 
who directly experience them, I show how infrastructure have changed the context of risk. When 
the context of risk changed through infrastructure, it allowed the neighborhood to break with its 
flood-prone past. Residents no longer faced nature, but instead face infrastructure (and each 
other through or with respect to infrastructure), which had a profound effect on the built 
environment as well as the affective effect on their sense of security and belonging – part of the 
larger city. In a very real sense, then, the neighborhood’s transformation through infrastructure 
not only redefined notions of risk, it also reconfigured the boundaries of belonging. I further 
discuss the relation between politics and the production of the affective relation of people to 
infrastructure in Chapter 5.  
 In what follows, I divide my discussion of risk and infrastructure into four sections. The 
first section traces the origins of Santa Fe from the colonial period through the founding and 
development of the neighborhood of Centenario in the “extreme south” of the city. I explore the 
reasons behind the neighborhood’s founding and for whom it was founded. Section 2 details the 
construction of three mega-infrastructure projects around Centenario. By showcasing these 
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infrastructure projects, I emphasize that, in contrast to the North American context where natural 
hazard risk is normally a low priority issue that gets overlooked politically, floods and flood risk 
have long been important political issues. Here I examine the paradox of risk created by the three 
infrastructure – that although they aimed to reduce risk, they actually increased it. By arguing 
that risk was increased primarily for the poor and lower classes, I add nuance to this paradox, 
which was first identified by geographer Gilbert White in the 1930s. The paradox results in what 
I call an immoral hazard whereby the poor and lower class bear disproportionate harm from the 
failures of infrastructure to reduce risk. In Section 4, I investigate the changing context of risk in 
Centenario and how it led to the loss of a crucial adaptation strategy– lacustrine houses elevated 
on piles. I narrate the story of the flood of 2003, highlighting the suffering and loss it caused, and 
how it was made more pronounced discursively through the disinformation; I argue that this 
resulted in another immoral hazard. Section 5 develops a theoretical perspective to help explain 
the paradox of the infrastructural fix or why, despite the failures of infrastructure, people still 
believe it will protect them from flooding.  
 
2.2 An Urban History of Santa Fe’s Extreme South 
In order to trace the origins of the uneven geography of risk and infrastructure, the 
present-day town of Cayastá is a necessary starting point. Early in 1573, Juan de Garay set out 
from the town of Asunción, capital city of the then Governorate of Paraguay-Río de la Plata 
within the Viceroyalty of Peru. On November 15, 1573, Garay stopped at an outlet of the Paraná 
tributary known as the Quiloazas River (present day San Javier River) to found the new town of 
Santa Fe. Garay planned the town in accordance with the Spanish Law of the Indies, which 
dictated the number of streets – usually 12 – built on a grid colonial towns could have built on a 
regular grid as well as the size of the central plaza (plaza mayor). Hunting and fishing 
opportunities were abundant and land was fertile for agriculture, but several problems including 
the lack of adequate highway communications, attacks by indigenous tribes and, most of all, 
erosion and flooding, posed a threat to the continuity of the town. When the Paraná River 
flooded, Santa Fe became isolated from trade and commerce for extended periods of time. One 
hundred years later, these ongoing challenges prompted the town council to take drastic 
measures – move the entire settlement to a safer place. The decision to relocate the city was not 
easy. Such action need approval by the Spanish Crown – and after several years of proffering, 
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the Crown finally agreed (Ullberg 2013). The town council identified a new site, located 80 
kilometers southwest between the Salado and Paraná Rivers, as most favorable for resettlement 
(Cervera 1908: 376). In 1660, 10 years after the decision to relocate was made, Santa Fe was 
founded in its new location. Despite the move, there was virtually no difference in the colonial 
town plan: new Santa Fe maintained its 12 streets built on a grid pattern with the central plaza in 
the middle. But while the town council took elevation into account in the resettlement decision, 
they failed to consider whether the city had sufficient space for expansion. They were more 
interested in how the rivers that flanked their new city could act as buffers against attacks by 
indigenous tribes rather than threats. Ironically, new Santa Fe would be overrun by the very 
rivers its founders hoped would protect them. 
For nearly 120 years, Santa Fe served as a Puerto Preciso
1
 which required all vessels 
navigating the Paraná River to register and pay royalties. During this time, Santa Fe experienced 
a period of sustained growth, that is, until 1780 when the cancelation of the port privilege led to a 
decline in economic activity and slow population growth. In the mid-nineteenth century the city 
was home to only 7,000 inhabitants who were concentrated around the eleven-by-six-block 
central district (Wolansky 2003). But in 1860 the agricultural development of the country trigged 
the increase in fluvial transport channels. A new, deep-water port in the neighboring town of 
Colastiné was created, which was connected to Santa Fe via rail. But constant flooding in 
Colastiné and an increase of international trade prompted the construction of a new port in the 
location used during colonial times. The new port
2
 – the third to be constructed in three centuries 
– was equipped with large warehouses, machinery and paved roads which facilitated the 
development of railway transport. In 1905, due to the overbank flow from the Paraná River, “The 
Great Flood,” as it was called, from the halted the construction of the port. Not only did the 
water levels of the river reach a record 7.83 meters – an elevation that has not been surpassed – 
“The Great Flood” also left the entire urban core underwater (Wolansky et al. 2003).3 In 
                                                          
1
 Puerto Preciso was a Spanish Colonial institution consisted of the privilege given by the Spanish Crown to certain 
port towns to charge taxes on all passing ships.  
2
 A project for the construction of a “new port” is in the works. “The Port Modernization Project” will site the new 
port farther southeast of Santa Fe directly on the Paraná River. The Port Authority argues that the new site will allow 
deep water ships to reach Santa Fe, which is something that they cannot do where the port is currently located.  
3
 “The Great Flood” of 1905 was arguably the most well documented flood in the history of Santa Fe prior to that of 
2003 thanks to the photographs of by Austrian immigrant Augusto Lutsch. But because Lutsch depicted only the 
wealthy families and upper class spaces like the Plaza España, his photos stand in stark contrast to the images of the 
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response to the flood, then Mayor Irigoyen decided to raise the ground around the port, making it 
one of the highest elevations of the city with real estate values even greater than today’s 
(Wolansky et al. 2003; Viand and González 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Great Flood of 1905. On left, a view from Rivadavia Street of the future home of 
the port. On right, Men in canoes on Rivadavia Street. Source: Provincial Archives of Santa Fe. 
 
Santa Fe was, after all, a port city, whose commercial activity was intimately linked to 
the river. The economic boom generated by the port in the early 1900s laid the foundation for the 
development of the city’s industrial base. While the railroad attracted mainly skilled European 
immigrants, the port and agricultural activities required little to no specialized labor. The day 
laborers, stevedores, longshoremen, cart drivers, and fishermen could not afford to rent or buy 
property in the colonial core or in the new modern neighborhood of Candioti Sur that catered to 
skilled, middle class workers. Many of these “peons” (day laborers or unskilled farm workers) 
came from other parts of the province or peripheral parts of the city, like Alto Verde, after 
having been displaced by the construction of the port started in 1905. In fact, the construction of 
the new port left many residents of the nearby town of Colastine unemployed, for it had been 
home to the old port of Santa Fe since the 1860s. Colastine’s economic collapse, coupled with a 
series of floods, caused a wave of migration to Santa Fe where these new migrants could find 
jobs with the newly built deep-water port. In addition, Italian, Spanish and French immigrants 
flooded the city with hope of gainful employment. The question for the city was where to house 
the low-skilled migrants. Since city officials discouraged unskilled and lower class workers from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2003 – the majority of which were taken of the poorest and most vulnerable – notably those residents fleeing the 
neighborhoods of the western peripheries. 
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living in the up-and-coming neighborhood of Candioti Sur (see Chapter 3), they deemed it 
necessary to develop a neighborhood with affordable housing near the city center where lower 
class workers could easily access their employment at the port and in government buildings. In 
1910, through Ordinance No. 1092, the municipal government founded the Centenario
4
 
neighborhood in the middle of the floodplain, yet close enough to the urban core. This area was 
referred to as the “extremo sur” or extreme south of the city.  
 
 
Figure 4. 1907 Plan of Santa Fe showing density by block and the designated land for the 
development of Centenario. Source: Martinez 1907, Municipal Census of Santa Fe.  
 
                                                          
4
 It was named Centenario for the Revolución de Mayo which took place 100 years prior. 
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City administrators extended Santa Fe’s southern boundaries in order to facilitate 
development in Centenario. The original subdivision plans for the neighborhood were mindful of 
the limits posed by “the insurmountable geographic factors such as the rivers that surround it” 
(Valentinuzzi 1991: 47). Indeed, Centenario was surrounded by water on all sides but one, giving 
it a peninsular shape. The impact of the city’s southward expansion was significant. The state 
inscribed itself on the natural environment, thereby placing the burden of flood risk precisely on 
the people whose livelihoods depended on water: the port workers and farming families whose 
labor had already conditioned them to “getting wet.” These were the people who were 
considered “used to” living with water. Early inhabitants’ livelihoods were enmeshed in the 
rivers – either through their work at the port or through agriculture. They lived by the rivers’ 
ebbs and flows, which provided them with unparalleled knowledge of the natural environment as 
well as well-fertilized land for growing crops which they peddled or sold at large to the 
government for livestock fodder.   
 
 
Figure 5. Map showing the urbanization of Centenario 1900 versus 1910. Source: Valentinuzzi 
1991.   
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Throughout the early 1900s, residents were constantly reminded that theirs is a land that 
“belonged to the rivers” – a sentiment echoed by current residents since the flood of 2003. 
Settling on the wetlands at the junction of the tributaries of the Salado and Paraná Rivers meant 
that residents would not only have to adapt their livelihoods to the fluvial environment, but that 
they would have to adapt their houses as well. Following Bankoff’s (2003:164) argument that 
“architecture offers a unique means of examining the human-environment interchange,” it was 
precisely residents’ architectural form that reflected a profound understanding of the fluvial 
environment. To adapt to the periodic rise in the rivers, early residents built lacustrine houses 
(lake houses) that were elevated on piles. Local historian Valentinuzzi (1991:48) describes these 
houses as a testament to the “ingenuity and industriousness of coastal residents facing nature.” 
Today only one house of its kind remains in Centenario, which residents claim would have 
served them well in the flood of 2003. In fact, current residents lament the loss of this type of 
adaptation since subsequent architectural styles were built to conform to the rest of the city and 
disregarded the risk of very fluvial environment in which they lived. The consequences of 
abandoning this type of successful adaptation were particularly dire in the 2003 flood.  
 
 
Figure 6. Lacustrine-style houses in Centenario circa 1910. Source: Valentinuzzi 1991.  
 
Centenario grew slowly and without government intervention beyond the initial 
subdivisions in 1910. Until the mid-twentieth century, it had no paved roads, waste collection, or 
clinics. Valentinuzzi (1991:69) asserts, “There was no planning or assistance in any form…there 
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were not even defenses against the river which periodically took possession of the 
neighborhood.” With lack of investment in infrastructure and urban services coupled with the 
constant flooding by the Paraná River, it is not difficult to ascertain why the neighborhood 
remained sparsely populated for decades after its founding. Capital flows from the public and 
private sectors gravitated disproportionately towards the city’s eastern zone, where the city’s 
middle class were concentrated on higher ground. Nonetheless, Centenario’s location at the 
city’s ‘extreme south’ made it strategically important for transportation connectivity. There, at 
the southernmost tip, Centenario literally served as the gateway to Santa Fe from the south. Thus, 
the construction of mega-infrastructure projects like highways and bridges around it became a 
fundamental part of its coming into being. Such projects aimed to connect and consolidate the 
city as well as to make flooding “a recurrent phenomenon of the past” (Valentinuzzi 1991: 159). 
But the decisions to intervene on land that “belonged to the rivers” created two paradoxes which 
I discuss in the sections that follow. The first, the paradox of risk, is well known and documented 
among geographers. Its premise is that in attempting to reduce risk, the state actually increases it. 
The second, which I call the paradox of the infrastructural fix, demonstrates that despite the 
fallibility of infrastructural fixes, citizens still believe that infrastructure will protect them.  
 
2.3 The Paradox of Risk and the Immoral Hazard 
As the city expanded south and west towards the rivers, floods began to pose even greater 
risk, as did the political risk of not taking action to protect citizens against flooding. This meant 
that city officials had to respond to the demands of more, safer land of which there was relatively 
little. Infrastructure projects, particularly large-scale infrastructure, allowed the city to grow in an 
unprecedented way. The rolling out of infrastructure projects, like the Irigoyen Embankment, the 
Mar-Argentino Avenue (Argentine Sea Avenue), and the Western Ring Road/Embankment, not 
only helped to defined the modernity and ideology of the city, but they also allowed the city 
room for expansion. These mega-infrastructure projects, which transformed nature, the rivers and 
their land into urban space, played a crucial role in the growth of Santa Fe in general and the 
development of Centenario specifically. They also demonstrate the paradox of risk – how 
infrastructure aimed at reducing risk has actually increased it. This paradoxical production of risk 
was first recognized by Gilbert White in the 1930s and has since been supported by empirical 
studies (see Burby 1985; Burby et al. 1991; Burby 2006).  
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What makes the paradox of risk particularly interesting in the case of Santa Fe is how it 
intersects with political processes to create what I call an immoral hazard. A moral hazard, 
according to Burby (2006: 9), is “an insurance term that refers to cases where the availability of 
insurance protection lowers an insured party’s incentive to avoid risk.” In the case of Santa Fe, 
however, the paradox of risk influences people’s behavior so that the poor and lower classes 
move into areas they think are secure, but are actually not. This results in an immoral hazard 
because the infrastructure creates a set of protections that redistribute risk, placing the burden of 
risk on the poor and lower classes – those with less voice. Hence, the immoral hazard transfers a 
disproportional burden of risk on to the poor and lower class, who inevitably bear the brunt of 
human suffering from the failures of the infrastructure meant to reduce risk.  
In the late 1930s, under the governorship of Manuel de Iriondo, the state began an 
infrastructure project that would result in the transformation of the entire south and west of Santa 
Fe. Although the construction of the Irigoyen Embankment was carried out under the guise of 
flood risk mitigation, the project had one overarching and highly political objective: land 
reclamation. With the continued influx of new urban migrants in the 1930s and 40s, the city was 
eager to gain land in response to the “real estate market’s demand” (Ullberg 2013:164). The 
Irigoyen Embankment “pushed the Salado River farther away and made room for the 
consolidation of the [western] neighborhoods Santa Rosa de Lima, San Lorenzo and Villa del 
Parque” (Dalla Fontana 2004: 29). The idea of building embankments or levees to gain more 
land where the growth in land values will justify (and pay for) them is not unique to Santa Fe. 
Noted geographer Gilbert White observed in 1975 that flood control works “…will be of little 
value if the reduction in damages that they accomplish is more than offset by new damage 
potential resulting from additional development in floodplains” (White, 1975, xviii). This 
potential was later demonstrated by Burby and French (1985), who found a positive correlation 
between the degree to which communities used flood control infrastructure “to limit their 
vulnerability to flooding and the amount of new development taking place in their flood hazard 
areas after the flood control works were completed” (Burby 2006: 6). This, Burby (2006) notes, 
created a moral hazard because it caused people to behave incautiously when some level of risk 
mitigation has been provided.  
Just as city administrators at the turn of the twentieth century extended the city’s 
boundaries to facilitate development in the extreme south, the intended effect of the Irigoyen 
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Embankment was indeed to facilitate yet more development in this hazardous area (Burby 2006). 
The embankment functioned as it was designed to. Dalla Fontana (2004: 29) writes that the 
Irigoyen Embankment “contained the periodic floods that the city of Santa Fe received.” 
However, it simultaneously encouraged the occupation and development of Salado River 
floodplain which had dire consequences for citizens. Important to mention here is that coinciding 
with the construction of the Irigoyen Embankment in 1939 was Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 
3864/39, which regulated developments and subdivisions. Although it is unclear whether the 
ordinance issued guidelines for the occupation of the floodplain, what is clear is that the city left 
this 1939 ordinance untouched for over forty years – the outcome of which was the continued the 
infilling
5
 and haphazard occupation of the floodplain. Viand and Gonzalez (2012: unpaginated) 
argue that the construction the embankment combined with the municipal ordinance generated “a 
false sense of security, since the land remained low and was easily flooded when it rained.” 
When the city got around to updating the ordinance in 1980, the Master Plan made no mention of 
how the city might actually enforce its zoning regulations or how it might recover from an 
extreme flood event (Viand and González 2012, unpaginated). Furthermore, the embankment 
itself posed an obstacle for water to drain back to the river, which resulted in the construction of 
more infrastructure including “drainage channels and water reservoirs” to solve problem of 
runoff (Ullberg 2013: 164). In the 1970s, four pumping stations were installed at different points 
along the embankment to siphon out water that accumulated within city limits.  
The second and third examples of the paradox of risk are two separate infrastructure 
projects that comprise Santa Fe’s ring road.6 In the late 1960s, the state began construction of a 
ring road around the extreme south of Santa Fe. Starting in the east by the port and looping 
around Centenario, they built the Mar Argentino Avenue. The objective of this project was to 
construct a highway that would provide a wider, safer and faster route around the city and act as 
a “definitive barrier” against flooding from the Paraná River (Valentinuzzi 1991). Thus, the state 
constructed the highway raised on an embankment made of compacted soil dredged from the 
Santa Fe River – a tributary of the Paraná River. Construction began in 1967 and after several 
delays and interruptions it was inaugurated in the early 1970s. For residents of Centenario, the 
                                                          
5
 Infilling here refers to a method of land reclamation that involves filling the area with large amounts of heavy rock 
then filling with clay and dirt until a desired elevation is reached.  
6
 These highway projects were designed by the Dirección Provincial de Vialidad (Provincial Highway Directorate).  
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Mar Argentino Avenue meant much needed relief from flooding. Rodolfo, one of Centenario’s 
elders told me, “Up until the time the Mar Argentino Avenue was built, we always ran the risk of 
flooding, especially due to the rise in the Paraná.”7 It was, for residents and state agents alike, the 
best solution to flooding that was available at the time. But the Mar Argentino Avenue failed to 
provide a definitive one. And, like the Irigoyen Embankment, it encouraged more people to 
move to Centenario.  
 The intended effect of the Mar Argentino Avenue was facilitate further development in 
Santa Fe’s extreme south by populating the Centenario neighborhood, where growth had been 
notably slow. In fact, in the 1970s and 1980s, Centenario experienced unprecedented population 
growth (Valentinuzzi 1991). People very much believed that the infrastructure would do what it 
was intended to do: make the area safe and “protect them” from flooding.8  The growth stimulus 
for Centenario was further augmented by the development of the FONAVI
9
, a public housing 
complex situated on an open stretch of land with sandy soils between Centenario and the western 
sector of the Mar Argentino Avenue. The FONAVI is made of twelve four-story postmodern 
monoblocks that span an area of 86,000 square meters. From an aerial view, the monoblocks of 
the FONAVI mark an obvious break from the hodgepodge of individual housing styles in 
Centenario.
10
 However, these mammoth structures could efficiently house far more people than a 
block of residential houses in the neighborhood. Not only did the FONAVI produce a very 
significant change in aspects of the built environment, it also produced some welcomed and 
unwelcomed social changes, as Benito explained:  
 
When we were young, the land that today belongs to the FONAVI was all sand so we 
would always play football there. When they started constructing buildings in 1979, 
everything changed. In 1982 they finished construction and people moved in. For us, the 
impact was significant because we went from not having any neighbors in front to having 
6,000 neighbors all of a sudden…Before only a few roads were paved, now they paved 
almost all our roads… it was a lot of progress all of a sudden. In three years we had three 
buses when before we didn’t even have one! There was a lot of movement. People would 
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 Interview on August 13, 2012.  
8
 Interview on August 30, 2012.  
9
 Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda or National Housing Fund is a state agency created in 1970 to combat the housing 
deficit and provide affordable housing for low-income residents.  
10
 Although the FONAVI comprises a separate neighborhood called San Geronimo according to the state’s 
bureaucratic mandate, residents refer to it as “FONAVI Centenario,” noting that while there is a distinct separation 
in the kind of housing it offers, residents still belong to Centenario. 
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come and go at all hours and cars that would pass too. The first few months it was 
difficult to sleep. We used to stand at our door just to watch all the movement. We’re 
used to it. It was like coming from the country to the big city (August 16, 2012). 
 
The FONAVI effectively brought an end to residents’ way of life which was more akin to 
a small community or village. At the same time, it resulted in neighborhood-level infrastructure 
development and service delivery. In the extreme south where the city dragged its feet in 
providing infrastructure, the city was suddenly paving roads and installing drains in connection 
with the construction of the FONAVI. Fernando, one of my interlocutors, told me that it used to 
take “years of struggle” demanding urban infrastructure and services in Centenario.11 He proudly 
noted that it was the perseverance and stewardship of residents that propelled the government to 
carry out urban infrastructure projects, particularly for drainage.  
The FONAVI provided another important underpinning for the continued development 
and occupation of the floodplain, which was orchestrated by the state to encourage the 
occupation of hazardous land. It is common practice that public housing projects are sited in 
hazardous areas, and this is not an exceptional case. The FONAVI was planned specifically for 
low income residents. Following the founding of Centenario for the ‘peons’ in 1910, the state 
again assigned the poor to live in the low-lying lands of the floodplain. There, at Santa Fe’s 
southernmost tip, the state built a public housing complex that provided all the features of 
(post)modern life for the lower class. And they were protected by a solid wall of defenses. 
Centenario was indubitably deemed safe for human occupancy. But the FONAVI accelerated 
urbanization and resulted in more impermeable surfaces. The neighborhood’s development 
became increasingly contingent upon more and more infrastructure. The Mar Argentino Avenue 
stopped water from the Paraná River from entering the neighborhood, but it also prevented 
runoff from exiting. So while infrastructure solved one problem, it created another one – it 
increased the risk of pluvial or rain-related flooding. In the early 1990s, the city installed storm 
water drains, but they too fell short of solving Centenario’s flood problems. As ever larger areas 
of the neighborhood were being developed at the expense of the fluvial environment – and this 
was especially pernicious for the urban poor who pushed to the very peripheries of Centenario 
which lacked any form of infrastructure and services – more and more infrastructure had to be 
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built to combat the compounded flood problems. This produced a situation whereby residents 
thus became increasingly vulnerable in the face of heavy rains, even though the infrastructure 
surrounding them was meant to reduce the risk of flooding.  
In the mid-1990s the state continued construction of the ring road northwards from 
Centenario along the city’s western periphery. This infrastructure is particularly crucial not only 
as an example of the paradox of risk, but also in demonstrating how politics (and political 
decision making) is more crucial in the actual genesis of flood risk. Instead of using the same 
method of construction as the Mar Argentino Avenue whereby they built the highway atop an 
embankment, state engineers designed the embankment running parallel to the highway. In fact, 
it was as if as if the embankment, which would protect the poorest and most populous 
neighborhoods of the western periphery, came as an afterthought to state engineers. The Western 
Ring Road/Embankment Project (Avenida de Circunvalación/Obra de Defensa de la Ciudad de 
Santa Fe)
 12
  began in 1994 and contemplated three sections. Section I included the construction 
of the first axis of the Ring Road to connect the Carretero Bridge at Centenario with the Santa 
Fe-Rosario Highway Bridge at the Barranquitas neighborhood. In reality, Section I was a 
reinforcement and extension of the Irigoyen Embankment. Section II included the construction 
of the highway and embankment from the Santa Fe-Rosario Highway Bridge to the Las Flores 
Hippodrome, but the embankment dropped off at Gorostiaga Street which leads to said 
hippodrome. Sections I and II, which were built simultaneously, were completed in 1997, and the 
project was inaugurated the same year, even before Section III was carried out. The timing was 
of the project’s inauguration was crucial; former Governor Carlos Reutemann, who began the 
project in 1994, needed something very prominent to run on his campaign for reelection in 1999. 
The Western Ring Road/Embankment project was just what Reutemann needed – it was the 
embodiment of the “phantasmagoria” of his first term in office.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Argentina was a member of the Coalition forces during the Gulf War of 1990-91 and sent a frigate to support 
Kuwaiti troops. In 1994 in return for Argentina’s support during the Gulf War, the Government of Kuwait issued a 
loan to Argentina to finance highway infrastructure development across the country and the Province of Santa Fe 
was the main recipient.  
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Figure 7. Map of Western Ring Road/Embankment Project showing the three sections. Source: 
Bacchiega, Bertoni and Maza 2005c.   
 
In 1998, a year after its inauguration, the state agency in charge of the project’s execution 
– the Provincial Highway Directorate or DPV – underwent some upheaval. During the staff 
turnover as part of a new administration, the new state engineers assigned to the project had little 
understanding of its incomplete status. In fact, even though the Western Ring Road/Embankment 
Project was under the province’s purview, they wrote to the Municipal Secretary of Hydraulic 
Works at the city for up-to-date information. The Municipal Secretary, who had been, for years, 
encouraging the DPV to take note of the extraordinary flood risk posed by the lack of closure of 
the embankment at Las Flores Hippodrome, responded to the new engineers’ query with a memo 
stating: “1) The hydraulic works are not at 100%; 2) the infrastructure in some cases do not 
respond to the technical guidelines established in the project; 3) the state of the works is the 
following: in some cases they are incomplete or poorly completed, in other cases, they have not 
been carried out.” He added, “It is clear that the hydraulic system functions only partially….” 
(Pais 2008: 113). It should be noted that this was not the first time the DPV-designed projects 
were poorly designed or constructed. In 1972 the DPV designed the Santa Fe-Rosario Highway 
Bridge with an insufficient span of 155 meters – a whole two meters less than the natural channel 
width of the Salado River, which is 157 meters. The bridge was destroyed by a flood a year later, 
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and subsequently rebuilt with the same insufficient span! In fact, the reconstructed bridge with 
same 155 meter span that caused its collapse in the 1973 flood contributed to the 2003 flood by 
acting like a dyke, which stopped the flow of water further downstream and forced it through the 
gap in the embankment (Bacchiega, Bertinoi and Maza 2005a).  
City officials were aware that the gap in the embankment stopped abruptly, leaving a gap 
of 15 meters between the end of the embankment and higher ground outside the Las Flores 
Hippodrome. They knew that unfinished infrastructure project put their city and citizens at 
increased risk of flooding. Yet, the DPV’s hands were tied. Six months after receiving the 
Municipal Secretary’s memo, the Director of the DPV responded stating that “there wasn’t any 
time to change anything [structural], the work had been completed, and the shortcomings remain 
in guarantee but without sanctions on the executing engineering firm for a lack of compliance” 
(Pais 2008: 114). Beyond Reutemann’s desire to inaugurate the project in preparation for his 
reelection campaign, the other reason why there “wasn’t any time to change anything” was 
because the DPV had to close out all of its ongoing projects. Effectively, the state had no more 
money to continue Section III. This was 1997 – at the height of the neoliberal era whereby the 
state was driven by the desire to have a zero deficit. State authorities at that time were in the 
process of privatizing several large public institutions (Banco Provincia, Dipos-Aguas) and 
needed to close out all mega-infrastructure projects that were in the works. Although the DPV 
was not privatized, the rush to a zero deficit meant that the embankment was left unfinished – a 
decision that would ultimately affect citizens’ vulnerability and carry weighty political 
repercussions. The project’s blueprints, however, did call for a “provisional” closure at the 15 
meter stretch of open space between the end of the embankment and the southwestern wall of the 
hippodrome was necessary until Section III of the embankment could be completed. Reports 
from expert witness testimony state:  
 
…a natural closure at 17.50 meters IGM (elevation) cannot be carried out because such 
an elevation does not exist in the surrounding territory. The closure will be carried out 
with reinforced dry-stone wall located at the curb of Gorostiaga Street, immediately to 
the west of the entrance of the Las Flores Hippodrome. Gorostiaga street has, at that 
closure point, an altitude of 16.40 meters IGM for which  – for river rises higher than the 
historic maximum – a provisional wall should be carried out with bags or similar 
elements that can after an extraordinary event be taken away to rehabilitate transit in this 
artery (Bacchiega, Bertoni and Maza 2005c: 15).  
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I wish to emphasize here that margin of security provided by this infrastructure hinged on 
whether or not a provisional closure was implemented. Important to note here is that although 
city officials were acutely aware of the “incomplete hydraulic protection” provided by the 
unfinished embankment and understood the importance of the provisional closure, the decisions 
made with respect to the construction and management of the embankment came under the 
purview of the provincial government (Pais 2008: 114). They were the ones in responsible for 
the embankment, although the city had a responsibility to protect its citizens. When the Salado 
overflowed its banks in 1998, city officials, working together with provincial officials, responded 
accordingly by placing sandbags along the 15 meter breach. Yet, in the case of the 2003 flood, 
by the time city officials received word from the province to send a team to sandbag the breach 
in the embankment, it was already too late. When I asked the former Municipal Director of 
Hydraulic Works what happened, he put hand on his head and his eyes filled with tears. His 
remorse was palpable. He told me, “By the time we went to go plug the breach by the 
Hippodrome, we just stood there. The water was coming in so fast; there was nothing we could 
do at that point.”13 The water quickly eroded the embankment causing the 15 meter gap to 
expand to 100 meters. Expert witness testimony states that while it may have slowed the entrance 
of water during the 2003 flood, “the provisional defense would not have been effective in 
avoiding [the entrance of] the water” altogether (Pais 2008: 114). As floodwaters approached the 
capital building (Casa del Gobierno), provincial officials made the decision to blast through the 
southern section of the ring road along the Mar Argentino Avenue (behind Centenario) in order 
to relieve the inundated city. At that point, on May 1, 2003, water inside the city was higher the 
water levels in the river. While this action provided almost immediate relief to Centenario and 
the colonial core, the neighborhoods of the western periphery remained under five to seven 
meters of water for several more months. 
 When events like these occur, the disaster is often much worse than might have been the 
case had the infrastructure project never been built (Wisner et al. 2004; Jeffers 2010). But as I 
emphasized earlier, the margin of infrastructure security depended on decisions made with 
respect to the provisional closure. The difference between the decision to make the provisional 
closure in 1998 and the lack of decision to do so in 2003 was intimately related to political 
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 Interview on January 11, 2013.  
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factors. 2003 was a pivotal year – not just for Santa Fe, but for all of Argentina. It was the first 
time since the 2001 economic crisis that citizens would vote to elect a president and congress. 
The choice of president and national congress members was considered crucial in preventing the 
country from delving deeper into crisis. Two-term Governor of Santa Fe Carlos Reutemann – the 
same politician who inaugurated the Western Ring Road/Embankment project before it was 
complete – was, at the time, busy campaigning for a National Senate seat. In the weeks and 
months leading up to the flood, state experts warned the Reutemann administration that a flood 
was imminent. But Reutemann put the flood on his political backburner in order to concentrate 
on his campaign for the Senate (which he won). Elections took place on Sunday, April 27, 2003. 
The local daily, El Litoral, published an article stating that “Voting took place with normality in 
spite of flooding.”14 The northwestern neighborhoods began to flood precisely on Election Day – 
two days before water entered the gap further downstream at the Las Flores Hippodrome. In fact, 
residents in those neighborhoods recall that Reutemann’s political brokers gave them rides to the 
polling stations in large trucks or canoes just so that they could vote.  
 So, the paradox of risk is prey to politics and political influence. It is not so much that the 
decisions related to infrastructure intentionally aimed to increase risk, but rather that the 
authorities making those decisions, as my historical presentation indicated, prioritized land 
politics, neoliberal policies and electoral cycles. Viewing flood hazards as a minor problem that 
would not affect a large middle class voting contingent, politicians and state agents downplayed 
risk. They used infrastructure to develop hazardous areas so that the city could gain land, which 
consequentially increased risk – but not for everyone. The paradox of risk, then, creates an 
immoral hazard precisely because the poor and lower classes bear the cost/increased risk from 
infrastructure development on hazardous land. For political-territorial gain, and by prioritizing 
votes over vulnerability, risk was transferred to the poor and lower class sectors of society – the 
people who today still bear the burden of that risk. But the immoral hazard does not stop there. 
The failure of the government to adequately inform the public of the flood risk created another 
kind of immoral hazard, as I demonstrate below.  
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 http://www.ellitoral.com/index.php/diarios/2003/04/27/tapa/TAPA-01.html 
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2.4 The Changing Context of Risk 
With the completion of the ring road vis-à-vis the Mar Argentino Avenue and Western 
Ring Road/Embankment projects, Centenario became, quite literally, walled in. As the fluvial 
environment became decidedly less so, buttressed with infrastructure aimed at keeping the rivers 
at bay, residents’ views of their environment changed. The formerly fluvial environment 
translated directly to lacustrine-style houses that were elevated on piles. But the newly walled in 
setting led to housing styles that conformed to the rest of the city. Gabriel, one neighborhood 
interlocutor told me, “We used to adapt to the environment. Now we adapt the environment to 
us.”15 Infrastructure, then, had the effect of not only separating people from the water, but also of 
a de-intimization and de-sensitization of their natural surroundings. This section is devoted to 
exploring a less studied, but still important aspect of infrastructure: its effect on people’s 
understandings of socio-environmental systems as well as notions of risk. I begin by detailing 
residents’ context-based notions of risk, particularly with respect to their local knowledge of the 
rivers that surround them. Then, I show how disinformation created another moral hazard and 
how residents’ shock forced them to reassess risk and reconsider what they have done to nature. I 
conclude by examining the paradox of the infrastructural fix which demonstrates that even 
despite the fallibility of infrastructure – no better exemplified than in the case of the 2003 flood – 
citizens maintain an unyielding belief that infrastructure will protect them from floods.   
One of my interlocutors in Centenario was Hilda, a Chilean transplant to Santa Fe. Before 
moving to Santa Fe over thirty years ago, she lived in the Chilean capital of Santiago where she 
faced risk of earthquakes. But she originally came from the south of Chile where she faced risk 
of fire. Hilda told me, “The first thing you realize is that each place carries different risks and 
your knowledge of those risks makes you feel differently.” When she moved to Centenario in the 
1970s, she said she felt “safe.” She considered flood risk to be minimal because of the 
infrastructure that surrounded the neighborhood. Nonetheless, she remarked, “I don’t live in fear, 
but I still worry when the Paraná River rises.”16 As Hilda pointed out, our notions of risk are 
inevitably situated – tied to context, position and place (Harraway 1988). For Hilda and many 
other residents, notions of risk were tied to the particular context of the rivers that surrounded 
Centenario, even before infrastructure was built to protect the neighborhood from flooding. In 
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fact, the way of framing the rivers and their behaviors greatly shaped the context in which 
residents view risk.   
 Long before Santa Fe’s founding between the Paraná and Salado Rivers, there was the 
legend of the “angry Paraná River” that allegedly can be traced back to the Toba, a group of 
indigenous peoples who inhabited Santa Fe before Spanish colonization (see Ullberg 2013: 191-
3). According to the legend, when the Toba people failed to respect the Paraná River, it would 
strike back violently, causing floods that destroyed their crops. This legend has permeated 
through history and fueled the contemporary social imaginary. For instance, during the floods of 
1982, 1983 and 1992 which occurred when the Paraná River overflowed its banks, journalists 
and political officials used words like “angry” and “violent” to describe the river’s behavior. The 
Salado River, in contrast, has historically been framed as a “rio de llanura” or a “river of the 
plains” that calmly flows across plains of Argentina. Residents claim that because of the colossal 
scale of the river’s fluvial processes, which cross national boundaries, the Paraná River “warns 
you” of a flood in a way that the Salado River does not. The reality is that both rivers’ fluvial 
processes are fundamentally the same. Yet, it was the social imaginary of the rivers that gave rise 
to the framing of the Paraná River as angry and the Salado River as tranquil. Despite the fact that 
Centenario was located in the middle of the floodplain and surrounded by tributaries of both the 
Paraná and Salado Rivers, both residents and government officials assigned greater risk to the 
Paraná River and have historically downplayed the risk of flooding from the Salado River. My 
interview with 80 year old Rosalita, a highly respected neighborhood elder, was particularly 
elucidating in that regard. She said, “In 2003, it wasn’t stopped! The water from the Salado River 
wasn’t stopped – because no one thought of it! Not us, not the government, no one. Who is going 
to think of that!? Especially from the Salado [River].”17 Rosalita’s statement shows that when it 
came to flood risk, all eyes were looking eastwards – towards the Paraná River.  
The state, too, played a major role in framing the Paraná River as riskier than the Salado 
River. First, the discourse of political officials and technocrats perpetuated this type of framing 
of the rivers. Municipal and provincial officials have long inscribed, through technology, a 
greater risk on the Paraná River, which is reflected in the social imaginary of residents. For 
instance, hydraulic engineer-cum-mayor Mario Barletta told me in an interview, “Santa Fe is 
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always going to have enormous risk – not because of the Salado River, but because of the 
Paraná.”18 This is discourse is as much colloquial as it is technocratic or political. Citizens and 
government officials alike have always been obsessed with the Paraná River first because of its 
scale and second, I argue, because when it floods it affects a largely middle and upper class 
voting contingent. It is materially and discursively very much a part of the politics of planning in 
Santa Fe (see Chapter 3).  
 This discourse emerges from the physical construction and material tinkering with the 
river systems. After the Paraná River flooded in 1982 and 1983, the National Institute of Water 
(Instituto Nacional de Agua or INA) created a Hydrological Information and Warning System to 
develop and operate the hydrological forecasting and early warning systems for the La Plata 
River Basin which included the Paraná River (INA 2012). The Paraná River has been monitored 
through hydrometric and sensor technology since the mid 1980s. The Salado River Basin has 
also been monitored. In 1978, during the military regime, INA installed five hydrometric 
monitoring stations along the Salado River. But due to the financial constraints in the context of 
Argentine hyperinflation in the late 1980s, “only one of the five hydrometric stations” was kept 
in operation after 1988 (Ulberg 2014: 163-4). So while the Salado River was largely 
unmonitored since the late 1980s, the Paraná River has received consistent monitoring and a 
greater investment in the technology (read infrastructure) to do so.  
Infrastructure developed around Centenario as well as in the rivers reshaped notions of 
risk just as much as it prevented and forecast flooding. Clearly, the framing of the rivers 
contributed to the downplaying of flood risk from the Salado River by feeding the belief that the 
Paraná was riskier. But when infrastructure physically separated residents from both rivers, it fed 
another belief: that they were protected from floods. As Hilda pointed out, infrastructure made 
residents “feel differently,” and as such, it changed the context in which people adapted. In a 
very real sense, then, the transformation of the extreme south redefined risk (and behaviors). It 
contributed to the context of both a physical and an imagined conformity with the rest of the city. 
When I asked my interlocutor, Gabriel, what happened to all the lacustrine houses, he said that 
with the construction of the ring road and the embankments, “There was a defensive wall built 
around the neighborhood. We felt safe…protected. But, you know, I think it was more than that. 
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We thought, finally, we’re part of the city!”19 Adaptive functions, like lacustrine houses, are 
framed by their survival function (Watts 1983). Since infrastructure now defined their survival in 
the extreme south, residents no longer needed lacustrine houses to survive. Infrastructure had 
obliterated the adaptive function of those houses. Through infrastructure, they had appropriated 
and transformed nature and infrastructure became “the material means of social reproduction” 
(Watts 1983: 242) – at least on an affective level.  
 Infrastructure had changed the context of the built environment of the extreme south. It 
also had an effect on residents’ sense of belonging. Infrastructure interventions, like policy 
interventions, shape citizenship and belonging in a very real way (Ribot 2001; Marino and Ribot 
2012; Ribot 2014). The goal of state planners and engineers’ is to consolidate the city through 
integrated, universally networked infrastructure. Yet, that high modern ideal is rarely achieved; 
and the incompleteness of infrastructure has significant material, social and political effects. As 
Graham and Marvin (2001) have shown, infrastructure are never truly universal and often result 
in social and spatial inequalities. Infrastructure draw a material as well as symbolic line between 
the haves and the have nots. So when the context of risk in Centenario changed through 
infrastructure, it allowed the neighborhood to break with its flood-prone past. Residents’ 
adaptive processes had changed as lacustrine houses ceded their survival function to 
infrastructure. In the process, residents built houses as if they were on higher ground, conforming 
to the built environment with the rest of the city. That change, not only made them feel 
“protected,” but it also gave them a sense of belonging. The absence of belonging left them 
struggling, suffering. But they were no longer just the “extreme south.” Rather, they had become 
part of the city. In a very real sense, then, the neighborhood’s transformation through 
infrastructure not only redefined notions of risk, it also reconfigured the boundaries of 
belonging.
20
  
 
2.4.1 Disinformation and Shock 
Residents, indeed, based their notions of floods and flood risk on the context created by 
infrastructure. This became strikingly apparent when I asked residents about the history of floods 
in the neighborhood. Floods have posed a timeless challenge for residents of Centenario. In 
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addition to the floods in the 2000s, some of the worst floods occurred in 1966, 1973, 1983, 1988, 
and 1998. But to my surprise, residents told me that they had never experienced a flood before 
2003. Hilda told me, “Maybe in the early and mid 1900s…and I think there was also a big flood 
in the 1960s. But we never had a flood. At least not like the one in 2003.”21 Hilda helped me to 
understand. She explained, “Before 2003, most people here – unless you lived in the way back of 
the neighborhood – never really had water inside their houses…at least not since the 1966 flood. 
Sure, there was water that collected in the streets, but not in the houses.”22 Whether or not water 
entered one’s house made a critical difference in how residents viewed a flood. Since the flood 
of 1966,
23
 there was no flood of such a magnitude that caused water to enter residents’ houses. 
Hence, there was no “previously existing stock of knowledge” of flooding of that kind (Kuhlicke 
2010). Residents argue that this is the direct result of the construction of the infrastructure around 
the neighborhood, which began soon after the flood of 1966.    
Infrastructure had, over time, manufactured a kind of certainty so that residents could live 
“without fear of advancing waters” (Valentinuzzi 1991: 159). Residents believed in the certainty 
that infrastructure promised. After all, the promise of infrastructure was “to provide a service that 
works continuously in the background, supplying durable and uninterrupted flow of essential 
services and amenities” (Mitchell 2014: 438-39). In the case of Santa Fe, infrastructure promised 
to solve the problems of flooding and it had been living up to that promise. Infrastructure 
stopped water from entering residents’ houses, it integrated them with the larger networks of the 
city and modern urban life, and it gave them a sense of belonging that they had not previously 
experienced. Infrastructure ultimately created a knowable, certain realm of security, protection 
and belonging that made flood risk fade into oblivion. Infrastructure – and no longer nature – 
became the defining element in how residents conceived of risk. Risk was something that flowed 
in the rivers and fell from the sky and infrastructure allowed people to separate themselves from 
it. They believed that infrastructure protected them and that belief changed their perception of 
risk.   
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 “The flood of 1966 coincided with the year that Santa Fe’s Club Colón won the national soccer championship.  
The flood had inundated much of the Centenario neighborhood, including the old soccer stadium, bringing with it a 
freshwater fish called sábalos from the Paraná River. Since then Colón fans were called Sabaleros after the fish.   
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 But the flood of 2003 changed that. Residents became aware of the failure of the hard 
physical structures they had placed their belief in. It was not, however, simply a matter of the 
technical shortcomings of the infrastructure or that it failed to withstand the pressures of the 
floodwaters. The causes of the flood of 2003 were as much social and political as they were 
physical and technical because the embankment itself was inextricably linked with the social, 
political and economic processes that created it. It was, in fact, government negligence not only 
in responding to the gap in the embankment, but also in providing disinformation to citizens 
during the flood. Municipal officials made a series of public announcements between April 27 
and May 4, 2003 that downplayed the risk of flooding and assured residents of Centenario that 
they were “safe” from harm. 24 One of those public announcements was made by former Mayor 
Marcelo Alvarez on April 29, 2003. He made the following statement on air the morning of April 
29:  
 
[It’s] a totally atypical phenomenon . . . For those residents who call in [to the radio] from 
the south I can say that . . . we have no problem whatsoever with Pumping Station No. 1 
that is, all [neighborhoods] of Barrio Centenario, Villa del Centenario, Barrio Chalet, 
Barrio San Lorenzo, Barrio El Arenal, all those will not have any problems, because [the 
floodwater] is extracted by the Pumping Station No. 1 . . . the southwest will have no 
problems . . . [General Lopez Avenue and the embankment] is in good condition, there 
won’t be any problem at all [in that area]. (Track 4. la inundación | voces de una 
tragedia. Emphasis added to denote the emphasis of the mayor). 
 
Residents trusted Alvarez as much as they trusted the infrastructure. Here was a public 
official telling them that they would be safe. But by nightfall, the waters of the Salado River had 
completely inundated low-lying Centenario. It was not as if Alvarez only said that the south 
would not have any problems. He identified specific neighborhoods, targeting the people living 
in them, which is precisely what made his statement so powerful. He created and controlled 
residents’ experience in such a way that resulted in greater suffering and loss (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1992, 1997). Because not only did Alvarez’s statement discourage 
Centenario residents from evacuating; it also prompted residents from other neighborhoods along 
the northwestern periphery to seek refuge with friends and family in Centenario. For instance, 
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Hilda told me that, after hearing Alvarez’s statement, her neighbor encouraged his cousin, who 
was from a neighborhood in the north, to take refuge with him in Centenario. By evening, they 
were all on the roof of Hilda’s house. She said, “The water was already up to our necks. There 
was nowhere to go but my roof which is flat. By 8PM, we began to lose services. There was no 
electricity, no phone, no radio, nothing. Luckily it was a very clear night and we could 
communicate with neighbors across rooftops.”25 While Hilda, her neighbor, and his cousin found 
a man in a canoe to take them to higher ground the next morning, other residents of Centenario 
refused to leave their house and belongings for fear of looting. Gustavo was of the latter group. 
He lived on his roof for a week after the flood. He told me that the first night was by far the 
worst. People had left the neighborhood in such a panic that they left their animals behind or got 
separated from them in the water. “It was the worst form of suffering: I couldn’t see anything for 
dark of night. But I heard everything. Dogs, horses screaming…then nothing. It was quiet. At 
3AM I gazed into the murky water and I saw what I thought was a doll floating past my house. I 
shined my flashlight on it and reached out and grabbed it. I immediately realized that it wasn’t a 
doll. It was a real baby…only it was dead,”26 he recounted in tears.  
As if it was not enough that government officials created a immoral hazard first through 
the paradox of risk, in 2003 their discourse resulted in a different immoral hazard. The corpse of 
a baby floating in the water, residents being rescued from rooftops via canoes, and the lack of 
early warning that resulted from the disinformation greatly increased people’s suffering and loss. 
It also awakened residents to the dysfunction of infrastructure and government officials – both of 
which they believed would protect them from flooding. What is worse is that after the 
disinformation, politicians continued to highlight their bureaucratic ineptitude. At a press 
conference on May 3, 2003, former Governor Reutemann stated, “I have not received any 
information [about the studies and reports] you mention. Nobody, absolutely nobody, has 
informed me [about this].”27 Reutemann denied his knowledge of the imminent flood or that he 
received any information from state experts. Further, in order to discourage inquiry about the 
breach in the embankment he blamed the flood exclusively on natural factors. So while the 
politics of elections, land and infrastructure represented by the paradox of risk created the first 
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Litoral, 2003.   
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imoral hazard, discourse – disinformation and the political convenience of denying the problem 
and blaming it on nature – created the second. Although Reutemann remains a national senator, 
disinformation did lead to the political downfall of Alvarez. Gustavo told me, “Okay so you 
build an embankment and leave a gap…yeah, that’s a problem. But the disinformation! 
Disinformation is close to being murderous simply because you do not inform [people]!” He 
added, “It really cost him. Alvarez died a political death. No one will ever vote for him again. 
And to that, I say good riddance!”28  
 
2.5 The Paradox of the Infrastructural Fix 
Much of the research on infrastructure in geography and related disciplines focuses on its 
failures and deficiencies (Graham 2010; Mitchell 2014). This is an extremely important endeavor 
as it helps to identify problems and develop solutions. But there comes a point when we must 
move beyond simply thinking about how it quite literally screws things up and how we can fix it 
to make it better. Part of that has to do with our understandings of infrastructure. For, when we 
begin to examine people’s actual experiences of infrastructure in cities, we can start to 
understand how, in our attempt to find “fixes,” we are reproducing not only the ways we 
configure the built environment (Star 1999), but also the ways we configure, structure and 
segregate different groups of society. Sure, infrastructure can increase protection from flooding 
by building a wall between people and water. But we also need to consider that social patterns 
make it possible for wealthier classes to separate themselves from water by building a stronger 
wall, on higher ground, and the ear of government officials. We begin to see how people, places, 
institutions and the natural environment are all woven together, yet separated by infrastructure. 
And we see this mostly clearly when we reach a point of crisis, shock or stressor.  
For residents of Santa Fe, that began with the flood of 2003.  They began to see 
infrastructure as problematic as any other part of human organization – as fallible as its creators 
(Star 1999). Residents realized that infrastructure transformed their neighborhood, giving them a 
sense of belonging and allowed them to benefit from the features of modern urban life. At the 
same time, it destroyed everything that they had come to know. The normally invisible quality of 
infrastructure – working in the background to keep residents safe – suddenly became apparent 
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(ibid). When this invisible quality became dramatically visible, it forced residents to think about 
how infrastructure in and around the neighborhood created a context that led them to forget 
about where they actually were living. Flavia told me that since the 2003 flood, she realized how 
people failed to accommodate the rivers – how they had maladapted to their environment. She 
explained, “We’ve done a lot of things that harmed nature, like building infrastructure projects 
that shouldn’t have been built, developing on land we shouldn’t have…but most of all, we took 
away the land that belonged to the river. And we suffered for it.”29 Indeed, the 2003 flood held a 
mirror to how residents were bound to their environment and how building on a floodplain had 
dire consequences, many of which cannot be undone. She continued, “In 2003 we were 
dramatically reminded that, all of the land of Centenario – was reclaimed from the river.”30 Hilda 
echoed her sentiment, stating “We realized that there is a big difference between the rest of the 
city and what lies in the extreme south after JJ Paso [Avenue]. You become very aware, despite 
all the infrastructure projects that you are living in the floodplain.”31 These realizations 
demonstrate that notions of risk are always in the process of being mediated and modified in 
relation to the shifting contexts (Wilkinson 2010).  
What is novel about this case is not the acknowledgement of maladaptation or how it was 
largely the poor and lower classes that were affected by the flood. Rather, it is that even after this 
acknowledgement, residents still believe that infrastructure will protect them from flooding. The 
actual experience of infrastructure has shown – perhaps no better than in the 2003 flood – that it 
does not always deliver the protection residents had come to expect. Paradoxically, despite the 
proven fallibility of infrastructure, citizens maintain an unyielding belief that infrastructure will 
protect them from floods – a belief that discourages citizens’ from considering non-structural 
alternatives in the name of flood risk reduction. For example, when I asked residents how they 
could reduce flood risk and who could do it, their responses were unanimous: infrastructure; 
built by the government. Gabriel said, “They’re already doing it. They already put the 
construction of Pumping Station No. 0 out for tender. The issue with flood risk in Centenario 
today is that we are lacking that pumping station to siphon out rainwater and discharge it into the 
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Salado.”32 Thus, in spite of the suffering and loss residents experienced in the 2003 flood, they 
still believe in infrastructure and they want the government to fix it or build more of it.  
Since 2003, the municipal and provincial governments have done just that. The provincial 
government has: (1) completed construction of Section III of the Ring Road/Embankment 
Project, extending it from the hippodrome to Recreo, the neighboring town to the north; (2) 
refurbished the engines of Pumping Stations No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 and put out to tender the 
construction of Pumping Station No. 0; (3) constructed a new reservoir and amplified the 
existing reservoir alongside Pumping Station No. 4; (4) created new channels leading to the 
reservoirs;
33
 and (5) reinforced and increased the height of the embankments on both the eastern 
and western peripheries so that they could withstand a 1,000-year flood (Gobierno de la Ciudad 
de Santa Fe 2014).
34
 Today the city is practically enclosed by flood control infrastructure. It 
makes residents feel safe. But, as Gabriel my interlocutor who was the neighborhood association 
president, recognized, it does not necessarily mean they are without risk. He admitted, “If this 
[the flood] happened to us again today, I’m honestly not sure if we have made progress in terms 
of evacuation, communication…They have put signs up and constructed infrastructure. They 
also closed the embankment. We still believe we are safe. But if you think about it, the risk of 
flooding ever-present! All of this, all of it is floodplain.”35   
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Figure 8. Map of the system of defense and flood control infrastructure. Source: Municipality of 
the City of Santa Fe, 2011.    
 
Hand-in-hand with infrastructure development, the municipal government drew up a 
contingency plan (Plan de Contingencia) which established measures to be taken to reduce 
damage in the event of a flood, heavy rains or storm (Gobierno de la Ciudad de Santa Fe 2014: 
34). Each of the eight city districts has its own contingency plan based on the problems and 
needs unique to each. But when I asked residents of Centenario about the contingency plan for 
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their neighborhood, the majority of them had no idea what I was talking about. Hilda’s response 
was especially revealing. “Contingency what?” she asked. I explained what I was referring to 
and she responded with the following: 
 
“Oh the flyers they [the municipality] gave out and the meeting places? Okay, yeah, but 
honestly if you told us we had to leave immediately for an emergency, no one would 
know where to go! They painted the lampposts yellow to identify a route leading to the 
neighborhood meeting place. First, we all thought that where the yellow paint stopped 
near the top of the lamppost was where water would reach in the next flood. Second, 
what if the meeting place is underwater? Third, the municipality distributed the flyers 
once and maybe carried out one emergency drill. But these things should be done at least 
once a year! And they don’t. Unfortunately, the government does a really bad job. They 
need to focus more on what we need: infrastructure. (Interview on September 7, 2012).  
 
Two fundamental ideas represent the core of residents’ concerns. The first is the 
continued inability of government to effectively communicate risk. It is not a trivial act to 
establish an emergency evacuation route or identify a meeting place. But when government 
officials fail to communicate the objectives of those measures, they end up posing obstacles for 
residents and result in more problems than they do solutions. By failing to communicate the 
objectives of the solutions to risk, residents are left confused and they have to put more effort 
into making sense of them, which ultimately disincentivizes them from using them. Second, 
while residents acknowledge non-infrastructural solutions aimed at reducing risk, they still view 
infrastructure as key in risk reduction. A striking example of this is when I accompanied the staff 
from the city’s Office of Risk Management to a poor neighborhood of the western periphery 
called Barranquitas. As we entered the neighborhood, we were met by the president of the 
neighborhood association. The staff explained that we were there to distribute the contingency 
plan to residents, to which he responded, rather irritably, “Listen, you guys painted the 
lampposts, but didn’t explain why, which made people confused. Now, you come to hand out 
contingency plans, but that’s not what people want. Listen, I wish you luck, but what people 
want is for you to clean the pipes and install the infrastructure that’s lacking, not come here and 
hand out a meaningless paper.”36  
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The centrality of these ideas about infrastructure being the dominant solution to flooding 
presents a contradiction which I call the paradox of the infrastructural fix. The word “fix” has 
become ubiquitous. There is a spatial fix, a technological fix, a junky’s fix, etc. All of those fixes 
carry with them pejorative connotations precisely because the particular kind of solution that the 
fix offers is temporary and often results in the need for more “fixes” and more problems. Harvey, 
in writing about the “spatial fix” presents two meanings which I find particularly helpful with 
respect to infrastructure. The first meaning of fix, he writes, “refers to something being pinned 
down and secured in a particular locus” (2001: 24). This meaning is intrinsic to infrastructure 
whereby capital fixes – makes secure and immovable – physical structures, like roads and 
buildings, in space “only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital invested 
therein) at a later point in order to make way for a new ‘spatial fix’” (Harvey 2001: 25). The 
second meaning of fix is a metaphorical one in terms a junky needing a “fix” whereby “it is 
implied that the resolution is temporary rather than permanent, since the craving soon returns” 
(Harvey 2001: 24). That fix is entirely fleeting and never satiates the addict’s need for a drug. It 
does, however, hold the best prospect for an immediate solution. This, for Harvey, creates a 
solution to a problem through “temporal deferral” on an ever-expanding scale (2003: 115). The 
contradiction is then, by building infrastructure, we secure it in space, which inevitably destroys 
that space and requires that we build more infrastructure at a later time, as evidenced in the case 
of Centenario. The implication for infrastructure is that continuous technological progress has 
become a necessary condition to solve urban problems, reduce risk, and prevent deterioration of 
the city.  
It is primarily in this last sense that it leads to the paradox of the infrastructural fix. Why 
do people, despite the failures and impermanence of infrastructure as demonstrated through 
experience, still believe it will protect them? Why do people still expect a degree of certainty and 
security from infrastructure? And why does infrastructure eclipse other non-structural 
alternatives to risk reduction? I argue that we must probe the ideological, philosophical, and 
psychological realms of infrastructure in order to answer these questions. By contextualizing the 
paradox in these realms, I show that our beliefs in science and its experts, our beliefs in the 
solutions that emerge from science – the technology – as the rational way of solving problems, 
and our desire to be right, which is layered with affective response, provide the underlying basis 
for the paradox of the infrastructural fix.  
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First, according to Mattelart (1994), there is a “powerful set of ideological beliefs 
asserting the positive transformative powers of modern science and networked technologies” 
(cited in Graham and Marvin 2001: 43). These ideologies fed the belief that infrastructure was a 
central part of progress and modernization of the city (Graham and Marvin 2001). As a function 
of industrialism, modernist ideologies transcended the disciplines of engineering, architecture 
and urban planning. Perry (1995:9) argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
“engineers became the paragons of public works” as they began to apply science and technology 
to the space of the city not only for the functioning of society, but also to make the things in 
cities stronger, faster and better. People began to expect more from technology than they did 
from society. Indeed, as Turkle (2012) argues, technology appealed to people “most where we 
are most vulnerable. Santa Fe, as I was told countless times by my interlocutors, is most 
vulnerable in the face of floods. Risk reduction technologies emerged out of the disciplines of 
engineering and architecture because they employed scientific and statistical techniques. Since 
their methods were framed as rational and value-free, the engineers, architects and planners who 
applied them were regarded as devoid of political corruption and championed as the bringers of 
order and rationality to the industrial city and country (Chatzis 1999, cited in Graham and 
Marvin 2001: 44).  
 From eliminating Malthusian crises to stopping floods while gaining territory at the same 
time – all seemed to be within the grasp of these experts (Rosner 2004). Over time their role as 
problem solvers for the social, political and economic woes of the city led to solutions, albeit 
temporary and spatially specific and therefore partial. Their solutions were welcomed although 
they failed to be comprehensive or permanent precisely because the range of solutions to a 
problem becomes limited to those they can calculate through formulas and models (Mitchell 
2008). These experts cannot propose solutions that fall outside of their technical repertoire. How 
they view a problem becomes the basis for assessing the types of solutions, positively, and what 
those solutions ought to be, normatively. As one resident, particularly skeptical of engineers, told 
me, “When engineers fresh out of the university start working, they do a poor job because they 
only have the science and numbers guiding them. Even after years of experience, they still 
manage to screw things up because it is always the technical stuff – the ideal – not the 
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experience, that guides them.”37 Engineers and other experts are not consciously disdainful or 
ignorant of knowing how cities work in practice. Jane Jacobs, for instance, has argued that 
engineers and planners “have gone to great pains to know…about how cities ought to work and 
what ought to be good for people and businesses in them” (Jacobs 1961: 8). The fundamental 
flaw is that, as one high-level municipal official told me, “Technical experts do what they can 
based on what they know. But they don’t know how to govern a city and they sure don’t have 
any real skills for how to make decisions.”38 So inevitably, official efforts to reduce risk through 
infrastructure result in partial solutions or infrastructural fixes because they do not factor in the 
risks that fall outside of the technical realm – the risks that people face everyday as well as the 
decisions they have to make – about their livelihoods, personal security, social relations, or 
household economics. 
Marxist critical theorist Herbert Marcuse’s idea of technological rationality also offers 
insight into the paradox of the infrastructure fix. Marcuse’s indictment of modern capitalist 
civilization draws inspiration from Weber’s emphasis on the nature of rationality in the modern 
world (Orum and Dale 2009). Marcuse (1941) argues that rational decisions to employ 
technology can, once the technology is democratized, change what is considered “rational” 
within society. Defining technology as both the “technical apparatus” and the “social process” in 
which humans are inseparable, he asserts, “For they are themselves an integral part and factor of 
technology, not only as the men who invent or attend to machinery but also as the social groups 
which direct its application and utilization” (1941: 138). Technology becomes the tangible 
product of man and the control of that product is in the hands of those who were heralded to be 
the saving grace of mankind: the experts. Further, he argues that the production and distribution 
of technology affects those whom it serves. Marcuse (1941: 141) posits, “This rationality 
establishes standards of judgment and fosters attitudes which make men ready to accept and even 
to introcept the dictates of [the technological] apparatus.” Marcuse uses Lewis Mumford’s 
phrase, “matter-of-factness” to the pervasiveness of thought about technology; that it is not 
simply limited to its creators. It has made its way – not by force, but rather by man’s 
identification with technology. He gives the example of a man traveling by automobile, stating:  
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The countryside is shaped and organized by the highway. Numerous signs and posters tell 
the traveler what to do and think; they even request his attention to the beauties of nature 
or the hallmarks of history. Others have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the 
better. Convenient parking spaces have been constructed where the broadest and most 
surprising view is open. Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the pause 
that refreshes. And all this is indeed for his benefit, safety and comfort; he receives what 
he wants. Business, technics, human needs and nature are welded together into one 
rational and expedient mechanism (Marcuse 1941:143).  
 
It is at that point that the matter-of-fact attitude dissolves into “not only perfectly rational 
but also perfectly reasonable” norms (ibid). Applying the idea of technological rationality to the 
case of Santa Fe, I argue that because the decisions to build infrastructure to reduce risk were 
considered rational and “matter-of-fact,” infrastructure became the risk reduction norm in 
Santafesina society. Making infrastructure the rational choice creates a “buy in” for people to 
believe in the convenience and security that the technology can provide. In Santa Fe, people have 
learned that buying in to technology is the foremost way to obtain the desired result, i.e. flood 
protection. But, technology has created both the solution and the need for it. It is both the result 
of and cause for attempts to continuously seek solutions to problems. As Marcuse (1941: 144) 
argues, “The necessity which is the mother of inventions is to a great extent the necessity of 
maintaining and expanding the apparatus.” Even when technology fails to function, people’s 
beliefs and behaviors are shaped by the technology which they themselves have created. And 
those beliefs and behaviors persist over time and space.  
There are two caveats to technological rationality. As I mentioned earlier, urban 
infrastructure or any other form of technology is never universal or democratic. Instead it 
“splinters” across space and time and is subverted by politics in ways that divide rather than 
integrate (Graham and Marvin 2001). The splintering effect does not, however, make technology 
any less appealing to those who do not yet have it. The have nots will still aspire to have it, 
precisely because it is considered the rational solution to flood risk. The other caveat is that as 
much as technology constricts individuality in the ways Marcuse describes, it is also necessary 
for human realization (and adaptation). This leads to the third realm: the psychological. 
 Finally, the belief that technology is the rational way of solving problems can skew our 
consideration of alternatives and even color what we consider to be logical. So if infrastructure is 
the rational way of reducing flood risk – despite the incorporation of new facts like the failure of 
an embankment – residents tend to maintain their preexisting beliefs. Part of that has to do with 
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rational reasoning. But the other part, I argue, has to do with affect. The positive or negative 
affect for people, ideas and things like infrastructure “arise much more rapidly than our 
conscious thoughts” (Mooney 2011: unpaginated). People like infrastructure. It is precisely 
people’s affective ties with infrastructure that makes them feel safe. It gives them a sense of 
belonging. Hence, it is precisely this combination of rationality and affect that has shaped the 
way that we adapt: “we apply fight-or-flight reflexes not only to predators, but to data itself” 
(ibid). Even after a flood, in which infrastructure failed to protect them, they return, often more 
certain, to their original beliefs. That is because after a negative response to new data, we 
retrieve thoughts, memories and associations that are consistent with our previous beliefs (ibid). 
From a psychological standpoint, we cling to our beliefs because want to be right. Neither those 
who govern nor the governed like to be proven wrong. That means they must accept that their 
solutions have failed. Moreover, we all want to give greater heed to evidence and experience that 
bolster our beliefs rather than debunk them, even if it precludes consideration of other options. 
At this point, what other options does Santa Fe have other than infrastructural solutions? There is 
no complete return to nature and no complete reversal of the damage done. While we do want to 
perceive risk accurately, we also do not want to be wrong which makes us highly resistant to 
changing our beliefs even when the facts say we should. 
 
2.6 Conclusion: Infrastructure’s Uncertainty 
In contrast to Chapters 3 and 5, where I focus more on drainage infrastructure, this 
chapter has examined the history of three mega-infrastructure projects in parallel with the 
development of the Centenario neighborhood. Here I have illustrated two important paradoxes. 
The first is based on the contradiction that the infrastructure aimed at reducing risk has actually 
increased it. I add nuance to this paradox by demonstrating that infrastructure has not increased 
risk for everyone. Rather, the infrastructure increased risk for the poor and lower classes, which 
results in an immoral hazard. I use the term immoral hazard to refer to the disproportional burden 
of risk on the poor and lower class, who inevitably bear the brunt of human suffering from the 
failures of the infrastructure meant to reduce risk. In the context of deepening our understanding 
of risk, the paradox of risk and the resulting immoral hazard helps to illuminate why 
vulnerability persists exist in Santa Fe, despite official efforts to reduce risk. 
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Through the case of Centenario, I have shown that the infrastructure, which emerge from 
the technocratic framing of risk, have had significant effects on people’s lives. First, the 
deployment of infrastructure around the neighborhood changed people’s views of risk. It resulted 
in a loss of an important adaptation strategy. I demonstrated that before the construction of the 
flood control infrastructure, citizens adapted to their environment by building lacustrine-style 
houses elevated on stilts. Since then, they adapted the environment to them, ceding the adaptive 
function elevated houses provided to infrastructural solutions. Crucially, infrastructure have a 
strong affective effect on their people’s sense of security and belonging, which de-incentivizes 
other non-infrastructural solutions. Because of people’s affective ties to infrastructure, the 
infrastructure that was meant to protect them also limits their ability to adapt and respond in the 
face of shocks or stressors from extreme weather and climate related events. 
As the once fluvial environment became decidedly less so, buttressed with infrastructure 
aimed at keeping the rivers at bay, residents’ perceptions of risk as well as their understandings 
of socio-environmental systems changed. The loss of this adaptation strategy had a devastating 
effect on residents in the 2003 flood. Yet, despite their direct experience of infrastructure failure, 
residents still believe that infrastructure will protect them from floods. This is due to the paradox 
of the infrastructural fix whereby due to the powerful ideological, philosophical and 
psychological hold of infrastructure, people return to their original beliefs – that infrastructure is 
the rational solution to flood risk.  
Infrastructure is how risk is reduced in our daily lives. Ideally they give us the certainty 
of protection, water, access to goods and services, power, sanitation, etc. But this view is 
problematic. We are living in a time when, in our experience of the world, we cannot fathom 
what it means to not be supported by infrastructure. But just as we must remain mindful that risk 
is ever-present, we must be aware that these infrastructure which support our existence are not 
certain, nor are they universal. Infrastructure, like any attempt at risk reduction, are socially 
enabled and therefore partial. They are part of the causal chain of vulnerability (Ribot 2014). By 
bringing attention to these paradoxes, this chapter has laid the groundwork to prise open new 
spaces for more socially-oriented policy interventions.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
Normalizing Discourses: Blaming the Victim in Modern Santa Fe 
 
3.1 Introduction: Planning on Discourses of Risk  
One afternoon in March 2013, I accompanied Federico, a government technocrat and 
resident of Candioti Sur, around his neighborhood. Candioti Sur is one of the oldest 
neighborhoods of about 10,000 people located in the east of Santa Fe adjacent to the port. The 
neighborhood stood out in many ways; its clean streets were organized in a grid pattern and the 
Spanish and Italian-style houses boasted large central courtyards. Many of them were gated. As 
we walked southwards towards the port Federico pointed out that this part of the neighborhood 
was most at risk of flooding, particularly due to the Caseros Drain. The drain was a formerly 
open ditch that divided the neighborhood into two parts: the more residential north and the 
industrial south. As we walked along drain, we talked about how he views risk. Federico told me, 
“Modern life reveals different ways of being. Each one is different because everybody’s 
experience of risk is shaped in a different way. Maybe you have money, maybe you don’t. 
Maybe you have stormwater drains and maybe you don’t. These divisions make it so that people 
experience risk differently and they separate people. Here in Candioti Sur, we don’t come into 
contact with the poor people from the city’s peripheries.”1 This chapter explores the production 
of risk not only through the material practices of infrastructure development and planning, but 
also through a discourse of the risk that takes shape largely through the normalization of the 
uneven distribution of risk between the “moral” and “immoral” spaces of the city. 
Risk and vulnerability are shaped by historical planning practices – of where 
infrastructure are placed and who they serve. These practices of government are shaped by and at 
the same time shape social order. Infrastructure and planning came to play a key role in the way 
in which risk was rendered intelligible and in the development of strategies for its management, 
particularly in terms of the people and places that were classified and categorized as “at risk” 
versus those who were not (Rose 1996). Through the practices of government since the 
nineteenth century, political decision makers apportioned risk unevenly among citizens and 
society placed different demands on the land (Hewitt 1983, 1995; Wisner 1993; Cannon 1994; 
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Bankoff 2002, 2003). Higher ground, for instance, was reserved for the middle and upper 
classes, while low-lying (riskier) land were left for the lower classes – a common practice 
throughout the world. Crucially, these material practices are linked to discourses of planning and 
improvement which produce and reproduce the stratified distribution of risk. These discourses 
are embodied in the ways in which risk is framed in terms of features of neighborhood, the 
provision of infrastructure, cleanliness, and morality. Rose (1996: 331) argues that discourses 
shape the practices and strategies that address risk by “seeking to act upon the dynamics” of 
neighborhoods. They configure the territory upon which these strategies should act and “they 
extend to the specification of the subjects of government as individuals who are also, actually or 
potentially, the subjects of allegiance to a particular set of community values, beliefs and 
commitments” (Rose 1996: 331, original emphasis).  
In the case of Santa Fe, people at greater risk often do not perceive their own risk, but 
rather find it a normal outcome of their placement or their own actions. Infrastructure plays an 
important role in that discursive normalization by acting as “mediators through which the 
perpetual process of transformation of Nature into City takes place” (Kaika and Swyngedouw 
2000: 1). In the late nineteenth century, Santa Fe’s experts – the architects and engineers who 
planned the city – saw nature as an object to be rationally manipulated. As part of the iterative 
process of planning the city, this was done through the use of infrastructure as a governing 
technology as well as discourses of modern city planning (Graham and Marvin 2001). But as 
much as infrastructure were intended to “bind spaces together,” universally integrating the city, 
they “dramatically, and unevenly” refashioned the spaces of the city, separating out the social, 
economic, cultural, physical, and ecological (Graham and Marvin 2001: 11). Just as 
infrastructure proved to be powerful spatial, temporal and material mechanisms, the discourses 
of risk, which coevolved with social and political formations in the city, were crucial to the 
production of subjectivities as well as in the normalization – and therefore the non-questioning – 
of risk.  
In this chapter, I explore how infrastructure development and  planning practices, both 
materially and discursively, produce what people and places are “at risk” in Santa Fe. I argue that 
in the fields of urban planning and infrastructure development, which were key elements in the 
“broader project of modernity,” the government assigned the poor to unsafe and marginal areas 
and rich to the safe areas while they assign infrastructure to the rich and not to the poor  (Graham 
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and Marvin 2001: 41). In other words, they placed people vis-à-vis risky space and provided 
infrastructure in the interest of those who are already less at risk. Discourses, then, reinforced 
and normalized the uneven distribution of risk created by these two processes. Thus, the 
government produced risk subjects not only by allowing people to settle on low-lying land at risk 
of flooding, but also through discourse. In particular, government agencies employed a 
discursive move to blame the victims, which clearly became a discursive production of risk 
subjects (a la Rose 1996). Through discourse, government invested in the development of 
Candioti Sur, a neighborhood on higher ground, in the formation of “ideal subjects” and 
affiliated them to expertise, while at the same time, they blamed those who settled on low-lying 
land as being inferior and having made bad decisions of their own. On the one hand the state 
does one thing but says another and people by and large believe what the state says. Hence, 
because people believe the discourse of government, risk appears natural and risk subjects 
responsible, rather than the state. Using Friedrich Engels’ concept of false consciousness, I argue 
that the power of the discourse was such that it keeps risk subjects from recognizing and 
rejecting blame (Kilminster 1979; see also Bourdieu 1977 for the related concept of habitus). As 
a result of the blaming the victim, the poor end up in a discursive realm that is shaped by the 
location of infrastructure with respect to the “at risk” people and normalized so that their risk is 
made less visible and more acceptable.   
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The second section 
historicizes the development of the neighborhood, focusing on how city officials carved out the 
space of Candioti Sur as a site of modernity and progress. They imbued it with the infrastructural 
elements that set it apart from other spaces of the city. But this was not only a physical practice; 
it was premised on the discourses of the state, which by accentuating the differences between the 
organized and ‘moral’ spaces of the modernist project and the disorganized and ‘immoral’ other 
spaces of the city, produced the conditions that underlie risk in socially and spatially different 
ways (Ranganathan 2015). Through Candioti Sur, the state produced ideal, modern subjects who, 
through their relationships with government, were able to bypass bureaucratic red tape and get 
government to respond to their demands to reduce risk. But not all of Candioti Sur was created 
equal; and one crucial piece of infrastructure – the Caseros Ditch – discussed in Section 3, led to 
the formation of a sacrifice zone in the southern sector of the neighborhood. There on the low-
lying land of El Chilcal, the combination of industrial waste and stormwater runoff caused 
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flooding. I detail how the state recognized this and embraced El Chilcal as a sacrifice zone and 
its inhabitants as sacrificial subjects who could incur the unequal distribution of risk, until the 
influx of capital prompted the city to revalue the territory of El Chilcal. By selling the land of El 
Chilcal to a developer, the city was able to finance a project to enclose Caseros Ditch.  
Section 4 of this chapter demonstrates how the city, in attempting to solve the drainage 
problems associated with Caseros Ditch, actually increased flood risk for residents. Risk here 
was no longer considered a natural or health-related problem as it was it the past. Because of the 
city’s “slipshod” solutions, risk became an infrastructure problem. The recurrent flooding due to 
poor infrastructure construction propelled residents to make their own “household” solutions to 
reduce risk. These were structural adaptations they made to their houses, not only because they 
had the economic resources to do so, but also because their privileged positions gave them access 
to information on zoning and risk. Section 5 examines the normalization of risk, which I argue is 
a process notions and locations of risk are constructed materially by physically separated people 
and places (through infrastructure) and discursively by labeling people as “unsafe” and 
“immoral” and socially eschewing those who do who not fit the precepts of social order or ideal 
of modern subjecthood to the margins of society.   
 
3.2 A Modern City with Ideal, Modern Subjects 
In the late 1800s, the government of the city of Santa Fe began an urban improvement 
project aimed to unfetter the city from its colonial past and create a new city based on modernity 
and progress. The first step towards this goal was to carve out a new space where they could 
employ European design and planning principles – precisely the tools that were constructed as 
key elements of the “broader project of modernity” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 41). City 
officials, captivated by European practices and discourses of planning and improvement, enlisted 
the help of British engineers and future governor of Santa Fe, Ignacio Crespo. These experts 
“saw what they knew” – problems facing similar post-colonial cities, and proposed plans that 
were effectively futures for the elite who occupied them (McFarlane 2008). They determined that 
the northeastern edge of Santa Fe was the most logical site for the new neighborhood due to two 
strategic reasons. First, the land directly north of the port and west of the Santa Fe River (and 
Setúbal Lagoon) had some of the highest elevations outside of the colonial core. Second, it was 
located between three important modes of transportation: the port to the south, the Santa Fe 
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River to the east, and a new boulevard to the north that transected the city east-west. In 1910, the 
city government named the neighborhood Candioti Sur en homage to Pablo Marcial Candioti, the 
elite land owner who donated the land to the city. In line with the modernization paradigms 
taking root globally at the time, the city commissioned major urban infrastructure and services to 
be built in and around the neighborhood, including large public parks and gardens, paved streets, 
bridges, street lamps and sewers – infrastructure critical to the reduction of risk which some 
neighborhoods in Santa Fe are still fighting for a century later. These infrastructure served to 
define the territory of Candioti Sur, producing a modern space.   
Infrastructure projects, particularly drainage, quickly became associated with curative 
powers able to “cleanse” city spaces, (Felbinger 1996: 11, cited in Graham and Marvin 2001). 
One such infrastructure project was the Lake Plaza (Plaza del Lago o Laguito). Situated at the 
heart of the neighborhood adjacent to the boulevard, the site for the plaza was originally a brick 
yard with a large threading pit for brickmaking. Each time it rained, the mud pit transformed into 
a vast lagoon. The urban bourgeoisies who lived along the boulevard found the development of a 
lagoon in their backyards to be problematic. They claimed that when the mud pit filled with 
water it was “disease-ridden” cesspool that was “detrimental” to their health (Dalla Fontana 
2003: 28). They demanded the government take action. So the city evaluated their options and 
decided it would be both efficient and quite pleasant to convert the mud pit-turned lagoon into a 
proper lake with French-style gardens and a grotto around it. They called it Lake Plaza. The 
middle and upper class residents were initially quite content with the government’s solution. 
They embraced Lake Plaza and used it for recreational purposes, noting that it offered all the 
“perks distinguished society could want” (ibid). Yet, the solution for Lake Plaza soon exposed a 
larger urban problem: the lack of drainage infrastructure. By constructing more impervious 
surfaces in the site without adequate drainage infrastructure, the lake overflowed and impeded 
residents from using the “perks” Lake Plaza offered. The standing water attracted mosquitoes 
and soon the lake was considered “disease-ridden.” Lake Plaza went from being the pride to the 
bane of the neighborhood. This was an obvious problem for city officials who, through Candioti 
Sur, were attempting to cleanse this part of Santa Fe from the social and physical ills that other 
neighborhoods bore witness to. In the context of creating a modern Santa Fe, flooding was one of 
those ills. Mayor Manuel Irigoyen, one of the key political figures behind some of the great 
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modernist projects of Santa Fe’s Belle Époque (1900-1920), thus ordered the infilling of the lake 
and the leveling off of the land around it.
2
 
 
 
Figure 9. Lake Plaza in 1907. Source: Dalla Fontana, 2003. 
 
Fed by the concern among the urban bourgeoisies over disease and health issues, city 
administrators planned Candioti Sur as a clean, orderly and above all else, a “moral” space that 
aimed to overcome the ills of the disease-ridden, disorganized and immoral spaces of the city 
that were cropping up at the time (Scott 1998). Coinciding with the construction of heavily 
engineered – and thus considered scientific and rational – infrastructure projects, such as the 
Colgante Bridge, the railroad and the port, was another kind of project premised on the 
discursive construction of Candioti Sur as the “fruitful terrain where fertile seed of the republic 
was planted” (Dalla Fontana 2003: 30). This discourse took material form vis-à-vis three 
interconnected functions: place marketing, land ownership and education. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, waves of European immigrants flooded Santa Fe, lured by the employment 
opportunities namely in the railroad industry. As the center of modernity and on the path to 
                                                          
2
 The former Lake Plaza, which is now called Plaza Pueyrredón, is still highly prone to flooding after heavy rains.  
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becoming comparable to its European counterparts, Santa Fe became the headquarters of the 
French Railway Company (Empresa de Ferrocarriles Franceses), which by no coincidence, was 
established in Candioti Sur. In fact, the railroad played an integral role in the development of the 
neighborhood as well as in the everyday lives of the Italian, French and Spanish immigrants, 
who obtained jobs with the railroad. The railroad not only maintained central operations in 
Candioti Sur, but it also provided workers with trade skills in metallurgy, mechanics and 
carpentry, which were crucial in the development of the city’s skilled workforce (Vittori 1997). 
In other words, the railroad invested in its workers. Because of that, employment with the French 
Railway Company was highly sought after. It also provided workers with access to credit, which 
facilitated the purchase of land. Capitalizing on the existing flow of skilled workers to Candioti 
Sur vis-à-vis the railroad, the state took an active role in marketing Candioti Sur as the ideal 
location for the development of a middle class. 
The purpose of the discursive project of Candioti Sur was to emancipate the “good” 
working – and soon-to-be middle class – people from the “risks of immorality” (Graham and 
Marvin 2001: 44). Using discourse rooted in the idea that people own their own labor, state 
agencies marketed Candioti Sur as an “Opportunity for speculators to make money; laborers to 
become landowners” and “One block from the boulevard for laborers and the wealthy” (Nueva 
Epoca newspaper in 1909, cited in Dalla Fontana 2003: 31). In their place marketing of Candioti 
Sur, the state promoted the well-ventilated “hygienic housing” in the neighborhood, accentuating 
the differences between the organized and “moral” spaces of the modernist project and the dirty, 
disorganized and disease-ridden spaces of the western periphery (Vittori 1997). This 
demonstrates how the state mobilized discourse to construct a social order in the city. Candioti 
Sur was discursively constructed as morally superior while others like the westernmost 
neighborhood were constituted as indelibly inferior, unsanitary and impure. In this way, state 
agencies placed the very visible burden of risk as well as the invisible burden of marginality onto 
specific spaces in the city’s west in the interest of luring a certain social class to the east. They 
also encouraged citizenship through discourse. One state agency linked land of Candioti Sur with 
the moral basis of citizenship, using discourse like “Here there are no voters without houses…” 
(Dalla Fontana 2003: 31). By encouraging and legitimizing land ownership principally among 
skilled European immigrants who came to Santa Fe with an already ingrained, capitalist sense of 
“saving and progress,” state agencies simultaneously discouraged and excluded lower-income 
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sectors of society from locating in Candioti Sur (Dalla Fontana 2003: 34). Residents today 
reproduce this type of discourse juxtaposing Candioti Sur with the rest of the city. Nacho, one of 
my interlocutors from Candioti Sur, made sure I was aware of just how “different” Candioti Sur 
was compared to the rest of Santa Fe. He told me, “The other neighborhoods in your study have 
nothing to do with Candioti Sur. The Centenario neighborhood and Candioti Sur, for example, 
have nothing to do with each other. Due to cultural and educational reasons, we are very 
different.”3 
  Nacho was not exaggerating. Education was a crucial factor that set Candioti Sur apart 
from the rest of the city. It was part of becoming a modern city “whereby the few who know-
how and own-how maintain domination over the many who do not know-how or own-how” 
(Luke 2010: 68, from Disrupted Cities). As part of the overall logic of the urban improvement 
project, once people owned land, the next step was to educate them. Hence, education was not 
only an integral part of the creation of a modern Santa Fe; it was a key aspect in the production 
of ideal subjects because of the capacity for personal empowerment. The ideal subjects were not 
necessarily European immigrants themselves, for the railroad already provided them with 
additional educational opportunities. Rather, the ideal subjects produced by educating the 
children of immigrants who would go on to become government experts as well as members of 
the upper middle class. Horacio, one of my interlocutors, told me, “The first generation wanted 
their children to be better off than they were. They – and the school teachers – pushed their 
children to study. So the neighborhood went from being a neighborhood of working class to a 
neighborhood of ‘qualified professionals’ – those that went on to get college degrees.”4 
According to Gramsci, one of the most important functions of a state is "to raise the great mass 
of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to 
the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling class" 
(SPN 258). In the early 1900s the neighborhood school founders considered it their “moral duty” 
to educate the children of Canditoti Sur in “hygienic institutions” with “adequate ventilation”, 
thus raising them to a level attune with the objectives of modernity and progress (Dalla Fontana 
2003: 30-31). One such institution was the School of Art and Trade (today the La Salle Jobson 
School) whose founding mission was, in fact, “to facilitate the instruction and improvement of 
                                                          
3
 Interview on January 22, 2013.  
4
 Interview on January 28, 2013.  
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the proletariat of the neighborhood” (Dalla Fontana 2003: 30). Education reinforced the 
discourses of place marketing and land ownership, which together formed the foundation for 
ideal, modern subjecthood – what I call the Candioti Class.  
The Candioti Class, who embodied the incursion of order and morality, became elite 
social markers of modernity. This ideal, educated, and morally superior group was 
entrepreneurial and, because of their access to different forms of capital, were able to transcend 
relationships with government officials based on dependency, like political clientelism. In 
contrast to the unequal power relations in the poor neighborhoods of the western periphery where 
residents’ livelihoods were dependent on what politicians and government officials could them, 
the power relations of the Candioti Class allowed them to become the politicians and government 
officials. As I was repeatedly told by my interlocutors, Candioti Sur has a lot of well-off 
residents and many of them are politicians. Indeed, the last three mayors of Santa Fe came from 
Candioti.
5
 When I asked Federico, one of my key interlocutors in Candioti Sur, what made 
Candioti Sur different from other neighborhoods, he said, “It was a neighborhood where people 
worked towards excellence. The first residents went in search of businessmen, who had public 
recognition and economic power – and likewise, privilege – to serve as councilmembers for the 
municipal government.”6  
The strategy of inserting economic strongmen into the government involved multiple 
processes at different scales. At the neighborhood level, residents sought out the local shop 
owners and business elites and elected them as their neighborhood representatives with the hope 
that they could parlay their economic prowess into political progress. Their economic resources 
provided them the bargaining power to make more credible commitments to the city, which in 
turn gave them social and political capital (Theesfled 2011). Their social, political and economic 
capital together would determine the degree to which the city government would be responsive 
to their demands. How well they could leverage their capital within the larger political system 
would allow them to strengthen their positions, not only at the neighborhood level, but also 
within the larger urban political system. By supplely leveraging their capital, they could harness 
enormous political advantages which allowed them to bypass bureaucratic red tape and utilize 
                                                          
5
 Former Peronist Party Mayors Marcelo Álvarez (1999-2003) and Ezequiel Martin Balbarrey (2003-2007) both 
came from Candioti Sur and still reside in the neighborhood. Former Radical Party Mayor Mario Barletta (2007-
2011) came from Candioti Norte, the neighborhood to the immediate north.  
6
 Interview on January 17, 2013.  
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their privileged positions in government to respond to the neighborhood’s problems. This, my 
interlocutors told me, was called amiguismo which roughly translates to an old boys’ network. 
Through amiguismo, the Candioti Class actively constructed and maintained key positions in the 
government. Their higher levels of education provided them with privileged access to 
information and knowledge, thereby furthering their social and political connections.  
Amiguismo is based on a relational politics whereby the positionality of the players and 
the consequential alignment of their social, political and economic capital becomes the 
foundation to simultaneously “fix the problems” of the neighborhood and of government.7 In 
amiguismo, the educated Candioti Class with all their expertise have considerable capacity to 
make demands on government in terms of their own perceptions of their interests both visible 
and vital to the political objectives of the city. Their education and expertise allowed them 
particular leverage in amuisimo in relation to the identification and management of risk. As Rose 
(1996: 349) notes, the “novel intellectual techniques of risk identification, risk assessment and 
risk management bring into existence a whole new set of professional obligations” in which it is 
imperative for experts to “reduce the risk they may pose to others – their children, members of 
'the general public'.” For instance, in the early 1900s the Candioti Class sought to mitigate the 
risk of crossing the north-south railroad tracks. These tracks cut Candioti Sur off from the rest of 
the city and posed a risk for anyone who attempted to cross them. In the process of looking for a 
solution, the neighborhood’s elected representatives submitted a proposal for the construction of 
a footbridge to cross over the railroad tracks. Within months of their proposal submission, the 
city responded. They constructed a footbridge over the railroad lines (Dalla Fontana 2003: 55). 
The Candioti Class’ position allowed them to influence government decisions to their advantage. 
Through the self-reinforcing process of amiguismo, their privileged position became the source 
of their power, while at the time allowing them to gain more of it.  
 
3.3 Sacrificial Land and Sacrificial Subjects  
Critical scholarship on vulnerability emphasizes the historic social, political and 
economic characteristics that render people vulnerable (see Blaikie et al. 1994; Bankoff 2003; 
Pelling 2003; Ribot 2014). Much of that literature as well as local discourse tells us that the 
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elite’s access to economic resources and political connections results in them getting what they 
want: the ear of those in power. Those in power are, in turn, responsive to the demands of the 
elite. Up to this point, the case of Candioti Sur fits that narrative. But not all of Candioti Sur was 
created equal. In this section, I examine why, despite their status as ideal, modern subjects and 
relations of amiguismo, the Candioti Class failed to get the government to respond to their 
demands to reduce flood risk – even when that risk was recast as health-related. I show that the 
lack of government response, which had dire consequences during the floods of 1982 and 1983, 
stemmed from the very intentional production of a “sacrifice zone” in the south of Candioti Sur 
(Lerner 2010). Lerner (2010: 3) argues that “low-income and minority populations, living 
adjacent to heavy industry and military bases, are required to make disproportionate health and 
economic sacrifices that more affluent people can avoid.” Borrowing the term from Lerner 
(2010), I argue that the government consciously made the southern sector of Candioti Sur a 
sacrifice zone, thereby spatially diverted risk onto a land and a people they deemed undeserving 
of state investment.  
The spatial and social division of the neighborhood hinged on one particular 
infrastructure: the Caseros Ditch. Only when there was an influx of capital – from mega 
infrastructure projects funded by the central government – did the city government take interest 
in the land to the south of the Caseros Ditch, known as El Chilcal.
8
 Indeed, central government-
funded improvement projects not only prompted the city’s revaluation of El Chilcal, but it also 
triggered local investment of capital in it. The government labeled poor people who inhabited El 
Chilcal as “encroachers” and they therefore mattered little in the way of urban political 
processes. The political elites surely did not need their votes, nor did they care that they occupy 
the sacrifice zone of El Chilcal, until of course they saw the profitability from capital being 
drawn to large-scale infrastructure projects around El Chilcal (Mitchell 2014). The label of 
“encroachers” was less about their poverty, and more a designation of these inhabitants as 
sacrificial subjects who served to soak up – quite literally – the unequal distribution of risk 
placed on the land so that the ideal, modern and exalted ones did not have to deal with it. This is 
akin to Rose’s (1996: 337) point which states that government produces risk subjects “in terms 
of an ethic of activity which establishes new divisions between those who are considered to be 
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competent citizens and those who are not.” That ethic of activity is produced not only through 
territorialized government practices, but crucially through the autonomous practices of risk 
subjects themselves. As Ribot (2014: 690) states, “individuals internalize the explanations of risk 
as if it were produced by their behavior and not by broader social and political-economic 
forces… By blaming themselves for the risk, risk subjects take on the burden of self-protection 
rather than seeking social protection. This is a causal link that dampens government 
accountability and demand for response.”  
When city officials established Candioti Sur on one of the highest tracts of land in the 
early 1900s, they provided it with a host of urban infrastructure and services in the name of 
“public” interest. Yet there was one crucial type of infrastructure they failed to provide, which 
the story of Lake Plaza foreshadowed. In this neighborhood which was planned as aesthetically 
and morally superior to other neighborhoods in Santa Fe, it was not the proximity to the Santa Fe 
River or port that put residents at risk of flooding. It was the lack of stormwater drains. For the 
Candioti Class, the lack of drainage infrastructure constituted an indirect flood risk and the 
presence of standing water posed a direct risk to their health as the deep pools of runoff and 
sludge were seen as “filthy” and “diseased-ridden” (Dalla Fontana 2003: 56). A newspaper 
article from 1912 stated, “Due to the lack of stormwater drains, the standing water in some 
streets of the Candioti neighborhood constitutes a health risk to inhabitants” (cited in Dalla 
Fontana 2003: 56). This risk, however, did not affect everyone in Candioti Sur equally. Clearly, 
there was a gentle slope from the north to the south of the neighborhood leading towards the 
port, but it was not only physical geography that determined which parts of Candioti Sur were 
risky. Risk was produced by a complex set of socio-natural relations whereby both the state and 
private industry were implicated.  
In 1910, when the port was established to the south of Candioti Sur, the Port Authority 
did everything it could to ensure its success. The location of the port had already changed twice 
since Santa Fe’s founding. The constant flooding of the port in the nearby town of Colastiné 
made its reestablishment near the urban core of Santa Fe particularly crucial. This new port could 
not flood. The lack of stormwater drains in Candioti Sur, directly north of the port, complicated 
its drainage situation. Thus, the Port Authority, sanctioned by the state, dug a canal to divert 
pluvial and industrial runoff away from the port. This “canal” known as Caseros Ditch was an 
open ditch that ran parallel to the east-west railroad lines and divided Candioti Sur into two 
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sectors: the residential north and the industrial south. Indeed, Caseros Ditch was a spatial 
signifier that divided the neighborhood into the not-so-risky higher land and the risky low-lying 
land. Caseros Ditch also became a social signifier that separated the ideal, modern subjects, i.e. 
the Candioti Class, from those who would be sacrificed for the sake of the port and the modern 
subjects. Since it was important for the city to maintain good relations with the Port Authority, 
the main economic driver of Santa Fe, it was both politically and economically more efficacious 
to sacrifice the unwanted southern sector, shifting flood risk onto this land rather than onto the 
northern residential sector or the port.   
 
 
Figure 10. Aerial view of Caseros Ditch dividing El Chilcal from Candioti Sur circa 1930. 
Source: Dalla Fontana, 2003.  
 
Since El Chilcal had the lowest elevation in the neighborhood, it was far from a priority 
for the city. It was purposefully excluded from the city’s modernist plans for Candioti Sur. Its 
low elevation, sandy soils and proximity to the port made residential development prohibitive. It 
was a “sacrifice zone” – surrendered to the industrial giants at the time: the port, the railroad and 
the brewery (Lerner 2010). Caseros Ditch sealed the fate of El Chilcal. The very physicality and 
El Chilcal 
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spatial separation of El Chilcal rendered it an ideal place for the development of private 
industries where they could easily exploit the land and dump their runoff. In the process, these 
industries infilled the land, reducing the financial burden on the city government as well as the 
liability of the state for protection from flooding. El Chilcal constituted an opaque zone whereby 
relations between industry, developers, and state agents blurred the lines of formality and 
informality. Over time, because of its proximity to the port and lack of regulation and 
enforcement, it became populated by unskilled day laborers. Their employment with the port was 
erratic and they did not have the income to buy property or fit into the social space of the 
northern sector of the neighborhood. So they rented low cost irregular parcels of land from the 
Territorial Credit Company (Compañia de Credito Territorial), a developer that bought up a 
sizeable portion of the land that did not belong to industry. There, exposed to the mix of sewage 
and industrial runoff that spilled over the Caseros Ditch every time it rained, they built wood 
shacks with thatched roofs. But these shacks stood out too much against the backdrop of the 
Candioti Class’ European-style houses and the unsightly flows of sludge and foul smells 
emanating from the ditch were enough for the Candioti Class to make complaints. On the basis 
of a health and sanitation risk, they demanded that the city enclose the ditch. As a first step, the 
state took disciplinary action – not against the Port Authority that constructed the ditch, but 
against the poor who settled in El Chilcal.  
In 1913, under Ordinance 1336, the city government labeled the settlement of El Chilcal 
an “encroachment” and prohibited the construction of wood shacks in the entire eastern half of 
Santa Fe.  Adding to residents’ precarious living conditions, the poor of El Chilcal were now 
liable to have their homes destroyed. The city government gave residents of El Chilcal eight 
months before they would raze their houses. Eight months came and went without eviction. 
Residents of El Chilcal continued to occupy the zone for another 40 years before they were 
removed (Dalla Fontana 2003: 80). Since El Chilcal was already considered a sacrifice zone 
where industries could dump their runoff not just on the land, but also on the bodies who 
inhabited the land, the state tolerated their occupation (Voyles 2015). And the poor inhabitants of 
El Chilcal served a purpose. They would never be ideal, modern subjects. Instead they were the 
sacrificial subjects of Candioti Sur – sacrificed so that neither the Candioti Class nor the port 
would carry the burden of risk. Furthermore, there was a kind of congruence between what was 
deemed “good” for the poor who were allowed to occupy El Chilcal and what was considered 
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good for the city’s ideal, modern subjects. In this sense, there developed a simultaneous 
“effectiveness for the regulator and happiness for the regulated” (Rose 1998: 122).  
Since the city considered El Chilcal a sacrifice zone with sacrificial subjects, it had little 
incentive to clean up the southern margins or evict the encroachers. But the impulse came in the 
1950s when there was a nationwide focus on large-scale infrastructure projects. At the core of 
national economic policy, President Perón made record investment in Argentina’s infrastructure 
during the decade of the 1950s. For Santa Fe, that meant a renovation of the infrastructure in and 
around the port. One major project was the rehabilitation of Alem Avenue (Avenida Alem) which 
in reality was more than a local avenue that looped around the port; it was part of a national 
highway. Capitalizing on this highway project that formed the southern border of Candioti Sur, 
the city paved a street (Marcial Candioti Street) that connected the neighborhood with Alem 
Avenue, giving it a new direct access route to the city center (El Litoral 1957). Where capital is 
successfully drawn into large infrastructures, it often flows into smaller projects (Mitchell 2014). 
The infusion of public funds for infrastructure projects led to a revaluation of El Chilcal. The 
central government-funded infrastructure projects that were being carried out around El Chilcal 
rendered it “colonizable by capital” and claimable for residential development (Ranganathan 
2015: 14). The city sold the land of El Chilcal to a private developer that built “chalet” style 
houses, touted as a “beautiful residential development” by a local newspaper – a necessary step 
to finance El Chilcal’s infrastructure needs (El Litoral 1957). It meant that after 55 years of 
demand making, the time had finally come to enclose Caseros Ditch to add cohesion to the 
neighborhood (Dalla Fontana 2003: 59). 
 
3.4 Slipshod, Self-help and Clandestine Solutions  
In 1968, at the height of El Chilcal’s transformation, the city culverted Caseros Ditch 
making it a closed-conduit storm drain. But, in keeping with the historic precedents of building 
and (re)building infrastructure in Candioti Sur (and arguably the entire city), the culverted ditch 
failed to be a permanent solution to the neighborhood’s drainage problems. The new Caseros 
Drains resulted in increased risk for residents. Compounding drainage problems, the southern 
sector of Candioti Sur was becoming increasingly urbanized which meant more impervious 
surfaces and storm water flows into the closed-conduit drain. The drain, however, was not built 
to sufficient capacity so with every heavy rain, houses and business within a four block radius of 
91 
 
Caseros Drain would flood. The risk to the Candiotti Class was no longer a natural or health-
related problem. It was an infrastructural problem. Residents on both sides of the drain were at 
risk of getting themselves and their belongings wet. It was only a matter of time before the 
combination of the rise in the Paraná and lack of drainage capacity of Caseros Drain would prove 
disastrous for Candioti Sur.  
Caseros Drain remains a sore subject – one that had plagued the neighborhood for over a 
century. My interlocutors repeatedly complained to me about the Caseros Drain: Why should 
they, the Candioti Class, have to wait so long for a solution? After all they were not the poor, but 
the ideal, modern subjects (see Chapter 4, the politics of waiting). Federico, one of my 
interlocutors, griped that the culverted Caseros Drain was an example of the poor construction of 
infrastructure in the city – a comment that echoed what residents of other neighborhoods had told 
me. Federico said, “Here in Candioti Sur we have all the necessary infrastructure – things that 
other people in the city don’t have. But it doesn’t make it any less risky for us if they [state 
experts] keep doing things a medias.”9 A medias is a colloquial expression used to describe 
something that is done slipshod, carelessly and lazily. Residents of Candioti Sur believe that one 
of the greatest errors of government is constructing slipshod, short-term infrastructural solutions. 
Federico went on, “Of course you can’t prevent rain, but you can prevent a risky situation as a 
function of drainage…but not if they do a crap job on the infrastructure!”10 Residents claim that 
while rain and the rivers pose direct risk of flooding, slipshod infrastructural solutions posed an 
indirect risk – and one that is infuriating to residents. Importantly, infrastructure are not 
“separated and autonomous”; they are linked to humans as well as to nature and “co-evolve 
closely in their interrelationships with urban development and with urban space” (Graham 2001: 
8).  
Residents’ criticality of the city’s slipshod drainage infrastructure goes hand-in-hand with 
the city’s failed attempts at fixing Caseros Ditch. Their criticism intensified in direct relation to 
their experience of flooding in 1982 and 1983 when the Paraná River overflowed its banks. 
Flooding was particularly bad in 1983 and caused the collapse of the Colgante Bridge. It was the 
worst flood residents of Candioti Sur had ever experienced. Part of the severity has to do with the 
connections of the drainage network. When the water at the port reaches a height of 7.10 meters, 
                                                          
9
 Interview on January 18, 2013.  
10
 Interview on January 29, 2013.  
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it starts to flow up through and out of the storm water drains, thereby flooding Candioti Sur. 
Elena, one of my interlocutors, explained, “The biggest flood here was in 1983. The Paraná 
[River] reached 7.35 meters high then went down to 7.10 meters, and water came through the 
grates of the storm drains. From Alberdi [Street] to the Caseros Drain was full of water. It was a 
meter high! People used canoes to get around. They also built wooden footbridges just to get 
from one side of the Caseros Drain to the other.”11 Relief came to the flood-prone area around 
Caseros Drain fifteen years after this flood. In 1998, the city installed a major trunk drain with 
two drainage pipes of 1.70 meters in diameter with sufficient carrying capacity. Elena told me, 
“Since then the flooding caused by rain around the drain has been reduced. But before then we 
had to help ourselves.”12  
The lack of an effective solution to Caseros Drain situation prompted residents to come 
up with their own solutions to reduce the risk of flooding. There were two specific self-help 
solutions they employed: flood protection door barriers and elevated houses. Walking around 
Caseros Drain, I was particularly struck by the presence of door barriers and elevated houses, for 
these types of adaptations were not typical of the northern sector of Candioti Sur. Aware of the 
flood risks presented by owning a property near the Caseros Ditch, residents used their own 
resources to install wooden, metal or even concrete slabs in front of the doors at the entrance of 
their houses. These removable slabs act as barriers preventing the entrance of water. Federico 
noted that his door barriers made him feel less vulnerable, especially during heavy rains: “If I 
hadn’t installed a door barrier, water would have entered my house a number of times. It’s 
dreadful to think about! I have so much to lose….”13 Some residents even went so far as to 
elevate their houses. Instead of building them from ground level, they elevated the foundation of 
the house about a meter high so that you had to walk up a flight of stairs to enter the house.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Interview on January 10, 2013.  
12
 Interview on January 10, 2013.  
13
 Interview on January 18, 2013.  
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Figure 11. Door barriers and elevated houses in Candioti Sur. Photos by author, 2013. 
 
When I asked Elena whether these two types of adaptations were planned or built onto 
houses as an afterthought, she responded, “Considering the history of the zone around Caseros, 
residents took precautions to make sure that the level of the house was well above the level of 
where they estimated water could reach. So they planned their houses like that. They took into 
account the recommendations of their neighbors and of the municipality. And, obviously, they 
had the money to do so.”14 In contrast, residents of the low-lying many low-lying neighborhoods 
of Santa Fe, like Los Angeles (see Chapter 5), added these types of structural adaptations after 
having built their houses. In addition to having sufficient economic resources, access to 
information on zoning has a lot to do with the residents’ decisions to undertake structural 
adaptations. Residents in Candioti Sur claimed that most peripheral neighborhoods of Santa Fe, 
including El Chilcal in Candioti Sur, should never have been inhabited. Horacio, for instance, 
blamed the city, “They let people build houses in zones where they shouldn’t! People shouldn’t 
live in those places! Not in permanent structures, at least!”15 However, necessity and the flow of 
capital propelled the city’s expansion into areas that were low-lying and flood prone. Adapting 
their houses to flood prone land a function not only of economic resources, but also the ability to 
communicate with government officials and have access to information. As Elena noted, prior to 
the residential development on the land that once was El Chilcal, government officials 
communicated the risk so that residents could anticipate flooding and build their houses 
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 Interview on January 10, 2013.  
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 Interview on January 28, 2013.  
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accordingly. Thus, in addition to economic resources, access to information on zoning and risk 
on which residents could base their decisions about housing construction was key in adaptation.  
In search of household solutions to minimize their risk of flooding, the Candioti Class 
also used their privileged positions to skirt rules and regulations, even while they enforced them 
on others. In talking to Elena about the neighborhood, she described what she called residents 
“bad habits.” I imagined she was referring to litter, which often blocks drains and causes 
flooding. However, she went on to tell me about the clandestine connections that people make 
between their roof gutters and sewers, which was illegal. I was confused. Using the word 
“clandestine” in relation to Candioti Sur did not make geographic sense. I needed clarification. 
“You mean in peripheral neighborhoods?” I asked. Looking somewhat guilty, not to mention 
annoyed at my confusion, Elena exclaimed, “No! I’m talking about right here in Candioti! I even 
have one!”16 Apparently these clandestine connections were common in Candioti Sur. Due to 
slipshod infrastructure or insufficient capacity, or a combination of both, stormwater drains in 
Candioti Sur cannot handle intense rains. The drains in the street overflow and are unable to 
receive anymore household runoff, which causes residents’ central patios and courtyards to 
flood. To avoid this residents connect their rain gutters to the sewer system. Elena emphasized 
that residents in Candioti Sur know that it is wrong, but that it does not stop them from breaking 
the rules. She told me, “I don’t have any problems. It’s clandestine. I know it’s wrong. But it’s 
very difficult to verify because the authorities have to have a warrant to enter a private house. 
Still, the way of verifying clandestine connections is simple: all you have to do is throw some 
water down the grate and see if it comes out onto the street. But authorities cannot just enter 
people’s houses.” She added, “To make these types of connections in poorer neighborhoods it is 
very difficult. Here in Candioti Sur people have no problem; they have money to pay. All they 
have to do is pay some handyman who will keep his mouth shut.”17  
 
3.5 Othering and the Normalization of Risk 
In writing on pollution and taboo, Douglas argued that “ideas about separating, purifying, 
demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an 
inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between within and 
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 Interview on January 10, 2013.  
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 Intreview on January 10, 2013.  
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without, above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is 
created (1966: 5). Douglas’ work has contributed to a lineage of literature about symbolic 
boundary maintenance in order to establish certain norms as good and necessary and others as 
bad. According to Kingfisher (2007: 195), efforts to differentiate, exclude and “other”, through 
which the “inside,” “normal” and “safe” are produced “occur on an ongoing basis via the 
mundane interactions which constitute the day-to-day reproduction of institutional 
arrangements” and social order in the city. Likewise, there are spaces and times whereby those 
efforts to other are intensified, such as in the low-lying, peripheral neighborhoods, or when the 
rivers rise, or during a prolonged period of heavy rains. The ways that people in the city define 
and differentiate themselves in relation to other people and places, as Elena did above, are 
products not only of the social order that is created through city planning and infrastructure 
development. They are products of the discourses of risk. Instrumental to that discursive 
production of risk are, as Rose puts it, the “self-governing properties of the subjects of 
government themselves in a whole variety of locales and localities” (1996: 352). That is, the 
discourse of residents themselves determines, in part, who is included and excluded.    
Residents repeatedly told me that there were certain places in the city that consistently get 
flooded due to their location on the floodplain or lack of adequate drainage, and that the people 
who inhabit those places are “used to” getting flooded. For them, flooding was “normal” and, 
flood risk, as Bankoff (2003: 153) posits, “has become an integral part of the daily human 
experience.” If it is the case that flooding was normal for certain people, then the question 
becomes one of how the normalization of flood risk is socially produced. I argue that the 
normalization of risk is an artifact of two interlinked factors: the physical planning of the city 
and its related infrastructure and discourses on risk – both of which are related to how risk is 
framed. In other words, the normalization of risk is both a physical, spatial as well as a discursive 
process through which notions and locations of risk are constructed by physically separating 
people and places (through infrastructure) and discursively by labeling them as “unsafe” socially 
eschewing those who do who not fit the precepts of social order or ideal, modern subjecthood to 
the margins of society.  
Today the city of Santa Fe is an almost completely enclosed by infrastructure. 
Embankments, elevated highways, and pumping stations line the perimeter of the city. Their 
purpose is the same as that of their predecessors – to control the river. Where these infrastructure 
96 
 
are planned was not based on what Porter (1995) calls “mechanical objectivity.” Of course, 
modern Santa Fe and its infrastructure were built through techno-scientific processes of planning 
and engineering. But these processes aligned with a more abstract vision. And that vision reflects 
the kind of social order the city’s architects and engineers aimed to create at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Underlying planning for a desired social order was the unequal distribution of 
risk: the division between east and west. The colonial core and northeastern neighborhoods 
comprise the highest elevations of the city, and as such were planned for the middle and upper 
classes. Embankments made of concrete blocks and geotextile blankets protect those residents, 
notably the Candioti Class, while the embankments along the poor western periphery are mostly 
earthen, prone to erosion and do not have as successful of a track record for flood protection as 
those in the east. Similarly, as mentioned above, neighborhoods like Candioti Sur were provided 
with infrastructure that are still lacking in many neighborhoods today. Indeed, planning and 
infrastructure provision of the city mark the physical parameters of risk – and reflect the existing 
social hierarchies that shape who gets and who does not get infrastructure.  
While planning and infrastructure provision incorporate the vision for a modern Santa Fe 
and demarcate the parameters of risk, they also influence the ways in which risk is discursively 
produced. Indeed, the planning and infrastructure of the city has created a normative grid to 
discursively assess risk by comparing certain places and people with the norms and aspirations of 
those citizens who have been elevated as ideal, modern subjects. For instance, locating ‘inside’ 
the ring of defenses as residents call the embankment or on the higher land in the east of the city, 
is equated with wealth, education, and order. They are the included. In contrast, settling outside 
the ring of defenses or on the low-lying land at the peripheries is considered befitting of those 
whose lifestyles or labor has conditioned them to get flooded. Hence the distinction between 
what Rose (1996) calls the “affiliated” and the “marginalized.” Making the distinction clear, 
Rose asserts, “To remain affiliated one must…have become integrated within all the practices of 
everyday life, sustained by a heterogeneous array of 'civilized' images and devices for lifestyle 
promotion…But the marginal are those who cannot be considered affiliated to such sanctioned 
and civilized cultural communities. Either they are not considered as affiliated to any collectivity 
by virtue of their incapacity to manage themselves as subjects or they are considered affiliated to 
some kind of 'anti-community' whose morality, lifestyle or comportment is considered a threat or 
a reproach to public contentment and political order” (1996: 340).  
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Indeed, the notion of who is at risk is not only a function of planning and infrastructure 
development, but also a discursive function of the purported characteristics of the people who 
occupy them. One morning while talking about the natural cycles of the Paraná River, I asked 
Federico, the government employee and resident of Candioti Sur, if the river still poses a flood 
risk. His response reveals just how the Candioti Class differentiate themselves, in terms of risk, 
from other people and places in the city: “No, here [Candioti Sur] there isn’t much of a risk 
anymore. They closed the defenses and fixed Caseros Ditch. So, no. The people at risk are those 
who live on the riverbanks or the islanders.
18
 They are at risk of flooding from the rise in the 
river, but the floods also benefit them because it brings them fish. Anyway, those people are used 
to living with risk.”19 A pattern quickly emerged from my interviews with residents from all 
neighborhoods. Flooding was not viewed necessarily as a problem for people who lived on the 
riverbanks or in the islands. Rather, flooding was “beneficial” for them because it contributed to 
their livelihoods. Flooding was something this group of people was used to, and risk was 
something they embodied. Former Mayor of Santa Fe, Mario Barletta, even told me “Risk for the 
people of the island zone is culturally accepted.”20 The common problematic vision is apparent: 
the people on riverbanks and islanders live in a waterworld; they are a rugged brood with a kind 
of primitive mentality whereby they clearly ‘prefer’ to live with flood risk rather than have 
greater security living on higher, drier ground or within the limits of the embankments. The 
following newspaper article about the islanders also reflects this view:  
 
They are islanders. A handful of men, women and children who daily awaken on a piece 
of land surrounded by water, who are nourished by the river, who develop with a 
landscape that sometimes turns against them. And that is when they prefer to stay and 
resist. Because they are used to the roughness of a life stripped down to the most basic, 
which may be a roof that shelters them or a good plate of food that nourishes them. Life 
on the island is different. And it is not difficult only when the river rises. It is always 
difficult (El Litoral 1984: unpaginated, emphasis added).  
 
The way that this passage, among countless others, describes the islanders – used to the 
roughness of life – as if they were conditioned for economic hardship and flooding, is a clear 
example of how the normalization of risk is discursively produced. Local discourse produces a 
                                                          
18
 Santa Fe is surrounded by small islands – some of which are inhabited by fishermen.  
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 Interview on August 15, 2012. 
20
 Interview on March 11, 2013.  
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perception whereby the islanders embody risk as a “constant feature” of daily life (Bankoff 2003: 
153). Horacio described the islanders similarly, stating, “At best, it’s like an extreme sport. They 
construct their houses knowing that the water is going to take them away. After the water 
recedes, they return and reconstruct their houses in the same place. Why? That’s life. They can 
be at the point of dying thousands of times, but they still go back and do it.”21  
Not only are the islanders and those who settle on the riverbanks identified as those who 
are supposed to flood; they are repeatedly described as being used to flooding. It is “normal” for 
them. So on April 29, 2003 when the Salado River covered a third of the city, residents expected 
the people located on the banks of the Salado River on the other side of the embankment to be 
the hardest hit. These were the inhabitants of Varadero Sarsotti, a piece of low-lying land that 
lies to the south of Centenario. During past floods, the inhabitants of Varadero Sarsotti suffered 
from flooding comparatively more than those “inside” the ring of defenses due to their increased 
exposure. Horacio told me, “Since they live on the banks of the river, they’ve gotten used to 
floods. They have their community, they have their families…and they have more risk. But 
that’s how they live.”22 In a historic turn of events, the 2003 flood left them dry. Varadero 
Sarsotti remained untouched by the floodwaters because the very infrastructure that was meant to 
keep the water out of Santa Fe instead kept it in the city and away from Varadero Sarsotti. For 
the residents of the urban core, it was ironic – ironic and disappointing. They, the ideal, modern 
subjects were supposed to be better protected than the “primitive” people on the riverbanks. This 
is a prime example of reality running counter to the dominant local discourses of risk. 
Nonetheless, residents chalked it up to a freak event. For, the normalization of risk is a form of 
praxis through which the ideal, modern subjects constitute themselves.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: The Invisible Power of Discourse   
This chapter has shown infrastructure development and planning practices, both 
materially and discursively, shape the unequal distribution of flood risk. Through material 
practices, the state carved out different spaces in the city by servicing some neighborhoods with 
infrastructure and allowing the middle class to settle there, while consciously allowing the poor 
to settle on land not serviced by infrastructure and/or at exposure to flood risk, such as 
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floodplains, riverbeds or stormwater channels – until that land was deemed “developable” by 
flows of capital. Discourse, then, reinforced and normalized the uneven distribution of risk 
between the organized and “moral” spaces and the disorganized and “immoral” spaces of the 
city. Both materially and discursively, the government produced ideal modern subjects in the 
“moral” spaces and risk subjects by allowing people to settle in sacrifice zones, which they 
deemed undeserving of state investment.  
Social inclusion and exclusion was not only materially and discursively produced by the 
state. It was also co-constituted by the discourses of residents themselves as subjects of 
government (Rose 1996). This was done by a discursive move to blame victims and to turn 
victims toward blaming themselves. I have shown that the groups historically marginalized and 
deprived of the physical protections and secure land, are also those most exposed to flood 
disasters and get blamed for them and accept that blame. I demonstrate that inequality deepens in 
the city, with some protected (the Candioti Class with their political-economic connections, for 
instance) and others at greater risk (those who rely on political clientelism for access to 
resources), while being covered by a discourse that blames the victims (and the beneficiaries) for 
choosing to live in risky (and secure) areas. By routing residents’ affective responses to the city’s 
risky and safe spaces through a discursive field defined by high-modern ideals, those who settled 
on low-lying land were labeled as inferior and immoral. This case highlights the invisible power 
of discourse in cultivating a false consciousness among both the risk subjects as well as the 
modern, ideal subjects, which results in the non-questioning and normalization of risk.  
Reflecting on the material and discursive production of risk in historical planning 
practices is useful for tracing causality and for theorizing contemporary vulnerability. Past 
planning and infrastructure decisions and discourses shaped contemporary risks. Yet, we must 
also consider that the discursive production of risk is a key practice not only of government, but 
also of its subjects. With an awareness of how citizens themselves as subjects of government are 
implicit in the discursive production of risk, we can more-effectively fight vulnerability and its 
underlying material inequities by brining attention to the illusion of neutrality and objectivism in 
infrastructure development and planning practices (Kilminster 1979; Gramsci 2000 [1971]). 
Because people internalize discourse, how government and its citizens identify who is at risk has 
important implications for the logics of inclusion and exclusion as well as for the allocation of 
responsibility and the taking on of response. In this way, discourse actively shapes the 
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construction of the material and social world by projecting framings of risk that shape 
vulnerability and belonging in the contemporary city.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
People, Politics and the (Re)Production of Vulnerability 
 
4.1 Introduction: Clientelism and Vulnerability  
 
“Political clientelism is like taking aspirin for cancer. It might help for a month, but after 
a while, I’ll need to take more and more aspirin until I die.” (Interview on November 11, 
2011.) 
 
The above remark by a high-ranking municipal official was perhaps the most concise 
statement about the unequal relationship between people and government I encountered during 
fieldwork. This relationship is the focus of the present chapter in which I trace the emergence of 
political clientelism and examine how it shapes people’s protections and vulnerabilities. While 
vulnerability scholars (Blaikie et al. 1994; Hewitt 1997; Pelling 1999; Ribot 1995, 2013a, 2014) 
view the relationship between people and government as critical among entrenched historical, 
social and political factors, the role of citizen-state relations remains an underexamined aspect of 
vulnerability. Part of my argument here, as part of a larger claim of this dissertation, is that 
vulnerability must be examined not simply with reference to hazards, impacts, maps, or statistics, 
but rather in terms of the relationship between people and government that shapes crucially 
citizens’ ability to influence government to respond to their needs.  
By narrating the history and development of a poor neighborhood in Santa Fe’s western 
periphery, Santa Rosa de Lima (hereafter Santa Rosa), I show how local citizens become 
involved in unequal relations of exchange not because they are duped, but because their interests 
are harnessed through consent, compromise and coercion. Referred to as a “petri dish” for 
clientelism by one government official, Santa Rosa has long been a prime electoral arena for 
politicians, the target of state-sponsored social programs and plans, and as such has generated 
incentives for politicians and their political parties to expand their influence. Most recently it has 
been the site of state-sponsored urban improvement projects, including street paving, sewer 
construction, and a land-titling project. Yet, despite these improvements, the people of Santa 
Rosa remain vulnerable in many ways – and exposure to flood risk is just one of them. Graciela, 
one of my interlocutors from Santa Rosa, made that clear when I approached her for the first 
time to introduce my study. She said, “Oh, the flood of 2003? Well, that flood marked a before 
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and after in the city, especially for the western periphery. But, most importantly, it brought to the 
fore all the political maneuvering and the historic linkages of people to politics.”1  
Starting with the critical premise that a flood is just one of the multiple causes of 
vulnerability, this chapter provides a broader understanding of vulnerability by situating it within 
wider debates on political clientelism. I define clientelism as an institution based on contingent 
exchange relations because of the way it structures and shapes access to goods, services and jobs 
through the actions of politicians, government officials, experts, political brokers and other 
intermediaries. Thus, my contribution frames vulnerability as a question of access to the material 
benefits as well as social and political protections structured and shaped by citizen-state 
relations. My argument is twofold. 
First, clientelism is largely an underexamined causal factor of vulnerability and urban 
environmental risk. It has been given little attention within the literature on vulnerability, with 
the exception of Kenny (2002) and Nelson and Finan (2009), who show that the policy programs 
designed to mitigate drought in Northeastern Brazil actually contribute to underlying 
vulnerabilities because of the persistence of patron-client relations. Much of the literature also 
fails to consider how locally embedded institutions, practices and relations like clientelism 
cultivate desires and “configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” to create a collective will that 
leads people towards the solutions desirable to the government and limits the other choices 
available to them (Li 2007: 5). Crucially, in this chapter and the next, by treating the local as a 
category that works within, not outside of, governmental programs and projects, I show how 
clientelism reinforces the government’s technocratic approach to risk while simultaneously 
offering temporary solutions that dull the pains of vulnerability.  
Clientelism has, however, received a lot of attention in the political science literature (see 
Roniger 2004; Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2009, 2011). Yet, despite the upsurge of work on 
clientelism coming out of political science, there remains a lack of conceptual clarity and 
consensus about the definition. Hicken (2011: 290) notes that although there is no generally 
accepted definition, the literature emphasizes “dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy and 
iteration” as key elements of clientelism. Early literature viewed clientelism as a social security 
system (Scott 1972), while, in later decades, political scientists drew our attention to how it 
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linked the poor masses with political elites (De la Torre 1992, 1998; Stokes 2005) and how it has 
become a form of social and political control (Fox 1994). With the exception of Scott (1972), 
what this literature had in common prior to the 2000s, was the belief that patron-client 
relationships would eventually disappear as democracy was established, reestablished or 
consolidated, particularly in the Global South. While few scholars such as Scott (1972), who 
argues that clientelism serves positive functions, like a social security system built on a moral 
economy, much of the political science scholarship portrays clientelism in a negative light (Orac 
and Rinne 2000). In addition to its portrayal as something negative, it was also conceptualized as 
“an archaic phenomenon particular to traditional and agrarian settings” (Roniger 2004: 4). 
Despite its treatment in the political science literature, I argue that clientelism is not an 
anachronistic vestige of earlier political mechanisms. Rather, its influence on society is seen as 
marginal primarily because its actual operation at the local level remains largely unexplored, 
with the exception of Auyero (2000). Auyero (2000), for instance, used clientelism to 
conceptualize the logic behind the patterns of relationships and interactions that are sustained 
through the exchange of ‘favores por votos’ (favors for votes) or any kind of political support for 
material benefits. I take clientelism to be a political institution that, as Gay (1990:654) argues, 
tailors “to the very structure of society itself.” Hence without examining clientelism as a key 
political-economic and obviously social relation between people and government, any analysis of 
vulnerability in Santa Fe will be incomplete. My analysis uses clientelism as a key conceptual 
and theoretical lens for analyzing the causal structure of vulnerability. I explore how clientelism 
is useful – not only from the perspective of the state and its functionaries, but also from the 
perspective of the clients, who are among the poorest and most vulnerable in the city. I argue that 
it is useful for solving problems as well as obtaining protection against the risks of everyday life, 
and, when the time comes, risks of flooding. Following Roniger (2004: 6) who posits 
“clientelism is an enduring feature of politics,” I demonstrate that clientelism evolves and 
flourishes not in spite of, but because of its importance to the function of local democracy and 
municipal infrastructure and service delivery (see Chapter 5).  
Second, I argue that clientelism – in the form of a contingent exchange of favors, jobs, or 
other material benefits – is a kind of institution that endures and adapts to the shifts in the 
international, national and local political economy because of its ability to provide access to 
goods and services. Agrawal (2008: 5) argues that institutions “structure and shape outcomes 
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through the actions of individuals and decision makers associated with them. To understand their 
impacts it is necessary to examine their internal processes, external relationships, and the 
linkages with different social groups and households.” Crucially, then, the key to understanding 
clientelism’s success and continuity is first, to view it as an institution that uses the unequal 
relations between people and government to recognize needs and second, to understand that it 
shapes access to material benefits, including jobs, as a result of those relations and connections. 
Roniger (2004: 2) posits that clientelism “a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals 
or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and markets 
from which others are normally excluded. This access is conditioned on subordination, 
compliance or dependence on the goodwill of others.” The conceptualization of clientelism as an 
access-granting institution most accurately reflects the realities on the ground in Santa Fe, 
particularly with respect to the role of the political broker and the ways of subordination, 
compliance and dependence. These, I argue, make clients vulnerable in the face of crisis. So 
access is precisely what links clientelism and vulnerability. Access theory, which explains the 
ability of people to benefit from things, provides broader empirical analytic of what people are 
able to obtain and use (Ribot and Peluso 2003). The access to goods and resources – mediated by 
political brokers with rules and social relations that protect some actors and subordinate others – 
create social stratifications that often result in increasing stress on those who are already 
vulnerable (Ribot 2014).  
Hicken (2011: 291) argues that access to a good or service “on part of both the patron and 
the client is contingent on the reciprocal benefit by the other party or the credible promise of 
such a benefit” (see also Robinson and Verdier 2003; Roniger 2004). I argue that it is that 
contingency – the quid pro quo nature of the exchange – that differentiates clientelism from other 
forms of political patronage. Following Ribot (2014) who notes that social protections have their 
own context-contingent causal chains, it is precisely the contingency that shapes people’s 
vulnerability because it unlocks access to material benefits as social and political protections of 
the unequal power relations. By shaping access to resources that fulfill people’s needs, clientelist 
exchanges limit the choices available and constrain residents’ agency in making demands on 
government. Over time, these exchanges have become embodied and institutionalized by the 
actors of clientelism who work towards solving problems by recognizing needs. As this chapter 
demonstrates, as long as needs persist and as long as clientelism recognizes those needs, it will 
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continue by reasserting the contingency in new ways. But while clientelism functions to 
temporarily treat the outcomes of vulnerability, such as displacement, it does not – nor is it 
intended to – resolve the underlying causes. In fact, I demonstrate that it even deepens some of 
the root causes. For instance, my informants lamented that many of their former patrons 
promised them jobs, but never delivered on those promises, which left them unemployed and 
unable to support their families.  
This chapter tells the story of Santa Rosa in three parts.
2
 The first part historicizes Santa 
Rosa as a shantytown and traces its evolution as a bastion of Peronism. By examining how Santa 
Rosa emerged as a transitory space for rural-to-urban migrants who were banished to the low-
lying land on the other side of the railroad tracks, I demonstrate the social stratification that 
created unequal patterns of vulnerability on the ground. In particular, I identify the railroad 
tracks as a liminal space, a boundary that separates the good from the bad, the wealthy from the 
poor, an acceptable level of risk from an unacceptable level of risk. The disciplinary action 
directed at the poor “encroachers” followed by the construction of the Irigoyen Embankment 
shows how the state increased risk in the western periphery of the city and encouraged a distinct 
pattern of settlement for the poor and marginalized. Importantly it shows how the act of 
recognition by the Peronist Party created the material underpinnings for the development of 
power relations that combined both collective action and clientelism.  
The second part explains the nuts and bolts of clientelist relations and the particular 
actors involved. It is here that I detail clientelism as an institution whereby political brokers and 
patrons assume pivotal positions in solving residents’ immediate needs while constraining their 
agency. I show how residents’ subjectivity is shaped by the clientelist relations that create 
avenues of access residents rely on to meet their needs, but simultaneously exclude them from 
formal processes of demand making. The terms puntero politico (political broker), hacer la 
política (doing politics), and unidad básica (political locale) encode the making of subjects as 
much as they describe the underlying reality of life. This reality, however, is itself shaped both 
by local and larger-scale phenomena which reproduces vulnerability through the internal 
processes, external relationships, and linkages with between its actors, of people to broader 
political-economic forces as well as to their local environment to each other (Oliver-Smith 2004; 
                                                          
2
 To narrate the story of Santa Rosa, I use the accounts of interlocutors – Graciela, Beatriz, Germán, José, Jairo, and 
Pato whose names I have changed.  
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Nelson and Finan 2009). The objective of the institution is the ongoing nature of the relations – 
is not to provide a permanent solution to satisfy needs. Rather, patrons – and brokers alike – use 
clientelism to visibly demonstrate that their position is invaluable to their clients. Patrons and 
brokers do this by giving residents what they want: recognition of their needs. In the final part of 
the chapter, I show how the flood of 2003 served as a turning point for residents in highlighting 
the vagaries of their relations with politicians. In the process it helps explain the political 
transformations taking place in the city and differences at a given point in time in how people 
view their relationship with the state (Agrawal 2005; Gupta 2005). The shifting political 
landscape reveals that in the wider gamut of causality, the reconfigured relations of clientelism 
continue to play an intimate role in the production and reproduction of vulnerability because they 
preclude residents from long-term representation and security. The difference being that in the 
past, the emphasis was on direct, face-to-face relations – what Scott (1972: 92) calls 
“instrumental friendship.” Today the relationship is much more transactional; clients are 
distanced from patrons by a chain of intermediaries.  
 
4.2 The Other Side of the Tracks 
With its history of floods, damage, and loss, Santa Fe’s densely populated westernmost 
neighborhood of Santa Rosa epitomizes the urban drama of the flood-prone city and its unequal 
distribution of risk and persistent vulnerability.  In the 80 years since its emergence as a 
transitory phenomenon – a shantytown – Santa Rosa has occupied a symbolic status for 
suffering, subversion, and marginalization that has captured the imagination of the citizenry and 
the resources of the local, provincial and federal governments. In 1960, it served as the site of 
Argentine filmmaker Fernando Birri’s neorealist film, Los Inundados (titled Flooded Out in its 
English version); was a hub of social and political activism during the military dictatorship in the 
1970s; and has historically played an important political role as an electoral stronghold for the 
Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista). Today, it is the site of state-sponsored urban improvement 
projects, including street paving, sewer construction as well as a land titling project. In this 
section, I consider how historic spatial practices of the state, such as hospital siting and the 
construction of an embankment, articulate with broader political-economic forces to produce a 
politics of space, exposing both a symbolic and a material the boundary between “over here” and 
“over there” and the “inside” and “outside.”  
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At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the modus operandi of local authorities followed the 
miasmatic theory of their European counterparts, which understood disease propagation through 
odor, pools of sewage, decaying animal carcasses and poor ventilation (McFarlane 2008). 
Authorities, thus, decided to was to push the miasma of the city away from the main 
thoroughfares frequented by the middle and upper classes to the western periphery. It was there 
they sited a cemetery and four hospitals (Dalla Fontana 2004). The land just beyond the cemetery 
and hospitals was a no man’s land. On late 19th century maps, this land was identified as bañados 
municipales or municipal marshlands, which were deemed unsuitable for settlement due to 
frequent flooding from the Salado River. There, in the barren wasteland at the banks of the 
Salado River, emerged the neighborhood of Santa Rosa. Shantytowns like Santa Rosa are, 
according to Auyero, transitory phenomena typical of a “stage of development” and have 
become an integral part of the urban geography of contemporary Latin American (2000: 62). 
And while it began as a temporary shantytown of ranchos (shacks, precarious houses), Santa 
Rosa grew into one of the most populous and arguably one of the oldest neighborhoods in Santa 
Fe (El Litoral 2012).
3
  
In the early 1900s, Cullen Hospital offered some of the best medical services in the 
Province of Santa Fe. As such, people from across the province traveled to Santa Fe to receive 
medical care. Entire families from rural areas would arrive in the city and wait as their family 
members would receive treatments and undergo medical procedures, some of which lasted for 
months at a time. As they waited, they built temporary dwellings from scraps of wood and metal 
– materials they scoured from the hospital and other surrounding public facilities nearby.4 They 
settled on the vacant land behind the hospital where they could visit family members undergoing 
medical treatment. But this land was vacant for good reason. It was low-lying where the city sent 
its rubbish and where the hospital pumped its excrement, thus making it unsuitable for settlement 
– except for those who had nowhere else to go. As mentioned above, it is a common 
phenomenon for poor rural-to-urban migrants to be excluded from the formal housing market. 
The story of Santa Rosa is no different. Over the next 30 years, more and more rural-to-urban 
migrants settled on the land behind the hospital, working as waste pickers, salvaging the 
                                                          
3
 No official records exist in relation to the inception of Santa Rosa, which is likely due to its informal development 
as a shantytown.  
4
 Interview with Pablo Benito, October 23, 2012.  
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recyclables disposed of by others, and as changarines or informal day laborers, as they waited 
for family members to be given a good bill of health. However, after their family members were 
released from the hospital, many families decided to stay in the city. There they found better 
employment opportunities than they could in the countryside. State authorities soon realized that 
what began as a temporary squatter settlement was quickly becoming a more permanent one. 
Since these new urban migrants were labeled as “encroachers” who settled on public land that 
belonged to the hospital and the 12th Infantry Regiment, the Army forced them to relocate from 
the land just behind the hospital further west, on the land on other side of the railroad tracks.  
The railroad tracks were raised onto an embankment made of compacted soil to avoid the 
frequent flooding of the marshlands leading to the Salado River. From the railroad tracks there 
was a sharp natural decline leading to the Salado River. Despite its classification as marshlands, 
state authorities saw an opportunity to gain land for these new urban migrants. Implicit in the 
creation of risk, state authorities constructed the Irigoyen Embankment along the western 
periphery in the 1930s. Making an already risky situation even risker, they drained and filled the 
marshlands and removed topsoil from already low-lying parts to construct the embankment.
5
 
Germán, a prominent social activist and one of my interlocutors in Santa Rosa, explained how 
the state constructed the embankment, “Because there were already neighborhoods to the east of 
the railroad tracks, in addition to the military barracks and hospital, they couldn’t remove the 
topsoil from there….and since they needed a lot of topsoil [to make the embankment] the 
bulldozer went over this land twice. It took away 50 centimeters (20 inches) each time it 
passed…that’s why from the railroad tracks to the edge of Santa Rosa there is almost a meter 
difference [in elevation].”6  
Early residents referred to the neighborhood as El Bajo or the low place because of its 
extremely low elevation.
7
 It was also called Barrio Tire Dié because it captured a common 
practice in the mid-1900s whereby children would run alongside the elevated railway tracks or 
jump up onto the steps of the slowly moving train, while others would stand at the bottom of the 
elevated tracks. All the while they would shout, “¡Tire dié, tire dié!” which is the colloquial for 
                                                          
5
 According to the city’s current Urban Plan (Plan Urbano 2009: 19), this land is considered a form of urban growth 
called “extension,” which is ironic since the city technically extended westward and has been inhabited since the 
1940s. 
6
 Interview on October 17, 2012.  
7
 Faraones, Marcela and Juan Larrea. 2011. Interview with Nelida Servin. Untitled. Film. 
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“tire diez [centavos]”, literally “Throw me ten cents!” The train passengers responded by tossing 
coins to the children. This practice was captured in a documentary film also made by Fernando 
Birri in the late 1950s, which depicted the poor people living in Barrio Tire Dié on the flood-
prone marshlands of the western periphery in what later would become Santa Rosa (Ullberg 
2013). This film as well as Birri’s first feature film, Los Inundados mentioned in the 
introduction, cast real people – actual residents of the neighborhoods of the western periphery at 
that time. Despite socio-cultural critiques that the films reinforce certain stereotypical cultural 
categories of the charity of the rich and the hope of the poor, the films clearly depict the socio-
political and material relations that constitute vulnerability as well as the liminal space of the 
railroad tracks.  
 
 
Figure 12. Railroad tracks in Santa Rosa. Photo by author, 2012. 
 
The elevated railroad tracks, particularly since they have fallen into disuse in the 1990s, 
exemplify a liminal space. Liminality, defined as “coming-into-being” may be understood as a 
“conceptual antecedent to Bourdieu’s habitus: a generative and structuring principle of collective 
strategies and social practices which is used to reproduce existing structures” (Jimenez 2001: 
203). The railroad tracks reproduce existing structure; they represent a frontier a frontier which 
divides two worlds. In everyday speech, residents use the railroad tracks as the physical spatial 
boundary that defines them in relation to the rest of the city. They refer to Santa Rosa as “over 
here” and the rest of the city as “over there”. Yet, they are just as much a social boundary as they 
are a material one, behind which lies poverty, suffering and marginalization. The cultural notions 
of spatial boundaries have become part of the urban imaginary, owing to the liminality of the 
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railroad tracks. It is common that residents, particularly children, talk about Santa Rosa as its 
own town, separate from the city. Residents frequently told me that they rarely go to the “city” 
meaning that they rarely cross over the railroad tracks.  
Since the mid-1900s, shifts in the national political economy catalyzed massive 
population growth in the neighborhoods along the western periphery, including Santa Rosa 
(Guber 1999; Auyero 2000; Ullberg 2013). The 1965 flood in the Province of Chaco in 
northeastern Argentina also had a profound impact on the population growth of the 
neighborhood. In the wake of the flood in El Chaco, hundreds of chaqueños
8
 migrated to Santa 
Fe, which is the closet big city to their province. Germán remembered the onslaught of 
chaqueños and how it was representative of a broader politics of space in Santa Fe:  
 
In 1965 the southern zone of the neighborhood became inhabited mostly by 
chaqueños…since then people settled further and further out [towards the river] until they 
reached where they are now. Of course, it’s always a situation where people first settle on 
the land and then the government installs water, electricity, builds roads. Always after the 
people already lived there. They never provide infrastructure before people live there 
(Interview on October 17, 2012).   
 
Like many migrants before them, the chaqueños arrived in Santa Fe without resources 
and found refuge in Santa Rosa. Since then, many of their extended family members migrated to 
Santa Fe in search of employment. Unless new migrants have familial ties or enough resources to 
build, rent or buy a house closer to the railroad tracks, they are typically pushed to the edge of 
Santa Rosa where the poorest live in ranchos alongside rubbish and livestock. Streets remain 
unpaved and unnamed. There, at the city’s edge, the Salado River is visible and poverty more 
palpable. Occupation, rather than housing or protection from flooding, is of primary concern 
(Auyero 2000: 49). People live day to day, concentrating on meeting their basic needs for 
survival. For them, flood risk is something they embody; it is but one of their everyday struggles.  
 
4.3 Peronism and the Politics of Recognition  
In the 1940s, Santa Rosa became a permanent element of the urban landscape largely due 
to the intervention of the President and First Lady of Argentina, Juan Domingo and Evita Perón. 
                                                          
8
 Residents of the Chaco Province. 
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As part of Evita’s charity work, the national government constructed several housing units, a 
plaza and the Chapel of Santa Rosa de Lima. In 1948 Evita herself inaugurated the project, 
which was simply dubbed “4 de Junio” to commemorate the day of its inauguration, June 4th. 
Nelida, one of Santa Rosa’s elders, remembered that day. She recalled that people in trucks came 
to the neighborhood, distributing packets of clothes to residents. She noted, “They didn’t throw 
them to us. They went door-to-door bringing each one of us a packet of clothing.”9 For residents 
of Santa Rosa, that day marked the first time that they were recognized by the government. It 
was, effectually, the only case in the history of the neighborhood when the government 
intervened on its own initiative rather than as a result of residents’ demand making. Further, it is 
important to note that it was not the local government that intervened, but rather the national 
Peronist government. This historic act of recognition, here understood as an act of 
enfranchisement (a la Taylor 1994), established a bond between the Peronist political party 
(Partido Justicialista or PJ) and the party’s reign over the population of Santa Rosa.  
This linkage between the party and the people of Santa Rosa yielded mutual recognition: 
the Peronist Party recognized the residents of Santa Rosa which in turn provided the Party with 
the recognition of authority to rule over them (Sikor and Lund 2009). In other words, in return 
for their acknowledgement and enfranchisement by the national Peronist government, residents 
privileged Peronist politics and the Peronist ideology of social justice, political sovereignty and 
economic independence over others. Recognition mattered to residents. Since its origins as a 
shantytown at the turn of the 20
th
 century, residents of Santa Rosa had been treated as if they 
were “dispossessed of any form of political subjectivity” that would have made them feel part of 
the counted (Laclau 2005: 246). They were the ‘un-counted’. But with the Peronist recognition, 
which was both symbolic and material, Santa Rosa transcended the anonymity of being a 
marginalized shantytown to the particularity of being a bastion of Peronist politics and collective 
action. Recognition was more than an act of enfranchisement. It was a political act which had 
profound consequences for relations with the local, provincial and national state as well as 
among residents themselves. For, it was that very act of recognition that created the material 
underpinnings for a distinctive pattern of problem-solving relations that combined the collective 
                                                          
9
 Faraones, Marcela and Juan Larrea. 2011. Interview with Nelida Servin. Untitled. Film. 
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action of residents with the reciprocal exchange of favors for votes between a politician (i.e. a 
“patron”) and a client (Robinson and Verdier 2013).  
Santa Rosa was not built on a Peronist foundation. It was built by the collective action of 
its residents. Yet, it is precisely the Peronism’s sense of community and collective action that 
made Peronism resonate with residents of Santa Rosa. Santa Rosa’s physical and social 
marginalization on “the other side of the tracks” relegated its residents to the fringe of society, 
and generations of inhabitants had to learn to cope with the difficulties of everyday life by 
banding together. During my fieldwork there, residents often quipped that they live in a 
“country” (a private, gated community) because they were excluded from public goods services 
such as electricity, potable water, stormwater drains and sewers. One of the neighborhoods 
elders, Odalis, told me, “We didn’t have light, water, anything at all. My children never knew 
what it was like to receive a present for Christmas. But the one thing we had was each other.”10 
More than anything else, it was the sense of community and the collective efforts among 
residents made Santa Rosa a livable place. In essence, Santa Rosa had already embodied the 
ideal social model of community that rests at the heart of Peronism.  
At the time of Perón, the goal of Peronism was to create an organized community where 
the state directly intervened between labor and capital. A unique blend of socialism, liberalism 
and populism, Peronism maintained direct relationships with people, traditionally in the form of 
union-based mass linkages and organized events and rallies where residents would come together 
to make demands on the government. The fundamental mechanism of Peronist politics was – and 
in many cases, still is – the unidad básica (basic unit) or simply a básica. Básicas are 
neighborhood Peronist locales, the physical spaces where residents go to participate in political 
activities. As territorial representations of Peronism, básicas encoded both the routinization of 
rules and of behaviors among Peronist political actors (Levitsky 1998). While any Peronist 
supporter could form a básica, they were typically established in the houses of Peronist political 
brokers
11
 since brokers are typically better off than the average poor resident.
12
 Political brokers 
are intermediaries between Peronist politicians (patrons) and their clients. One of my 
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 Interview on September 21, 2012.  
11
 In Spanish, brokers are called punteros politicos or referentes. However, because of the negative association of 
the word puntero politico with clientelism, brokers – in my research – dislike being called as such. Referentes have 
become more acceptable usage, especially since the rise of the Radical Party in 2007.  
12
 Interview on October 27, 2012. 
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interlocutors and another social activist, Graciela, recalled attending political rallies at 
neighborhood básicas. She reminisced, “We would gather together in the home and they would 
distribute choripanes
13…and sometimes wine. Later they [the politicians] would make a speech 
and then they would actually listen to what we had to say. It was very uplifting.”14 The emphasis 
here was on direct, face-to-face, dyadic relations with patrons. Beyond their political functions, 
básicas also served as social spaces – medical dispensaries, food pantries, or places to have other 
types of needs met. These Peronist mechanisms not only provided a space for new socio-political 
arrangements to operate, but also for a space where they, the marginalized, were recognized. The 
more socially and economically marginalized residents of Santa Rosa were from the rest of the 
city, the greater their propensity towards collective action. Their main avenue for collective 
action was the Peronist Party. For it was the Peronist Party, champions of the poor and 
marginalized, which gave them what they so desired: recognition.   
The exile of Perón in 1955 and subsequent military dictatorship destroyed the básicas. 
All social and political activism in support of Peronism went underground. During this time, 
Santa Rosa became a hub of subversive activities. Residents continued to gather in clandestine 
meetings to debate politics and organize themselves around pertinent social issues of the day. 
Various groups, including Peronists, Radicals, priests and other members of the Church who 
were activists for the poor, united during the time of oppression and their members worked side-
by-side for what Beatriz, a social leader in Santa Rosa, referred to as “the greater good” of the 
neighborhood. She surmised that it was “necessity during the time of oppression that brought 
such different groups of people together.”15  
The historic geographic concentration of Peronist Party supporters in Santa Rosa made 
the neighborhood particularly receptive for the reemergence of Peronism when democracy 
returned to Argentina in 1983. During the 1980s, however, the Peronist Party underwent a 
transformation at the national level which had profound consequences for its reemergence at the 
local level. Although it was in opposition to the party’s traditional inward-oriented economic 
policies established by Perón himself, the Party adapted to the changing global political-
economic climate of neoliberalism. For, it was Peronism’s flexibility and adaptability as the 
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 Choripanes are sandwiches made of grilled chorizo, a type of sausage, very popular in Argentina.  
14
 Interview on October 27, 2012. 
15
 Interview on October 12, 2012.  
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party of the masses that made it so successful. Yet, part of Peronism’s political structure had 
changed. Levitsky (2003: 2) asserts, “By the early 1990s, the PJ had transformed itself from a 
labor-based party in which unions were at times the dominant partner in an increasingly 
clientelist party in which unions played a relatively minor role.” While Peronism retained its 
“bottom-heavy” decentralized model that relied on a base of working- and lower-classes and 
unions, its reemergence in the 1980s called for a new socio-political formulation which replaced 
the traditional mechanisms of political assemblies with clientelist-based mechanism (Stokes 
2005).  
The macro level changes of the Peronist Party as well as the shifts in the global political 
economy associated with neoliberalism, such as a more vigorous embrace of the market as part 
of a generalized withdrawal of state provisioning and action, meant that residents at the local 
level would have to adapt to a new way of ‘doing politics’ (Walton M. 2004). With Santa Rosa’s 
development as a marginalized community with history of collective action, residents were well-
equipped to adapt. They survived being pushed to the edge of society, the military dictatorship, 
the reemergence of democracy, political-economic instability and crisis, all the while living in 
the highly flood prone western periphery. They were, at their core, adaptable. But change did not 
come without drawbacks. Beatriz noted, “The return of democracy gave us the possibility of 
expression, among other things. But it also acted something like a vice.”16 What emerged with 
the return of democracy in the 1980s was competitiveness and political partisanship, which 
worked in favor of clientlist politics. Beatriz explained, “In the 1980s, neighborhood institutions 
became more fragmented than ever. A bunch of different groups used to work together, but later 
each group wanted to do its own thing because of political partisanship and the desire to mobilize 
one’s own political clientele.”17 The pre-dictatorship básicas that served as sites of political 
assembly and camaraderie were no more. What took their place was a new formation of básicas, 
which become fruitful for the Peronist Party’s increasingly clientelist exchanges, serving as a 
‘back door’ entry way for the state to provide social plans. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Interview on October 12, 2012 
17
 Ibid.  
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4.4 Clientelism and Its Discontents: Political Brokers, Patrons and the Persistence of Needs 
Early in the history of the neighborhood, residents of Santa Rosa were able to meet their 
needs by banding together and working for a cause. Later, in the 1940s, the Peronist Party not 
only recognized the residents who lived “on the other side of the tracks,” but the Party also 
recognized residents’ needs and the collective action promoted by the básicas worked towards 
satisfying those needs. But in the 1980s, the macro political-economic shifts that followed the 
return of democracy and neoliberal economic policies left vast sections of the urban population 
with a growing number of unsatisfied needs. Following the broader political-economic forces, 
the Peronist problem-solving mechanisms also changed in order to generate a coherent, albeit 
contingent way of satisfying needs.  
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982:80) argue that people “manage as well as they do…by 
following social rules on what to ignore: institutions are their problem-solving devices.” 
Following Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), I contend that clientelism, as a problem-solving and 
access-granting institution, plays a crucial role in promoting socio-cultural rules and norms, 
particularly with respect to the ways that residents – the clients – satisfy their needs and cope 
with, resist or recover from political-economic shocks and crisis. Particularly key in this 
institution are the political brokers who cultivate relations with clients, aligning their needs and 
aspirations with that of their patrons. The purpose of clientelism as a problem-solving institution 
is not to provide assistance so that problems are solved and needs are completely satisfied. The 
purpose, rather, is to temporarily calm needs so that the institution can continue – so that political 
brokers and patrons can visibly demonstrate that their positions are invaluable.  
Básicas were the central feature of local Peronist politics. Their evolution as the hubs for 
clientelist exchanges is crucial in understanding the role and performance of political brokers. 
Básicas, and by extension political brokers, lie at the center of the constellation of power that 
traverses the fields of “labor, exchange, calculation, distribution, and exploitation” (Fraser 
1989:120). To help me to better understand that constellation of power in Santa Rosa, my 
interlocutor Jairo explained that the unequal relations of exchange involve a hierarchy – a 
complex pyramid structure, similar to that of the military: 
 
First, there is the political candidate at the top, followed by the family and close friends 
(allegados) of the candidate. Then there are the sycophants (alcahuetes politicos) who go 
around with him. They aren’t advisors because they don’t get paid. Some of them work 
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for free knowing that if the candidate wins the elections they will gain a position working 
for him and over the next four years they will have a salary. Next in the pyramid are the 
political brokers (punteros politicos). These guys get paid a chapa politica.
18
 And at the 
bottom of the pyramid are the clients (Interview on November 3, 2012).  
 
The concept of the chapa politica (roughly translated as political capital) provides insight 
into the structure of exchange relations among patrons, brokers and clients. Political brokers, the 
intermediaries between patrons and clients, play a crucial role in the pyramid structure. Brokers 
must be sensitive to local needs and aspirations and win the consent of the residents to construct 
a base of “their people,” who, in turn, depend on them to “solve problems.” To problem-solve 
they fulfill a need by granting small favors in the form of access to a social plan, a job, or 
perhaps a job for someone’s son. As they gradually gather resources and hoard information, they 
use that knowledge to expand their presence as problem solvers (Auyero 2000:116). They 
maximize their social capital, which they in turn parlay into the chapa politica to negotiate with 
their patrons on behalf of “their people” in order to provide access to material things (Auyero 
2000:131). With their chapa politica, they can maneuver politically, making themselves 
invaluable to both patrons and clients.  
Enjoying the power and influence that comes with their chapa politica, political brokers 
structure and shape access “of information and of people, channeling resources from their patron 
to their clients and votes and support from their clients to the person in control of the (material 
and symbolic) resources” (Auyero 2000:83). Auyero argues that brokers position themselves in a 
way that makes them tantamount to “the goods received, the favors granted” (2000:123). That’s 
because behind every broker, there is a real need. And that need is what allows them to position 
themselves in such a way that they become synonymous with it: the need for a job, the need for 
money, the need for medication. Positioning themselves in relation to needs and the access to 
their fulfillment provides brokers more influence in the everyday lives of residents than official 
state authorities (Mamdani 1996). Indeed, political brokers orchestrate the back door means of 
entry for the state to the neighborhood.  
                                                          
18
 A chapa in this case comes from its usage as a time card which employees punched when they started and ended a 
job.  
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While brokers will often refute their work as political,
19
 they occupy strategically 
political positions that mediate between “state institutions and citizens, between public and 
private spheres,” filling the void where the state comes up short (Ranganathan 2014:93). 
Graciela observed the crucial role of political brokers and why they persevere: “If there weren’t 
real needs for food, jobs, improved conditions…basically for survival, there wouldn’t be a need 
for brokers. But needs transcend brokers. Different political administrations were not able to get 
rid of them. Brokers wouldn’t exist if there weren’t needs.”20 It is precisely the position of 
political brokers in relation to needs – many of which go unsatisfied or partially unsatisfied by 
the state – that make them elemental in political projects of patrons. Since political brokers’ 
position – as well as their chapa politica – is derived from the possession of and access to 
tangible and intangible resources aimed at solving problems, it allows brokers to negotiate both 
upwards to politicians, lower-level bureaucrats and party leaders and downwards to the people 
who vote them in power. They broker solutions oriented towards individual needs, taking their 
clients’ everyday concerns into consideration, integrating and addressing them as public issues to 
their patrons. The catch, however, is that brokers’ resources do not solve problems holistically. If 
they did it would minimize or even eliminate the role of brokers. Indeed, the function of brokers 
in relation to needs is crucial to understanding the pathology of vulnerability.  
The role of political brokers is performative (Butler 1997). In the informal theatre of the 
state, they are instrumental in cultivating and securing the consent of clients. Gramsci 
(2000[1971]) argued that consent is different from force, which consists of the relations of power 
and domination. Consent, he maintained, comprises relations of power cultivated in the realm of 
civil society and “expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion.” Brokers cultivate consent 
by using words and actions that reflect what people can see, aspire or imagine and strategically 
align them with the needs and aspirations of their patrons.  
Brokers also provide resources and just as quickly take them away, which has concrete 
consequences, especially for relations between patrons and clients. Historically, they played a 
key role in the distribution of state resources for social plans, which were allocated not in 
response to the objective measures of need, but rather based on the personal relationships 
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between patrons, brokers and clients (Nelson and Finan 2009). During the 1990s and early 
2000s, the resources for social plans such as Plan Trabajar
21
 and Plan Jefe/Jefa de Hogar
22
 were 
funneled through political brokers, who controlled access by distributing the plans to “their 
people”, i.e. the clients on their political rosters. Residents who grew up on these social plans in 
the late 1990s today have adolescent or young adult children of their own. About three quarters 
of these children in Santa Rosa are products of these social plans
23
 and assistance programs 
which have spanned three generations today culminating in the Asignación Universal por Hijo 
(AUH).
24
 In most cases, social plans provide the only form of secure income stream that families 
in Santa Rosa have. When I asked a neighborhood social worker if she thought the social plans 
were improving the lives of residents, she said:  
 
Here people don’t think about retirement; they think about their immediate needs. In 
some cases, [children’s] fathers have been able to find jobs in the construction sector, 
which has been growing with all the buildings being constructed over the past few years. 
They are formal employees and have been able to achieve some kind of financial 
stability. Nonetheless, I’ve seen a lot of families over the years living in the same 
conditions or are worse off, because they have no form of income other than social plans 
or the little incomes they have are being eaten away by inflation (Interview on October 
18, 2012).  
 
While the objectives of these plans were to provide economic compensation to the losers 
of neoliberal reforms in Argentina, they were used predominantly by the Peronist Party in the 
late 1990s to galvanize electoral support from the lower-income sectors and silence their 
opposition at the local level “by bringing about fragmentation among the poor, encouraging 
political clientelism and preventing marginalized sectors from establishing social ties” (Lodola, 
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German 2005). Social plans have, however, changed over the years owing to the development of 
more transparent and technology-driven methods of social programming like the tarjeta unica, 
which is a type of debit card that has a monthly stipend for the purchase of staple food 
products.
25
 Political brokers have adapted to these changes and although their role as gatekeepers 
to social plans has diminished, they remain at the “gates” of the state, utilizing state resources to 
reinforce their positions. Auyero argues:  
 
With each problem that they solve for a client, brokers are continually better positioning 
themselves so that, at election time, they will essentially be able to blackmail their 
clients, they implied threat being that, if the broker and his or her patron are forced from 
office, the broker’s clients will no longer receive the benefits of the social programs 
established by the patron and run by the broker (2000:123).  
 
In their roles at gatekeepers, brokers ensure that “their people” obtain state resources. At 
the same time, they must ensure that clients play their role, which is to support their patrons. 
They do so by monitoring, threatening, and persuading their clients (Szwarcberg 2008). They 
remind their clients that being on their political rosters is a privilege and that at any time they can 
cut off their access to resources, whether they be real or imagined, for instance, in the form of a 
job or the promise of a job, 1) should the client betray the patron or 2) should the patron lose an 
election. Social leader Beatriz explained that the role of political brokers remains fundamental 
because needs have not disappeared. Brokers continue to exploit their utility as gatekeepers to 
the means to calm clients’ needs in the short-term. She told me that the aim of political brokers is 
to “temporarily calm needs so that the clients must return to them, which makes the links 
between them [the brokers and clients] rigid and cyclic.”26  
 
4.4.1 “Doing Politics” and Working in the Trenches 
Political brokers typically carry out two types of work in Santa Rosa: 1) electoral work 
and 2) trench work (la trinchera).
27
 The first type is what residents refer to as “doing politics” 
(hacer la politica) while the second type is more akin to the social work carried out by Peronist 
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militants in the básicas of the past. Electoral work involves political campaigning and 
participating in political rallies around election cycles, every two and four years. Leading up to 
an election, brokers in Santa Rosa offer temporary work to clients in exchange for their votes for 
a patron. The work is always offered as temporary because, as mentioned above, it can be easily 
taken away should the patron lose an election. The temporary job is used as leverage – retracted 
in the event a broker finds that a client is doubling up and working for two different patrons, 
which is fairly common. One of the main reasons why a client works for two different patrons is 
to fulfill different needs. For instance, one politician may offer resources in the form of a social 
plan while another may offer a job opportunity. Part of that has to do with the increase in the 
number of patrons, which overall reflects the increase in political competition in Santa Fe since 
the return of democracy in 1983. Within the Peronist Party, especially, there has been an increase 
in competition, and the electoral work of political brokers has been a successful political 
mechanism for the 24-year long one-party rule of the Peronists. Reflecting on the increase in 
political party candidates, Graciela observed, “Here in Santa Rosa competition is really stiff 
because everyone knows everyone else. The links between patrons, brokers and clients can 
change quickly. Each link has a certain quantity of political brokers and associated ideology that 
makes it clear who is working for whom…this is the way of doing politics in Santa Rosa.”28  
Brokers’ ability to mobilize political support is fundamental in the procurement of goods 
and services for their clientele. But the exchange of support for favors is complex, non-linear and 
not often visible outside of the performance of brokers. According to Auyero (2000), básicas 
during the 1990s, served as sites of performance in the staging of ritualized exchanges, which, in 
the process, would legitimize the position of the political broker. Even though the use of básicas 
has diminished in Santa Rosa, the performance of the brokers has not. Beatriz explained, “You 
see it in the performance of brokers in meetings or assemblies and in relations with clients.”29 
The performance of exchange often involves the construction or installation of infrastructure and 
urban services, which are conferred in a subtle way, and never through direct communication 
between a client and a patron. Jairo explained:  
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You can go to a political broker and say, ‘hey tell the mayor we need him to fix Aguado 
Street.’ If they find it politically beneficial, they [state agents] come and fix the street. 
Then, the day that they need you for an election or something of the sort, the broker 
comes to you and says ‘you need to return the favor. Remember when I got the street 
fixed or cut the grass on the parkway? Well now I need a favor from you.’ Favor for 
favor they ask you…(November 3, 2012)  
 
These types of exchanges prove useful for politicians to create conditions for what one 
provincial official called “a fertile breeding ground” to construct and maintain political 
dominance.
30
 When it is in a politician’s best interest – that is, when they need votes to carry an 
election – they provide concrete benefits vis-à-vis visible, short-term neighborhood improvement 
projects, such as paving a dirt road or installing waste receptacles. Politicians carry out these 
projects because they can be publically performed and therefore publically recognized. Since 
they are visible, these types of projects unambiguously show the electorate that the politician is 
doing something as well as the promise that their efforts will continue, if elected. These types of 
small, yet visible improvement projects do two things. First, they afford politicians with a 
political masse of clients that will continue to support them as long as their clients believe that 
they will get things done in the neighborhood, i.e. that they continue to grant favors. Second, 
since these projects are typically small and involve short-term infrastructural “fixes,” they do not 
have the breadth or depth to holistically solve the neighborhoods’ problems or improve 
residents’ livelihoods. Rather, these projects are used as leverage for politicians. These projects 
serve as recognition of residents because they respond to a particular need, albeit a short-term 
one. The effect of that recognition is that residents feel empowered and enfranchised so that they 
vote for the politician, who can then expand or reinforce his political dominance.  
During an election year, brokers’ electoral work is critical. Political brokers maintain a 
roster of clients at all times and, as Beatriz noted, they always know exactly who is working for 
whom. On Election Day, the present day básica serves as the center for electoral operations. 
Using the roster of clients, categorized by last name and official polling stations, brokers plan 
and manage how and when their clients will be transported to their polling stations.
31
 To 
transport their clients to and from the polls, brokers contract vans or informal taxis (taxis 
truchos). The drivers contracted by the brokers make a lot of money on Election Day, much 
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more than they make from an average day’s work. One informal taxi driver told me that in 
exchange for his payment of 200 pesos (25 USD) to drive on Election Day, he was prohibited 
from accepting any other work that day. On the dashboard of their vehicles, drivers must clearly 
display a sign with an alphanumeric code indicating the political candidate for whom they are 
working. After voting, the drivers transport the clients to their homes or back to the básica, 
where they receive a bag of merchandise, which may include food, supplies and sometimes even 
money, in return for their votes. Of course, there is no standard mechanism to guarantee that a 
client voted for a patron. One way that brokers know if their clients voted for their patrons is by 
the results of the elections. A broker’s opportunity to move upwards in a political party is based 
on his utility which is determined by the number of supporters he can mobilize in support of his 
patron (Szwarcberg 2008).  
When the quantity of votes is revealed by polling station and neighborhood, brokers can 
usually deduce that “what clients gave them is what brokers made them vote for.”32 But in the 
close-knit community of Santa Rosa, people typically know who will vote for whom based on 
their associational memberships and ideological inclinations. It is said that if a client cannot look 
a political broker in the eye, then you know he voted against your patron (Stokes 2005). After an 
election, in addition to the chapa politica gained should a broker’s patron win an election, the 
broker will receive an “off-the-books salary” from the patron’s reserve funds, depending on the 
level of government into which the patron was elected. Patrons consider the brokers’ salary an 
investment in exchange for the maintenance of their political territory. Jairo equated salaried 
political brokers to “ñoquis” – people who receive a salary from a political official without even 
having to appear at the place they are supposed to be working. The only time they do show up to 
work is to collect their salaries, typically on the 29th of the month which coincides with the 
Argentine custom of eating gnocchis on the 29th of each month, hence the name.    
 The second type of work is trench work. Beatriz noted that trench work is the social work 
that brokers carry out everyday often through a neighborhood association (vecinal) or civil 
society association. She asserted, “Not everyone can do it – everyday you have to be out there, 
talking with residents, making proposals, seeing if you can work together with other institutions, 
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continuing to develop your organization. All of this happens at the margin of elections.”33 This 
daily, long-term, preparatory work of brokers “in the trenches” is more than a job to brokers – it 
is a vocation. Fueled by the one thing that has always motivated residents to band together – 
needs – brokers maintain a special relationship with the neighborhood residents based on mutual 
obligation. Their formation as trench workers and problem solvers is later put to the test in their 
electoral work.  
 Soup kitchens are the traditional exemplars of trench work carried out by political 
brokers in Santa Rosa. To illustrate, I draw from my experiences in two neighborhood soup 
kitchens. They are operated by two men who once worked together in the Vecinal of Santa Rosa, 
the neighborhood association, but had a falling out in the late 1990s when they competed for the 
presidency of the vecinal. Since then, one of them, José, separated from the vecinal and formed 
his own civil society association with funding from resources that align with his political 
preferences. José, a follower of the Kirchner faction (Kirchnerista), of the Peronist Party began 
receiving funding for his soup kitchen in 2003 from the Ministry of Social Development of the 
Nation, which led by Alicia Margarita Kirchner, the sister of former president Néstor Kirchner, 
the father of Kirchnerism. Pato, on the other hand, was elected President of the vecinal which in 
the afternoons operates as a soup kitchen for disadvantaged youth. Pato explained, “A lot of 
children bring tupperware so that they can take food home to their siblings, even though they 
aren’t supposed to. Schools provide children with lunch, but then they go home and don’t have 
anything to eat, knowing the situation of a lot of families at home.”34 The vecinal’s soup kitchen 
is funded by the Provincial Ministry of Social Development, which led by Socialist Party. A die-
hard Peronist – more specifically an Obeidista, a follower of former Provincial Governor Obeid, 
Pato and his group at the Vecinal have been called traitors for their affiliation with Socialist 
Party. But for Pato, just because there is a mismatch between their political preferences and 
funding source does not make them “sell-outs” to Peronism. They see their trench work as self-
sacrificing and important in maintaining the social fabric of the community. Pato said, “We 
provide kids with a warm meal, which they might not otherwise have. But more than that, we 
have to be psychologists, social workers, cooks, teachers, and nurses…for many kids. Each 
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family has their own story. These kids face a lot of problems. I work here for the youth and the 
future of the neighborhood.”35 
Trench work is especially important during times of crisis, such as floods or economic 
recession, when residents look to their respective political party for immediate assistance. The 
party, in turn, intervenes with short-term food aid, subsidies or household supplies. Political 
brokers and their patrons take advantage of these points of crisis, positioning themselves in such 
a way that takes the personalization of favors to the extreme. By personalizing a favor at the 
point when a resident feels the most vulnerable, they solidify their stake in the residents’ social 
imaginary. As the crisis or event fades, they are left with the memory of a broker or patron as 
their savior. For instance, Maria, one of the young women I met at a soup kitchen, told me the 
story of how she evacuated from Santa Rosa during the flood of 2003. She was up to her knees in 
water, standing at the highest point of the neighborhood near the railroad tracks, carrying what 
she could on her back. Then Governor Reutemann passed by in a boat as he was headed to help 
put sandbags around the Children’s Hospital. He saw Maria and gave her money to take a taxi. 
From that point onward, her support for Reutemann never waned as she idealized him as her 
savior. Maria’s story is just one of countless that I heard about brokers and patrons who 
positioned themselves in the right moment at the right time to fulfill an immediate need, thus 
rendering that relationship invaluable. Crucially, the patron-broker-client relationship hinges on 
the fulfillment of an immediate need. As Graciela put it, “Where there is need, there is the 
possibility of politics, the possibility of clientelism, and the possibility of votes.”36 Politicians’ 
objective with these short-term means to meet needs, which staves off the outcomes of 
vulnerability (i.e. displacement) rather than resolving its underlying causes (Nelson and Finan 
2009). Thus, the objective of the patron is not to provide assistance so that needs are completely 
satisfied, such that the poor get out of poverty. But rather politicians’ objective is to visibly 
demonstrate the utility of their position so that clientelism as an access-granting institution can 
continue.  
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4.5 The Turning Point: Mistrust and the Politics of Waiting 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century, residents in Santa Rosa reached a turning point. Mass 
unemployment in the wake of neoliberal economic policies magnified residents’ poverty, social 
and economic inequalities and overall needs. Residents began to protest in reaction to the 
economic crisis which left many un- or underemployed. In response to the intensifying crisis, the 
national government implemented a variety of social plans to quell increasing levels of 
unemployment and quiet social unrest. At the local level, residents of Santa Rosa embraced their 
personal relationships with political brokers and their patrons who provided, in many cases, the 
only means of access to livelihoods. They continued to believe in clientelist relations, for they 
provided residents with access to food, social plans and employment opportunities. Then, as they 
were on the road to recovery, an event occurred in 2003 that marked a “before” and “after” in the 
city’s history (Viand 2009). The flood of 2003 left the entire neighborhood destroyed; 
completely underwater. The flood had sweeping effects, particularly for residents of Santa Rosa 
and the flood-prone western periphery. The neighborhood’s preexisting conditions of poverty, 
unemployment, social and economic inequalities, poor infrastructure, inadequate systems of 
social security and lack of early warning translated to grave suffering and loss. The experience of 
the flood also made residents begin to question their beliefs in the state, in politicians, and in 
clientelism as a problem-solving and access-granting institution.  
My interlocutors from Santa Rosa – Graciela, Germán, José, Jairo, and Beatriz – all 
voiced a sense of mistrust and betrayal of government officials not only due to the lack of 
advance warning of flood, but because of ineffective management both during and in after the 
flood. Neither the local or provincial government was able to evacuate the population of the 
western periphery prior to the flood because there was no policy decision made to do so under 
after the floodwaters broke through the breach in the embankment. On the eve of the flood 
disaster, there was no attempt by any level of government to communicate effectively with 
citizens by informing them, through the radio or other means, about how to respond in the face 
of the flood. The day of the flood, the mayor, rather incorrectly, made a radio announcement 
suggesting that people stay in their houses and that the historically flood-prone neighborhoods 
would not flood (see Chapter 2). It took two days after the flood broke through the breach in the 
embankment for government officials to make a decision to blast through the southern section of 
the embankment before any relief was had. In the meantime, residents from the western 
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periphery evacuated to the neighborhoods in the south and the southwest only to find that these 
neighborhoods flooded as much if not more than their own. The National Guard, which was 
deployed to Santa Fe by the national government to help evacuate the deluged neighborhoods 
and keep the peace during the looting and rioting that ensued, made a heroic effort but was 
overpowered by the sheer magnitude of the disaster and the absence of any state contingency 
plan to cope with it (Rajan 2002). Indeed, in the absence of the state, the UNL, civil society 
organizations, and individual citizens filled the void left by any formal administrative institution.  
In the aftermath of the flood, residents began to probe the causes of the flood. One of the 
beliefs about causality was that Peronist Governor Reutemann used the flood as a kind of social 
bulldozer to obliterate the neighborhoods of the western periphery so that subsequent Peronist 
administrations could start over with a blank slate (Scott 1998). Instead of making a decision to 
sandbag the breach or evacuate which would have effectively reduced the amount of damage, my 
interlocutors believed that Reutemann did nothing because it was, in fact, in his best interest to 
take no action. They believed that former Reutemann made no policy decision to sandbag the 
breach or evacuate precisely because he purposefully wanted to destroy the neighborhood 
institutions of the western periphery, silence their opposition to the economic crisis, and rebuild 
them to reinforce his political dominance. This echoes the work of Max Marwick who wrote 
about Central African people’s beliefs about witches as a ruthless way to “dissolve relations 
which have become redundant…blast down the dilapidated parts of the social structure, and clear 
the rubble in preparation for new ones…by allowing the periodic redistribution of structural 
forces” (Marwick 1952, cited in Douglas 1992: 90). Beatriz told me “it was good for Reutemann 
that the neighborhoods of the west flooded. It was good because it eliminated many of the 
organizations and institutions of the west that protested against his administration during the 
[economic] crisis. It completely fragmented the neighborhood’s organizations and allow for him 
to start from scratch.”37  
The devastation that came in the wake of the flood of 2003 guaranteed Reutemann two 
things. First, the state of emergency was instrumental in the provision of disaster aid in the form 
of goods and supplies which came from all over Argentina as well as internationally. As Pelling 
(2003: 42) notes, these goods and supplies “have exaggerated importance during the period of 
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scarcity following the disaster and it is likely that clientelistic relationships operating in the pre-
disaster period are reinforced by the state’s monopoly in goods distribution during recovery from 
disaster.” Beatriz and others observed that the thousands of containers of goods and supplies that 
were donated to government agencies for local distribution were never distributed to residents. 
Instead they were stockpiled and stored in warehouses to be used in the election campaigns six 
months after the flood.
38
  Many of my interlocutors went to churches, NGOs or the Red Cross in 
order to obtain food and clothing. But even non-state institutions failed to escape the extent of 
patronage. Political brokers went to the aforementioned donation locations and hoarded goods 
and clothing to use in future exchanges for political support of their patrons.
39
 Rampant price 
gouging was also common in local stores. In neighborhoods not directly affected by the flood, 
like Candioti Sur, residents complained that candles that normally cost 50 cents were sold for 5 
dollars in the wake of the flood.
40
  
Second, since Reutemann declared a state of emergency, he ensured that public funds that 
from national and international sources could be used for infrastructure projects and social 
assistance programs of his choosing. The state of emergency allowed for the use of executive 
order which meant that the administration need not follow normal protocol to put projects out to 
tender. The means, methods, management and beneficiaries of those projects and programs 
harkened back to the times of the heyday of the Peronist “fat cow” state when resources for 
large-scale projects were doled out in a indiscriminate way.
41
 Because of this, my interlocutors, 
including municipal council members, claim that the flood became a business for many 
politicians and their friends who were given contracts for reconstruction projects. A journalist 
who covered the flood told me, “The state was desperate. They needed a lot of work done 
quickly. And that work went to the private firms owned by friends of government officials or 
former government officials.”42 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Interview on October 12, 2012.  
39
 Interview on January 28, 2013.  
40
 Interview on January 28, 2013.  
41
 Interview on October 23, 2012. 
42
 Interview on October 23, 2012.  
128 
 
4.5.1 Adding Insult to Injury 
As part of the reconstruction process, the Peronist Governor Jorge Obeid signed a decree 
in January 2004 to establish a post-disaster reconstruction agency called the Unidad de 
Recuperación de la Emergencia Hídrica y Pluvial (Executive Unit for the Recovery from the 
Hydrological and Pluvial Emergency) commonly known as El Ente (the Entity).
43
 The main 
objective of the provisional agency was to carry out a census of the flood-affected population 
and survey and assess the damage to housing structures in order to administer the economic 
compensation or indemnifications.
44
 The agency amassed teams of professionals including 
physiologists, occupational therapists, social workers, public health workers, architects and 
lawyers to carry out the census and surveys. Using a calculation based on the level the 
floodwaters reached inside the house and a house’s cadastral category, the teams would assess 
the damage and relay that result back to the agency. The information was then corroborated with 
the database of the Provincial Territorial Cadastral and Information Service and the agency 
would months later distribute the indemnifications. One mid-level government social worker 
who now works for the Provincial Ministry of Social Development told me about her experience 
working with the agency. She said, “The agency’s policy was to manipulate the people – to give 
them less than what actually corresponded to their situation. How did we achieve it? We were 
trained to manipulate residents. We were trained – the lawyers especially – to speak really 
quickly so that poor or uneducated residents wouldn’t be able to understand us. It was a great 
manipulation of people…working with El Ente was a great way to advance careers and learn 
new things…but it was really a horrible experience for the residents considering the objective 
was to give them the least quantity of money that corresponded.”45  
The majority of residents I talked to from Santa Rosa found the distribution of 
indemnifications to be highly unfair. Unsatisfied, many residents contested the agency’s 
calculation claiming that the floodwater reached a higher height and lasted for a longer time than 
the teams had identified. The base amount of subsidy – which were what residents called the 
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indemnifications – was 4,000 pesos. 46  On a single street of similar houses in Santa Rosa, it was 
not uncommon for one resident to receive the base 4,000 subsidy and another resident on the 
other side of the street to receive twice as much. This made residents extremely critical of the 
state agency and the criteria for indemnifications. The agency’s criteria fragmented the 
neighborhood, pitting neighbor against neighbor at a time when they were all suffering. Beatriz 
recalled, “Everything we had known was broken up, disintegrated. But it was more than that. 
There was a sense of isolation. Obviously because every family was flooded and suffering….we 
all had to put their lives back together. But the institutions like El Ente that we relied on for 
compensation added to the sense of isolation…and frustration. In some cases where residents 
who had similar houses and similar experiences of flood, it put them at odds. It became hard to 
maintain relations with neighbors we lived next to for years.”47  
While many residents reeled from the unfairness of the distribution of economic 
compensation, other residents were content to receive whatever amount of resources they could 
get. José told me that he would take whatever money the government would give him because 
the home that he returned to was no longer a home – it was a mud hovel. So badly was his house 
affected by the floodwaters that he said that “it didn’t matter how many times I painted the walls, 
I couldn’t get rid of the watermarks…and during the humid summers, water seeps through the 
brick walls. Now in a way I wish I didn’t sign the legal document, but I really needed that 
money...”48 In order to receive economic compensation for the damage to their houses, residents 
had to go through a lengthy bureaucratic procedure that added insult to injury (Marino and Ribot 
2012). First, the process of receiving indemnifications involved a politics of waiting to which 
residents of Santa Rosa had long been sensitized through the waiting they had to do in clientelist 
exchanges. In this case, they were further sensitized to waiting by the power and subjugation of 
the state agency. As Auyero (2012:9) argues, the poor “know through repeated encounters that if 
they are to obtain the much needed ‘aid’…they have to show that they are worthy of it by 
dutifully waiting.” Waiting first required that a property owner or tenant journey to the agency’s 
office in the city center where they queued and waited for hours to be seen by a state agent. 
Then, after having already suffered the material and emotional damage from the flood, they were 
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required to wait, in most cases over a year, to be granted indemnifications. During that time, 
residents of Santa Rosa did not have resources readily available to do much more than clean the 
mud hovels which became their homes post-flood. The politics of waiting was so pervasive in 
talking about the lengthy process of receiving indemnifications Jairo told me, “it’s exactly 
because of stuff like this that we have the saying ‘Más largo que esperanza de pobre.’”4950 The 
waiting of the flood-affected residents pushed them to the very margins of society whereby the 
state opened its doors just when they are about to reach their threshold.  
The second way the state agency added insult to injury was through the condition for 
receiving indemnifications. In order to receive indemnifications, flood-affected residents had to 
waive their right to pursue legal claims against the state. They were required to sign a legal 
document that stated:  
 
The payment of extraordinary assistance established in this law will imply for the 
beneficiary, to waive any possible claim against the State for compensation for the 
damages resulting from flooding and, where applicable, to waive any claims or legal 
actions for compensation initiated [before the implementation of the present law] 
(Régimen de Reparación Excepcional Por El Desborde Del Río Salado 2003). 
 
This clause has been since disputed and claimed unconstitutional by social movements of 
flood activists. Activists cite the impunity and lack of accountability of the political authorities 
implicated in the flood. However, 10 years later no legal decision had been made regarding their 
responsibility which makes residents feel far from compensated. Because of the lack of 
recognition of the flood as a social catastrophe, there is still a degree of sensitivity, of harm, and 
of rawness with which residents talk about the flood. Graciela, in a moment close to tears, 
asserted, “What we have been looking for, but never got, isn’t a pathetic subsidy from the state. 
What we want is for the state – the authorities involved at the time – to acknowledge that the 
flood was a political and social catastrophe, not simply a natural one.”51 Since political 
authorities were not responsive or accountable to local people, residents felt unrepresented and 
invisible. The lack of responsiveness and accountability fractured residents’ relationships with 
political authorities, the effect of which was a lack of recognition. That lack of recognition 
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served to weaken their relationships and residents began to questions the forms of belonging they 
relied on through clientelist relations (see Ribot 2013b).  
When residents realized that flood causality could be traced back to government 
negligence by the same politicians they had long supported, mistrust of the state and politicians 
grew. In spite of Governor Reutemann’s denial of any advance warning, studies conducted by 
the UNL in the decade leading up to the flood warned of the possibility of a river rise of 
catastrophic proportions. Not only that, but the director of the National Water Institute’s (INA) 
regional headquarters in Santa Fe confirmed that INA had produced a report especially for the 
Reutemann administration that same year warning them of the possibility of a flood because 
water was flowing at a rate of “more than three thousand cubic meters per second.” They had 
even identified on a map where water could potentially enter the city, which was the same place 
of the breach in the embankment.
52
 The studies produced by local, provincial and national 
agencies proved that a flood of that magnitude could, in fact, have been avoided had policy 
decisions been made and early warning measures been taken.  
The flood served as a turning point in terms of how residents framed their vulnerability in 
relation to clientelism. They no longer viewed relationships with politicians and political brokers, 
whom they trusted, in the same light. Moreover, the relations they used to temporarily dull the 
pains of vulnerability were now exposed as one of the causes of vulnerability. The institution of 
clientelism not only failed to provide them with access to the physical, social or political 
protections before and during the flood; it also failed to recognize them as citizens worth serving, 
worth care or attention, after the flood. It was the lack of social reparation that was the most 
damaging. Graciela noted, “Just like how the politicians and government officials covered things 
up – about the flood being caused by natural phenomena…we too cover things up to be able to 
continue living. But you know vulnerability is there. You try to cover up in the everyday, but it 
appears and it hurts. As soon as you try to cover up the pain, you associate it with something else 
and there it is….this is because we do not have internal or social reparation. And this should be 
given to us by the state. This is why we are vulnerable (Interview October 27, 2012). 
The flood turned the spotlight on the political structures and maneuvering that residents 
have been exposed to for decades and made them question the institution that advanced 
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seemingly public goals for politicians’ personal gain. For, it was the collective experience of 
suffering, loss and lack of recognition that eclipsed residents’ personal relationships with 
political brokers and patrons. Previously, residents believed politicians to carry “god-like” 
qualities and treated them as such. Graciela explained, “That was the clientelism of before. Your 
vote in favor of a politician was more a way of demonstrating your trust in them, and in 
exchange they would have to show that things can change. But people lost confidence in that 
political structure.”53 After the flood of 2003, residents felt abandoned and betrayed. The 
recognition that had been systematically institutionalized by clientelism was chipped away by the 
negligence. Even worse, residents were not able to hold the decision makers accountable for their 
actions or inactions.   
The flood of 2007 occurred when residents were most vulnerable. Caused by excessive 
rainfall and inoperative water pumping stations, the 2007 flood – though of a lesser magnitude 
than the 2003 flood – washed away everything that residents of Santa Rosa worked so hard to 
replace. Some residents had just received their indemnifications the year before, which is why 
they describe the 2007 flood as “rubbing salt on an open wound.” Due to heavy rains over a short 
period of time, state authorities dubbed the flood a “natural disaster” which meant that residents 
received no indemnifications despite the fact that the neighborhood was once again left 
underwater. Disillusioned by the government negligence of the 2003 flood and the lack of 
recognition by successive Peronist administrations, residents took to the polls and in the most 
basic form of sanction, voted the Peronists out, and the Radicals in. José pointed out, “When 
people started to realize that they could have avoided this [the flood] and then the second one 
happened, they began to stop believing in the [Peronist] Party. People started to look for a 
change. In the elections of 2007 they voted for a different party.”54 After 24 years of the Peronist 
administrations since the return of democracy in Santa Fe, a Radical/Socialist Front took office 
in the municipal and provincial governments respectively.  
 
4.6 The Emperor’s New Clothes  
Since 2007 Santa Fe has undergone a transformation both aesthetically and 
administratively. In December 2007, the Radical administration embarked on a transformative 
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urban project complete with institutional reforms, decentralization, modernization of the 
municipal services, a new Office of Risk Management, a contingency plan for disaster 
prevention, and the construction and fortification of embankments and stormwater drains. But 
despite the long list of reforms, residents of Santa Rosa remain especially vulnerable. Although 
the flood of 2003 created “a moment of dislocation in the powers of the status quo,” the pre-
flood institution of clientelism and its relations of exchange remained intact (Pelling 2003: 45). 
That very institution continues to limit residents’ choices by constraining their agency in 
influencing their own security outcomes.  
When I asked a lower level municipal employee
55
 if there was a change in clientelism in 
Santa Fe since the Radicals took office in 2007, he laughed, “Of course not! Radicals continue to 
use clientelism just like the Peronists. The difference is that Radicals wear better suits and 
ties!”56 Although his comment was tongue-in-cheek, it is actually quite useful in thinking about 
the new institutional configuration of clientist relations since the rise of the Radical Party. In 
fact, the government employee’s comment evokes the tale of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” 
whereby the emperor may be cloaked in new suit, but his essence has not changed. That is, 
despite the changes since 2007, the institutional logic of clientelism has not changed. Initially, 
after the Radicals took office, the newly elected government officials had naïve notion that they 
could create transparent political structures which would snuff out the need for clientelist 
exchanges.
57
 Yet, newly elected Radical leaders still needed to appease their existing constituents 
and increase their electoral base. They found that they could use a new configuration of 
clientelism to do so (see Chapter 5).   
The most obvious conclusion that may be drawn from this is that political clientelism is 
alive and well in contemporary Santa Fe, and the underlying factor behind its survival is the 
persistence of needs – which fostered the emergence of clientelist relations in the first place. 
Graciela explained that today under the Radical administration, “Needs have not disappeared. 
We don’t promote the model of political clientelism. Likewise, we don’t promote the political 
broker. But we don’t do anything different in terms of satisfying needs.”58 The foundation of 
clientelism is persistence of needs and its ability to shape access to the resources to satisfy needs. 
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Hence, the Radicals continue to use clientelist relations, adapting it to their political needs and 
aspirations, in order to shape social and individual expectations, interactions and behaviors 
(Ostrom 1990). Because of the quid pro quo nature of clientelism, Graciela added, “It is really 
difficult to disconnect that logic from people’s heads.”59 José, one of my interlocutors, argued 
that the Radical Party still uses fundamental elements of clientelism, which produce vulnerability 
by enabling or disabling access to the things that people need, and hence, are hard to reject. He 
said:  
 
You find yourself vulnerable because you don’t have the capacity to respond. So brokers 
and politicians today still sell you whatever. They “sell” in this sense meaning they give 
you something that you don’t have the capacity to reject…so you are vulnerable to these 
things. We are all vulnerable. We are vulnerable to follow a group when we are all the 
same. Some more some less, but the vulnerability is there…in the social. The poorer you 
are the more vulnerable in the face of everything. There are people who are very poor 
who have the capacity but the same system makes them vulnerable in every sense 
(Interview on October 15, 2012).   
 
The floods had two important political-economic effects that occurred at the macro scale 
of the city and the micro scale of the neighborhood. First, the growing mistrust in politicians and 
sense of betrayal as discussed in the previous section generated a space for political competition 
that previously did not exist. The political impact of the flood made it such the governing 
administration is under constant threat of having their political power eroded away by 
competitors. After a 24-year period of one-party rule, there is competition not only within a 
single party but among different parties, notably the Peronist, Radical and Socialist parties. 
Second, the increase in political competition among the three major political parties at the macro 
scale of the city had a visible impact at the micro scale of the neighborhood. The increase in 
political competition produced an even deeper fragmentation and politicization since the 2003 
flood – one that splintered relations among neighborhood residents. The intensity of political 
competition in Santa Rosa was palpable. Jairo told me that he grew up alongside the people who 
today have become political brokers for the competition. He found that fighting with them was 
futile. “When you fight each other over support for political candidates, you say to yourself, 
‘Man, I’ve known these people for 20 or 30 years of my life!’ Then you wonder, why are we 
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fighting?.”60 José too, who separated from the vecinal to form his own civil society organization, 
noted the change in residents’ behaviors since the increase in political competition. He offered 
the following insight:   
 
Santa Rosa today is a very politicized place. There are lots of people who have lived here 
for years and everyone knows everybody else. The problem is that each one now has his 
own theory and you cannot unite them. We are now working on the issue of the sewers 
and instead of meeting to solve the problem, people are meeting to fight about it. 
Everybody wants to blame everybody else. One side blames the other, they blame others, 
but they don’t get together. So they live to fight...they misunderstand each other. They 
end up fighting and they think it is based on political affiliation. But we even end up 
fighting with the ones with are politically aligned with! (Interview on October 15, 2012).  
 
The increase in political competition was undoubtedly divisive in Santa Rosa. At the 
micro level of the neighborhood, it destabilized the Peronist status quo, which, in turn, changed 
the way that clientelist relations were conjugated in two related ways: 1) lack of territorial 
presence and 2) loss of affective ties. In addition to the disappearance of traditional form of 
básicas, patrons, too, disappeared from the territory. Graciela noted, “The way that Peronism 
connected with people was something that we don’t have today….the model of collective action 
and engagement of political leaders was not sustained.” The Radical administration uses a 
different model to engage with citizens. As part of their reform process, they decentralized 
certain public functions to be closer to the citizenry. They established eight district offices, which 
aim to streamline bureaucratic procedures and reduce wait times. With decentralization, the 
Radicals also created a new position: the district coordinator. District coordinators serve as 
intermediaries between the eight districts and the municipal government. They add another link 
in the chain between patrons, brokers and their clients. Pato compared the new configuration to 
that of the former Peronist administrations. He claimed, “The Peronists responded to the people’s 
demands more readily, without the involvement of another link in the chain of command. Now 
the resident speaks to the broker, the broker speaks to the district coordinator, and the district 
coordinator speaks to the mayor. Now there are two more intermediaries between the resident 
and the municipal government and residents don’t like it.”61 Residents also complained that the 
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district coordinator for Santa Rosa actually knows very little about the reality of neighborhood 
because he rarely visits the neighborhood. Rather, the district coordinator relies on a Radical 
political broker known as “El Gitano” (see Chapter 4) to navigate the neighborhood and 
supplement his lack of on-the-ground knowledge before reporting back to the leaders of the 
Radical administration. Politicians rarely “descend” to the neighborhood level anymore, as 
residents told me.   
The lack of politicians’ territorial presence in Santa Rosa has led to the weakening of 
affective ties among the main clientelist actors. The formerly affective relationships that tied 
together the dense web of relations among patrons, brokers and clients have been weakened and, 
in some cases, were replaced by “nakedly transactional,” and ever more institutionalized 
relationships (Gay 1990: 663). The less affective, increasingly transactional relations and the 
distancing of the politician from the territory makes residents feel like numbers rather than 
people. Graciela explained that politicians today “don’t embrace the needs of the people, 
understand their problems. They don’t work with us. For them, it is a matter of listening and 
giving a solution in word. You never see them in the neighborhood, then the elections come and 
you will see them every day. They’ll be at your house, knocking on the door, asking what you 
need. Afterwards, they disappear. It is like that. You tell them what you need and they promise 
you but then you never see them again.”62 As a result, the relationships involved in clientelist 
exchanges have become less affect-based, less stable, and less contingent on political ideology. 
Residents traded in their affective ties and ideological considerations in favor of more economic 
exchanges. Residents interests’ were constructed more based on political power than ideology. 
Beatriz shed some light on these transactions:  
 
What happens is that ideology does not matter. What matters is power. The power to 
become something or have something. Today, for example, there is a guy who supports a 
Peronist politician, but tomorrow who knows. Tomorrow maybe he’ll support a different 
politician who can guarantee can him better economic conditions. Here we have brokers 
that guarantee jobs for your children, a car, a new cell phone and more (Interview on 
October 12, 2012).   
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Power and ideology are relational and not located in a single politician or authority. Some 
residents lament the strong affective ties of their Peronist past, romanticizing the close, personal 
relationships between patrons, brokers and clients and their engagement with the neighborhood. 
When I asked a group of residents what real difference there is between the political brokers of 
the past and those of the present, they said that before they used to rely on brokers for their 
trench work – to obtain medicine or to take them to the hospital when sick or injured. Now 
political brokers are the ones who “fix the streets, the sidewalks, etc.”63 They view the current 
work of brokers as purely transactional and profit seeking. Because of this, residents say that 
brokers can be rented. “Politicians need them, so they rent them, and they pay them. This is 
called ‘militancia rentada’.”64 As a result of “rented militancy,” the once subtle distinction 
between “doing politics” and trench work has become more pronounced. 
 
4.7 Political Flipping and Rented Militancy  
Political positioning has become increasingly important for political brokers and their 
clients to adapt to increased political competition and uncertainty in “doing politics” today. 
Beatriz told me that today, political brokers “flip like a pancake in the air” in order to adjust their 
behaviors to the increase in political competition. Political flipping is a kind of local adaptation 
to the changing macro-political conditions in Santa Fe. Because elections at the municipal and 
provincial levels have become more competitive and contentious since the 24-year reign of 
Peronism, the relationships between politicians and brokers are no longer static or stable. They 
are dynamic, and therefore, more easily influenced by the kinds of tangible economic benefits a 
powerful politician can provide. Since it is uncertain how long tangible benefits will last, 
maintaining affective ties with a particular politician has become less important. Die-hard 
political party militants and loyalists claim that those who partake in political flipping are traitors 
or political mercenaries. When the Radicals took office in 2007, about 90 percent of the Peronist 
political brokers changed parties “like chameleons” and got in line with them.65 Flipping not 
only applies to the context of brokers in Santa Rosa, but also to the political officials who once 
worked for Peronist administrations. Jairo explained, “This [flipping] happens among brokers, 
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government officials, all types of authorities. There are officials who were from the old Peronist 
administrations from years back and when the Radicals won, they became Radicals.”66  
Jairo himself presents an interesting case of flipping. Like Pato, Jairo worked in the 
vecinal’s soup kitchen and is an Obeidist, a loyal follower of a branch of Peronism specific to 
Jorge Obeid who served several terms as governor and mayor.
67
 When I first met him, he told me 
he was “125 percent Peronist.” He added, “The Radicals run the municipality. The Socialists run 
the province. But we are Peronists. Inside the vecinal we don’t “do politics.” But outside the 
vecinal, we are Peronists.”68 Critical of local bureaucrats and political officials from the Radical 
administration, especially the incumbent Mayor José Corral, he recounted stories of people he 
knew who were promised jobs, houses, and many other things by the Radicals, who never 
honored those promises. He was visibly upset by this, saying that politicians and party loyalists 
should never promise you anything if they do not have it.  
A few months later, I noticed that Jairo was becoming far less critical of the Radicals. 
Easing up on his critique, he said, “Now things are a little questionable because everybody tells 
you one thing and you end up with another. But if I had to choose a political candidate now, I 
would be inclined to choose Corral. Because above all others, he is giving people work. Here in 
the neighborhood, there aren’t so many jobs, but at least he is doing something.”69 Suggesting 
that the criteria for support was very different at the different levels of government, he said that 
at the provincial level, however, he would be inclined to vote Peronist because he believes the 
Socialist administration is going backwards. But a year later, when I returned to conduct 
fieldwork during the 2013 elections, I found Jairo at a polling station in Santa Rosa. With 
Obeid’s power waning at both the municipal and provincial levels, Jairo enthusiastically 
supported the reelection of Mayor Corral and was excited to be part of the Radical/Socialist 
alliance. He asked if I saw the progress that the municipal administration was making with the 
sewer project and commented that they were also fixing the streets. Indeed, seeing the visible 
benefits of the Radical administration in Santa Rosa, Jairo’s allegiance to Peronism seemed to 
evaporate. Indeed, political competition at the macro level produced a kind of political boundary 
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making and breaking at the local level, for which political flipping was an essential adaptive tool 
to cope with the dynamic shifts in the political landscape. 
 
4.8 Conclusion: The Reproduction of Vulnerability  
By narrating the emergence and evolution of clientelism in Santa Rosa, from the heyday 
of Peronism to the present-day Radical reforms, I have demonstrated here that clientelism is an 
institution that has adapted over time by granting access to goods, services and jobs that 
temporarily quell people’s needs. It involves a dense web of political brokers and patrons who 
position themselves as invaluable gatekeepers first because they recognize people’s needs and 
second because they structure people’s access to the resources to meet those needs. Further, 
through its quid pro quo contingency, clientelism reduces people’s security by limiting their 
ability to influence government to be responsive or hold government officials accountable.  
Crucially, clientelism relies on a cycle of recognition of and short-term fulfillment of 
needs. It also relies on politicians’ abilities to grant access to goods, supplies, jobs and services 
using what one resident called “methods of seduction.” Politicians and their brokers will go to 
talk with residents, taking inventory of their needs. Later, the brokers promote a well-designed 
project or plan that will meet (or exceed) those needs. Finally, appealing to residents’ common 
sense, politicians make promises to give people what they need, or what residents think they 
need.
 70
 To use a concept gleaned from Gramsci, politicians cultivate a belief in a project or plan 
that “blends seamlessly into common sense” (Li 2007: 5). The patrons and political brokers 
recognize residents’ immediate needs, but cannot leverage the resources to holistically invest in 
changing them. They have no incentive to.  For, if they did, they may lose their political support. 
As one of my interlocutors put it, what politicians promise “is not within reality because they 
promise things that they know they cannot directly deliver on.”71 Hence, clientelism as an 
institution actually reduces residents’ security by enabling government to get away with making 
small investments in neighborhoods without having to deal with the redistributive issues.  
Residents, too, know that. They are not dupes. Graciela told me, “People remain quiet 
because they fear how they [brokers] will respond. Because people know that in two or three 
words, they offer them [things] and can convince them. This is why people are vulnerable…and 
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sometimes they convince them because the poorer people let them be convinced.”72 Residents 
feel powerless by clientelist relations because they fail to see an alternative way of meeting their 
needs. They also know that if they transgress the ways of access created by the institution, they 
may lose the means that help satisfy their needs, at least over the short-term. So while the 
affective ties may no longer be there, the increasingly transaction relations of the Radical 
administration remain are crucial to urban livelihoods. As Germán, one of my interlocutors, 
cleverly remarked, “Here in Santa Fe we are not going to disappear because of the floods. We 
are going to disappear because of residents who keep voting for the wrong people.”73 This quote 
rather succinctly sums up the reproduction of vulnerability through cyclical clientelist relations 
that recognize needs and temporarily satisfy them. Clientelism effectively reproduces 
vulnerability by the recognition of people’s needs, which capitalizes on a crucial locus of 
engagement to establish unequal power relations, thereby restricting people’s ability to influence 
their own security outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Politics of Visibility: 
Stormwater Infrastructure, Vulnerability and Making Visible the Invisible  
 
5.1 Introduction: The Discursive Tactic of Invisibility  
“I insist on the importance of the infrastructure that you don’t see” (Santa Fe Ciudad 
Videos 2013a). This is how the incumbent Mayor of Santa Fe talked about the solutions to the 
city’s drainage problems. The mayor’s comments were widely reported in the local press, 
quelling decades of controversy over infrastructure provision for the city’s northern and 
northwestern peripheries. The media attention had less to do with the city’s drainage problems 
that included well known health-related concerns and foul smells. Rather, the mayor’s statement 
brought media attention to the solutions he identified as unseen: the invisible infrastructure.  
This chapter theorizes the changing role of infrastructure in the politics of visibility – the 
practice of conjuring, codifying, promising and utilizing the visibility of infrastructure projects to 
influence citizens and maintain political dominance. I focus on stormwater infrastructure as both 
a set of materials and a “discursive object in urban government” (McFarlane 2008:  415). In 
doing so, I conceptualize “invisibility” not so much as a material reality, but rather as a 
discursive tactic to talk about drainage infrastructure as an important part of the fabric of the city. 
In many cities in the Global South, there is no such thing as “invisible” stormwater infrastructure 
– the jumbles of pipes, drains and culverts both under- and above ground – make them a very 
visible and vital part of the city. While stormwater infrastructure is not necessarily invisible, I 
argue that people talk about it as invisible. By bringing the attention to the discourse surrounding 
stormwater infrastructure, I demonstrate that invisibility is invoked to juxtapose stormwater 
infrastructure from previous periods of “monumental” high-modern infrastructure as well as to 
draw a line between political party rule. Once the infrastructure is discursively labeled as 
“invisible” by politicians and municipal decision makers, there emerges a political strategy to 
“visibilize” it. This tactic, I argue, allows government to legitimate itself and political parties to 
expand their electoral base. I also show that “invisibility” is co-constituted by citizens, who use 
the infrastructure to designate belonging. Recognizing the affective power of this infrastructure – 
how citizens feel abandoned when they lack the requisite infrastructure – then delivering it in a 
visible way makes citizens feel included, acknowledged and protected by the state.  
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My argument rests on the following three points. First, although Santa Fe is prone to both 
fluvial (riverine) and pluvial (rain-related) flooding, there has been a historic focus on riverine 
flooding. Citizens and city officials alike have long viewed the rivers as threats. So they 
constructed very visible, monumental infrastructure to block, cross and limit the negative effects 
of the rivers’ overbank flows. In the late nineteenth century, the visibility and scale of these 
infrastructure became an integral part of political campaigns showcasing state progress and 
modernity. Second, centuries after Santa Fe’s smart siting atop the highest tract of land in the 
1500s, the city has grown far beyond its original Spanish colonial town plan. The city expanded 
northwards and the government incorporated new neighborhoods that were far enough away 
from the rivers that the risk of flooding was believed to be negligible. Yet, what the government 
did not take into account was the effect of human occupation of these newly incorporated 
territories, which have poorly developed soils and difficulty absorbing rainfall. This, coupled 
with the lack of requisite drainage infrastructure like stormwater drains and sewers – makes these 
new neighborhoods highly prone to rain-related flooding. Third, in 2007, only four years after 
the Salado River flooded, a disastrous rain-related flood brought about a historic political 
change. After 24 years of Peronist administrations since the return of democracy in Argentina, 
the Radical Party won the municipal elections. Santa Fe’s newly elected leaders announced their 
vision to improve the city’s system of flood protection specifically by concentrating on the 
construction of stormwater infrastructure. They set aside part of the municipal budget to fund 
both large and small projects, from drain construction to canal and ditch cleaning. The mayor 
emphasized that the financing for large drainage infrastructure normally comes from the national 
or provincial government, but since the city could not wait any longer, they turned to their own 
municipal funds (Santa Fe Videos 2013a).
 
 
The Radical administration made a conscious effort to concentrate on the parts of the city 
that lack this essential, infrastructure – the ones that provide potable water, drain excess water, 
take away waste, and distribute the supplies of electricity and gas. In doing so, the Radicals 
recognized what Pinch (2010: 80) calls the “key to understanding technology” – a highly 
political key. Well aware of the city’s infrastructure deficit, they understood how under the right 
circumstances they can be seen as “agents of change” (ibid). The Radicals understood that what 
they could offer was what local people wanted – recognition – and that the provision of 
infrastructure was a constructive act through which the government recognized local people as 
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citizens worth serving. Infrastructure provision was integrally related to being politically 
enfranchised because of its relational role in local politics. As Star put it, “infrastructure is 
fundamentally a relational concept” such that it becomes real “in relation to organized practices” 
(1999: 380; See also Star and Ruhleder 1996). The characteristic of having or not having it 
provides the basis for an understanding of the relational property of infrastructure (Starr 1999). 
Having it gives people a sense of belonging. Not having it makes people feel abandoned by 
government. For instance, when it rains heavily, the north and northwestern neighborhoods, 
among others not serviced by stormwater infrastructure, flood. Residents recognized that if they 
had the stormwater infrastructure, their neighborhoods would not flood or at least not as much as 
they flood without it. The lack of said infrastructure makes residents feel abandoned, disaffected, 
like second-class citizens. Thus, stormwater drains are not simply “subtenders of use” providing 
integral protection from flooding (Star 1999: 380). Rather, they act as the bearers of citizenship. 
The provision of this infrastructure recognizes people’s needs and authorizes a form of belonging 
related to residency-based citizenship. Yet, even more crucially, the provision of stormwater 
infrastructure in the north and northwestern neighborhoods of the city reinforce citizen 
identification with the Radical Party.  
They Radical administration found a productive intersection between discourses of rain-
related flood problems and representation and contemporary practices of infrastructure provision. 
The Radicals recognized that there was a tendency to perceive drainage infrastructure as 
“hidden” beneath the ground, juxtaposed with the larger, monumental infrastructure of bridges 
and roads of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet, stormwater infrastructure was rarely 
invisible, as open ditches and canals could be found across the city, in rich and poor 
neighborhoods alike (see Chapter 3 for discussion of the Caseros Ditch). These infrastructure, 
just like the monumental ones, have always played an important role in urban politics and 
everyday life, from their identification as central features of modernity in the late nineteenth 
century to contemporary debates surrounding their failure, inadequacy, and maintenance after the 
floods in the last two decades (McFarlane 2008). Thus, the Radical turn towards discursively 
labeling this infrastructure as invisible engendered an equally radical makeover in the city’s 
political machinery. The method for making the “invisible” seen became one of visibilizing it 
through marketing and labor. While the visible impact of their work on invisible infrastructure 
provision is gauged through city’s marketing publications, what is fundamental to the Radical 
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administration is image production – how they show the citizenry that they are doing something; 
that they are “working” for them to manage flood risk. In 2010, the Radical administration 
created a program of municipal work crews (cuadrillas) to clean, maintain and construct 
infrastructure. In the interest of producing an image of change and progress, the Radical 
administration utilized the visible labor of work crews to deliver infrastructure. Thus, making 
visible the invisible is primarily composed of a machinery of laboring bodies overlaid by a media 
discourse.  
Particularly significant in this case is that work crews combine elements of both 
democracy and political clientelism to deliver infrastructure. The changing political environment 
since 2007, in particular, influenced clientelist exchanges in terms of how clientelism coexists 
with and supports democracy. While there is no generally accepted definition of clientelism, it, 
in essence, involves a quid-pro-quo exchange of resources for political support, leveraged 
through a patron-broker-client relationship. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the past the social 
relationship between the patron and client was fundamental, with an emphasis on “direct, face-
to-face interactions and transactions between the patron and client” (Hicken 2011: 290). 
Although there is still recognition of the importance of personal relations, the difference here 
since the return of democracy and particularly with the rise of the Radicals, is that the 
relationship between patrons, brokers and clients has been institutionalized and made overtly 
transactional.  
 Ribot (2013b: 103) argues that to be democratic, “institutions must be representative: 
accountable to the people and empowered to respond.” Through the provision of infrastructure, 
the Radical administration is democratic in the sense that they are being responsive by utilizing 
their discretionary powers to translate the needs of local people into policy and policy into 
practice (see Ribot 2003, 2013b; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). They are also being 
representative by providing local people with a sense of being cared for and a form of belonging. 
But it is not just that they are responsive and representative to the needs they think citizens have. 
Rather, the Radicals, through their own politics of visibility, align the needs and aspirations of 
citizens with those of their own. The way they are delivering infrastructure – through the labor of 
work crews – is reinforced by the allocation of jobs. Yet, the allocation of jobs is not done 
through democratic means, but through clientelist relations. Members of work crews exchange 
their labor for the political support of the Radical Party, which is leveraged by the work crew 
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leader who assumes the traditional role of the political broker. The municipal government pays 
the work crew leader for their labor and it is at the leader’s discretion how to distribute the 
payments to his or her crew. The transactional aspect functions similar to the traditional role of 
the political broker who maintained a roster of clients and determined who gets what (see 
Chapter 4). The use of labor in work crews highlights the changing role of political clientelism, 
reinforcing the argument that clientelism is an enduring feature of politics and that democracy 
has contributed to its transformation and present-day configuration in Santa Fe.   
This chapter begins by explaining the politics of visibility. Through an investigation of 
historic examples of infrastructure planning and interviews with stakeholders in Santa Fe, this 
research demonstrates how large-scale visible infrastructural solutions play a particularly 
important role in electoral politics – often at the expense of neglecting of drainage infrastructure 
like stormwater drains and sewers. The next section explains why the current city administration 
has turned toward the discourse of the invisible. This section demonstrates how the Radical Party 
used the city’s peripheries as an electoral growth area where they established the political 
discourse of invisibility to provide the much-needed solutions to rain-related flooding. Pivotal to 
their campaign was the promise of a city less vulnerable in the face of floods. In essence, they 
are making what is basic infrastructure “monumental” like that of the flood embankments. The 
conclusion shows how the politics behind infrastructure provision determines the types of 
solutions available to political officials, how those solutions are made visible, and how they are 
sanctioned by residents. Crucially, the politics behind infrastructure – particularly the political 
and discursive treatment of flood-related infrastructure – shapes people’s vulnerability and their 
sense that government is taking care of them. This politics speaks to the larger political relations 
between residents and the Radical Party: the way the Radical Party mobilizes the idiom and 
symbolism of the ‘invisible’ in order to shift affective affiliations and actual vulnerabilities.  
 
5.2 The Politics of Visibility 
Providing infrastructure is a fundamental activity of the state. Roads, bridges and 
embankments are necessary for the functioning of society. As such, these types of infrastructure 
are among the most visible outputs of state functions. Infrastructure like bridges and roads stand 
as monumental achievements. In essence, they are monuments to state power. As providers of 
order, security and mobility, infrastructure protects citizens from harm, improves their well-
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being, and allows them to move about the city to accomplish daily activities. These infrastructure 
are also visible measures of state progress and the quality of those who govern. They show that 
the state is doing something – that it is investing in the city and the welfare of its citizens. As 
important, but less studied, are the effects of infrastructure on society. Star (1999: 381) argues 
that infrastructure has a “taken-for-grantedness” and that we as humans normalize it in the 
everyday: we walk along it; drive on it; open the faucet and expect the flow of water without 
even thinking about it. Social scientists, too, often take infrastructure for granted. Graham (2010) 
suggests that the study of infrastructure has long been overlooked by social theorists because of 
this taken-for-granted quality.  
Contemporary discussions about infrastructure often focus on its breakdown, frailty and 
failures (Graham 2010; Mitchell 2014). While no infrastructure is truly invisible, the false 
dichotomy between the invisible and the visible is underscored especially when infrastructure 
fails. In many infrastructural contexts, particularly in the Global North, infrastructure only 
becomes visible when there is a problem. Star (1999: 382), for instance, argues that 
infrastructure has an “invisible quality” when it is working. But that invisible quality becomes 
visible, i.e. real, when it breaks down. While infrastructure failures are often blamed the 
movement and concentration of people or the inability of governments to cope with maintenance, 
expansion and renewal, Mitchell (2014) posits that the accumulation of capital drawn to large 
infrastructure can very well circumvent the construction of durable, valuable structures. He 
argues (2014: 437), “Where capital is still successfully draw into large infrastructures, it often 
flows into projects that appear to weaken rather than enhance the possibilities for future 
collective life.” Thus, the impetus for this chapter is to move beyond infrastructure’s “taken-for-
grantedness” and failures to show how infrastructure has a life of its own—an important 
materiality. And that life is political.  
Monumental infrastructure, in particular, explicitly draw out and on citizens’ affective 
responses, such as pride and aspirations of modernity. Graham and Marvin (2001:43) note that 
historically these infrastructure have become an essential part of the “modern ideal.” I argue that 
it is precisely their visibility that make monumental infrastructure so appealing. According to 
Anthropologist Penelope Harvey (2010: 37), these infrastructure have “an enduring appeal” 
because citizens can see, touch and experience them. The appeal of visible, monumental 
infrastructure to the citizenry is politically significant. Successful politicians capitalize on this 
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appeal, understanding that citizens vote first with their eyes then with their imaginations. These 
infrastructure enable politicians to turn citizens on to the transformative restructurings of the city 
that serve their electoral purposes as well as the needs and aspirations of citizens. Historically, 
these infrastructure have been used to influence –subjectivity – both materially and discursively 
– which has led to the stratification of risk throughout the city. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
infrastructure projects of the late nineteenth century, which allowed for the circulation of goods, 
traffic, people, waste and air, were critical to the production of self-governing, moral subjects 
(Rose 1996). While all types of infrastructure have played important roles as McFarlane (2008: 
418) notes, in connecting a “range of domains, logics and materialities in geographically distinct 
ways,” I contend that the monumental infrastructure as technologies of rule have historically 
dominated in urban politics.   
For politicians, infrastructure like roads and bridges form the foundation of a politics of 
visibility – the practice of conjuring, codifying, promising and utilizing the visibility of 
infrastructure projects to influence citizens and maintain political dominance. In Santa Fe, it is 
precisely the visibility of this infrastructure – along with the order, security, mobility and sense 
of pride that visibility evokes – that makes infrastructure a necessary component of electoral 
politics. Jorge Próspero Roze (2003) has, in fact, shown through his analysis of floods in the El 
Chaco province of Argentina, that by including some form of structural flood protection in 
politicians’ electoral campaigns actually wins more votes. Roze (2003: 28) argues that politicians 
use that infrastructure to capture votes or justify them, for which they “conceptualize the 
electoral moment as a political act par excellence.” In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the use of large-
scale flood control infrastructure in election campaigns, particularly that of Carlos Reutemann in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. But the use of infrastructure in the politics of visibility has an even 
longer legacy in Santa Fe. A particularly provocative example is the Puente Colgante (Colgante 
Bridge). Puente Colgante is a suspension bridge that connects the urban core of Santa Fe with the 
east across Setúbal Lagoon to University City and the neighborhood of El Pozo. In September 
2014, it was declared a National Historic Monument by the President of Argentina and is a great 
source of pride for citizens. When conjuring up an image of the city, the first thing that comes to 
mind is the Puente Colgante. Santafesinos adore it. It is prominently displayed on Santa Fe city 
marketing publications, postcards and dressed with lights during the holidays. I once made the 
mistake of commenting that I thought the lights on Puente Colgante made it look too exaggerated 
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to one of my interlocutors. I apologized, clearly having offended him. His response was, “The 
Puente Colgante is like your mother-in-law, you know? You can talk bad about your mother-in-
law, but you will always defend her if you hear someone else speaking ill of her.”1  
The idea for the Puente Colgante was conjured up under Mayor Manuel Irigoyen’s 
leadership in the early 1900s. Irigoyen was behind some of the greatest expressions of state 
power during Santa Fe’s Belle Époque (1900 to 1920), including construction of the Irigoyen 
Embankment, the Port of Santa Fe, and the railroads. After its completion in 1905, the wooden 
structure, which served both as a bridge and an aqueduct, met an untimely end when it collapsed 
under pressure from rising waters of the Setúbal Lagoon. But while the physical structure of the 
bridge no longer existed, the idea lived on –thanks largely to political leadership. The bridge was 
rebuilt in 1928 and endured until 1983 when it collapsed once again in a flood. For a period of 
almost 20 years, Santafesinos’ source of pride was but a memory. Then Mayor Jorge Obeid 
made reconstruction of the Puente Colgante a reality. In 1995 he announced, “Now is the time to 
construct this infrastructure (El Litoral 1995: 12).”2 At the time Obeid was serving his last year 
as mayor of Santa Fe while campaigning for the governorship. As mayor, Obeid was aware of 
infrastructure financing Argentina received from international sources, specifically the loans 
Argentina received to finance highway infrastructure projects and a promenade called the eastern 
riverwalk. So Obeid, a savvy politician, used the politics of visibility in his gubernatorial 
campaign. Playing up issues of flood security, mobility and pride, Obeid promised the 
reconstruction of the Puente Colgante. Although reconstruction began in 2000 – a year after 
Obeid’s first term ended – Obeid, who was masterful in the politics of visibility, exploited the 
bridge’s reconstruction and reopening during his second campaign for governor, which he also 
won in 2003. Obeid understood how the ability to see and imagine infrastructure influences 
people’s quality of life, pride, identity and belonging. Crucially, he utilized the politics of 
visibility as an active means of gaining and maintaining political power.  
At the neighborhood level too, politicians use visible infrastructure projects as a means of 
winning votes. In 2005 Mayor Martín Balbarrey paved Azcuenaga Street, a major artery that 
connects the two main avenues of Peñaloza and Blas Parera in the northern neighborhood of Los 
Angeles. All residents I interviewed in Los Angeles hail Balbarrey as a kind of hero for this 
                                                          
1
 Interview on August 22, 2012.  
2
 El Litoral, Friday June 23, 1995, page 12.  
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accomplishment. Even though he lost the election in 2007, he made a lasting impression in the 
neighborhood because he drew upon the affective responses of residents – in what the paved 
road meant to them: progress and mobility. One resident, Mauricio, told me, “Balbarrey was the 
first mayor to make any visible improvements to our neighborhood. Of course, I voted for him.”3 
But, Balbarrey lost to the Radical Party (Radical Civic Union or UCR) candidate Mario Barletta, 
who became the first Radical mayor since the return of democracy in 1983.  
Barletta cemented his historic leadership and maintained political dominance for his party 
by undertaking one of the most visible transformations of the city’s public spaces perhaps since 
the time of Irigoyen. By rehabilitating public spaces and historic public buildings, such as El 
Molino, an old mill, and La Redonda, an old railroad workshop, Barletta employed a politics of 
visibility to demonstrate that he was investing in the welfare of Santafesinos. Miguel Angel, a 
resident of the northwestern neighborhood of Los Troncos, asked me if I had visited La 
Redonda, which had been rehabilitated into a cultural and visual arts center. When I told him that 
I had, he said, “It’s really beautiful what Barletta did. You know, at first, I thought he was just 
putting up more infrastructure for the people living downtown – you know, the rich people. But 
then after I took my grandson I realized that this [La Redonda] is for everyone. It made me feel 
proud to be from here, to see what he did with this work.”4 Miguel Angel’s quote demonstrates 
that Barletta’s politics of visibility – using the city’s public spaces and buildings – evoked a 
sense of pride in its citizens.  
There is, of course, a spatial element to the politics of visibility as Miguel Angel 
mentioned. Politicians use the politics of visibility for infrastructure in the areas of the city that 
will most prominently be seen. That is because infrastructure projects are not spatially neutral in 
terms of electoral politics and, as such, are subject to exclusion. A long time advisor and friend 
of former Governor Carlos Reutemann, told me: “Sometimes the government makes mistakes by 
putting more effort into carrying out infrastructure in the city center which is more populous 
because more people see it…because, from an electoral point of view, it is more important than 
other areas of the city…”5 Hence, infrastructure projects are geared towards the urban core of 
Santa Fe where there is a larger and wealthier electoral base – where infrastructure is more 
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 Interview on January 12, 2013. 
4
 Interview on November 29, 2012.  
5
 Interview on February 5, 2013  
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visible and where politicians will get more votes. Residents living outside the urban core are 
acutely aware of this, and nearly all residents I interviewed in the northern neighborhood of Los 
Angeles pointed this out. One of them, Enrique, was particularly vocal. He said, “Instead of 
building a new pedestrian walkway downtown that costs 11 million pesos (US $1.5 million), 
they should install stormwater drains here in our neighborhood.” When I questioning the reasons 
behind the focus on infrastructure in the urban core, Enrique responded, “Political reasons. To 
open a street in the center of the city is more visible. It’s like marketing. Before you go and 
install a drain or clean a ditch in a peripheral area of the city where only the residents of the 
neighborhood will see, you do something in the center where all people will see.”6 Thus, the 
politics of visibility have historically played out in the urban core. However, as the city grew 
northwards, the new territories, not yet worked into the politics of the city, required attention to 
stormwater infrastructure labeled as “invisible.”  
 
5.3 The Rise of the Radicals and the Turn towards the “Invisible” 
The shift from the visible, monumental to the “invisible” underground infrastructure 
came at a time ripe for change. During the two and a half decades of Peronist administrations, 
floods had wreaked havoc on the city and its infrastructure. The flood disasters of 2003 followed 
quickly by 2007 undermined people’s perception of the Peronists’ ability to manage risk and 
ultimately govern the city. In March 2007, after citizens were still reeling from the 2003 flood, 
the city suffered yet another disastrous flood. But in contrast to the 2003 flood disaster, the 2007 
flood was caused by intense rainfall over a short period of time. It affected the same 
neighborhoods as in 2003, but the neighborhoods in the northern and northwestern peripheries 
were hit hard precisely because they lacked the requisite drainage infrastructure. Enter Mario 
Barletta. When the 2003 flood occurred, Barletta was the Rector of the National University of 
the Litoral (UNL). In the months leading up to the flood, Barletta, a hydraulic engineer by 
training, had authorized a university report warning the government of the increased flood risk 
due to heavy precipitation and the rising water levels of the Salado River. According to Barletta, 
since the university warned government officials of the heightened risk, the flood should not 
                                                          
6
 Interview on January 12, 2013.  
 151 
 
have come as a shock and the city should have been more prepared.
7
 During and after the flood 
of 2003, the city relied heavily on the university’s human resources for organizational, technical 
and advisory support. Barletta’s management of the UNL at the time of the flood was what 
prompted university students to push him to run for mayor and the lack of preparedness with 
which the city faced the rain-related flood of 2007 cemented his resolution.
8
  
With his background in hydraulic engineering and experience making up for the lack of 
effective city management during the floods of 2003 and 2007, Barletta’s political campaign 
centered on making the city less vulnerable in the face of floods. While he used a politics of 
visibility in the rehabilitation of the city’s historic buildings and public spaces of the urban core, 
Barletta did something different: he targeted the city’s peripheries as critical sites of action for 
the construction of “invisible” infrastructure. Emphasizing the importance of the city’s 
underground drainage network, he told me in an interview, “Santa Fe will always be vulnerable 
due to the rivers. That’s a given. But it is also vulnerable to rain.”9 The Radical Party staked its 
2007 political campaign on making the city less vulnerable in the face of floods, which meant a 
focus not just on the monumental flood control infrastructure like embankments, but also on the 
much-needed and historically-neglected stormwater infrastructure. The Radical Party 
differentiated itself from the Peronists by promising change; they promised to develop the 
infrastructure necessary to make the city and its citizens less vulnerable at a critical time when 
the city was suffering from flooding. Moreover, the political ways in which the Radical Party 
distinguished itself from the Peronist Party were particularly crucial for making their discourse 
of invisibility so strategic. The Peronists traditionally drew their support from the poor and 
working class who were spatially at the peripheries of Santa Fe. But the decades-long Peronist 
rule had an extremely negative effect on the poor and working class and, in 2007, there was still 
high un- and underemployment in Santa Fe. My interlocutor, Juliana, explained that the 24 years 
of Peronist administrations had left the city fragmented in terms of socioeconomic inequality. 
She told me, “After the economic crisis followed by the flood crisis, the Peronists issued social 
and economic assistance policies in the early 2000s. But people at the peripheries still felt 
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 In my interview with Barletta on March 12, 2003, he was unable to supply said report or provide any details about 
it.  
8
 Interview on March 12, 2013.  
9
 Interview on March 12, 2013.  
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disenfranchised because they didn’t see a long-term political project that invested in people.”10 
So the Radical Party set out to change that.  
The timing could not have been better for a change in the political landscape. For the first 
time since 1983, there was real political competition. For Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 28), 
competition boils down to “when citizens and politicians have strong incentives to try hard and 
win supporters at the margins for one or the other partisan camp.” In the 2007 elections, elections 
were close between three rival party blocs. In addition to Barletta, there were two other 
candidates who were vying for the position of city mayor. Although Barletta won the 2007 
mayoral race, he took only 33 percent of the votes. The two other Peronist candidates, the 
incumbent Mayor Martín Balbarrey and Cachi Martínez won 29 and 23 percent respectively. The 
Radicals knew that during this time of intense political competition they would have to make 
progress by expanding their electoral base. As one of my interlocutors, told me, “Santa Fe’s 
authorities cannot permit another flood. For, they will die a political death.” He added, “If the 
pumping stations don’t work, we will see the mayor himself going to take the water out [of the 
reservoirs] with buckets. No administration can politically survive another flood.”11 Indeed, 
floods are highly visible and their management has a very noticeable political impact – the 
possibility of political death. Under constant threat of having their political power eroded by a 
flood, the Radical administration could not afford to make a mistake. For, robust political 
competition would surely lead to a party turnover in government. According to many scholars, 
robust competition would lead to the eventual demise of clientelism. Geddes (1991, cited in 
Hicken 2011: 297-298), for instance, argues that “robust, balanced party competition induces 
politicians to professionalize the bureaucracy and abandon clientelism.” However, in the sections 
that follow, I demonstrate that this is not the case.  
The election of Barletta marked the end of Peronist Party rule and ushered in a new 
configuration of politics centered on the reorganization of the municipal infrastructure provision 
and delivery system. In previous municipal administrations, decision makers went after large-
scale, monumental infrastructure that people could see. Since most of the urban space of Santa 
Fe was already enclosed by flood embankments, which politicians used to fight the visible threat 
of floods, the Radical Party moved on to the lower-hanging, less-visible fruit: stormwater 
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 Interview on October 18, 2012.  
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 Interview on August 22, 2012.  
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infrastructure. This was not because the Radicals believed that stormwater drains were better at 
treating flood risk than embankments. Rather, this was a discursive strategy through which they 
could leverage the “invisibility” of this infrastructure in order to gain votes and, critically, 
distinguish themselves from the Peronists. In turning towards invisible infrastructure the 
Radicals recognized two important points. First, after living through the failures of the former 
administrations, they acknowledged the fallibility of large-scale, monumental infrastructure like 
embankments in reducing vulnerability. But there was no question that the crucial, yet neglected 
infrastructure like stormwater drains would. These infrastructure complement the large-scale 
monumental infrastructure in providing mobility and well being. But, more than that, they 
provide citizens with a sense of belonging and recognition as citizens worth serving.  
 
5.4 Invisibility and Recognition  
As the pace of urbanization quickened towards the end of the twentieth century, the city 
expanded in the only direction it could: northwards (see Figure 13). The municipal government 
incorporated the new territory in a piecemeal and fragmented fashion, but without providing the 
requisite infrastructure or urban services, such as access to public transport, paved roads, 
stormwater drains, sewers, potable water or educational facilities among others. Unquestionably, 
the north was a frontier zone that, until the 1980s, was home to large farms owned by a handful 
of landholding elite.
12
 Like many other frontier neighborhoods in the north, Los Angeles stands 
as the material manifestation of decades without planning. The material differences between the 
infrastructure in the city center and the peripheries had important effects on the critical relation 
between people and government. Without requisite infrastructure like stormwater drains that 
made people feel protected from flooding, residents living in the peripheries felt abandoned, 
disempowered and invisible in the eyes of government. They considered infrastructure provision 
to be a defining characteristic of being recognized as citizens by government. Recognition, in 
this sense, was a way of making people visible.  
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 Interview on November 24, 2012.  
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Figure 13. Map showing Santa Fe’s growth according to the Urban Plan of 2009. Source: 
Municipality of the City of Santa Fe, 2009.   
 
The neighborhood of Los Angles was incorporated into Santa Fe in October 1983, just 
months after the “return of democracy” in Argentina. Since then different sectors of the 
neighborhood were subdivided, sold and developed at different times. Noticeably different from 
the older neighborhoods of the urban core where large swathes of real estate are extremely rare, 
Los Angeles comprised ample “virgin” land for development. But the appeal of large lots came 
at an opportunity cost for the self-sufficient lower- and middle-income families who moved to 
the neighborhood. Maria, one of my interlocutors who moved to Angeles in the mid-1980s, 
remembered lamenting the decision. She told me, “It took me a long time to get used to living 
here. It was like living in a rural area. I used to live 10 minutes from the city center and could 
easily walk to all the supermarkets, restaurants and shops. I never wanted to come to the north. I 
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saw the north as backwards because of the lack of infrastructure and services.”13 In fact, Los 
Angeles was considered a periurban or rural area in the late 1990s according to the Municipal 
Stormwater Master Plan (INA 1996). 
Today the neighborhood still has large lots for sale by private developers. Many lots, 
which were once dotted with vernal pools (called lagunas or lagoons by residents) – a type of 
wetland that would fill from surface runoff – have been filled in by developers and residents. 
This particular geographic characteristic was crucial to the drainage of the area when inundated 
with rain. Infiling and urban development on land with high water tables and poorly drained soils 
has further complicated drainage. Those physical characteristics coupled with waste disposal and 
littering in open drainage ditches (still considered stormwater infrastructure) cause flooding 
especially during intense rains. Despite these material and geographic factors, residents of Los 
Angeles believed that they would be safe from floods due to the neighborhood’s landlocked 
location far enough away from the Salado River. The idea that the neighborhood could, in fact, 
flood was shocking to early residents. Sixty-eight-year-old Osvaldo, who is considered the 
neighborhood’s founder, told me that before he bought his plot of land, he “did the research” and 
that even the municipality “determined that the neighborhood would not flood.”14 But to his 
surprise, on October 21, 1983
15
 after a night of heavy rains, Osvaldo awoke to find his bed 
surrounded by a pool of water that reached nearly a half meter high. Since then, his house has 
flooded more times than he could count. Today it stands unfinished, the cement walls unpainted. 
To adapt to his surroundings, Osvaldo did build foot-high flood barriers on all his doors which 
one must step over to enter his house.  
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 Interview on January 12, 2013 
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 Interview on November 23, 2012.  
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 The Vecinal (neighborhood association) was named 21 October in remembrance of the date of the first flood that 
affected residents.  
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Figure 14. One of the lots for sale in Los Angeles. Photo by author, 2012. 
 
Unlike the other neighborhoods in this study like Centenario, Santa Rosa or Candioti Sur 
which are exposed to riverine flood risk or a combination of riverine and rain-related flood risk, 
flood risk in Los Angeles is rain-related (pluvial). Los Angeles is not directly at risk of riverine 
flooding, with which everyone was historically obsessed. Instead, the neighborhood is at risk of 
rain-related flooding. Rain-related floods are different. They are less visible in the eyes of the 
state agents who have been so focused on building a wall around the city to protect it from 
riverine flooding. While fluvial geomorphological techniques can estimate with some confidence 
the territorial extent of riverine flooding, estimating the future probability of extreme rainfall 
events and their distribution is more challenging (Houston et al. 2011). It is also difficult to 
predict, with any level of certainty, how the interplay of urban development processes and rain-
related flood risk will play out as the municipal government cannot keep up with the need to 
upgrade and extend drainage infrastructure to the north and northwestern peripheries.  
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Figure 15. Open drainage ditches in Los Angeles. Photos by author, 2012. 
 
Not only were rain-related floods less visible than riverine floods, residents themselves 
were less visible than those in the center. Residents of Los Angeles have long blamed the 
municipal government for the lack of this particular infrastructure. Successive Peronist 
administrations have failed to respond to the three-decade long demand for this critical drainage 
infrastructure. A local newspaper even described Los Angeles as a neighborhood “where time 
stood still for years; where improvements were not made despite demands” (Uno Santa Fe 2014). 
The lack of government responsiveness to residents’ demands greatly shaped their sense of 
citizenship. Ribot (2014: 688) defines citizenship as the “ability to influence those who govern – 
an ability to hold government accountable via sanctions.” Since residents were, for so long, not 
able influence government authorities so that they would be responsive, they felt like they were 
not worthy of being urban citizens. It was precisely the lack of response and recognition that 
made them feel vulnerable in the face of floods. When the neighborhood flooded, residents 
protested by employing the “power of pressure” (see Ranganathan 2010). They cut off access to 
major thoroughfares and contacted the media for coverage of the rain-related flooding to make 
their demands more visible (see Figure 16). By putting themselves in public spaces, they are not 
only demanding to be supported by the infrastructure they need, they are also protesting their 
vulnerability in the face of rain-related floods by calling attention to their own “invisible” quality 
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as citizens in the scheme of municipal infrastructure provision. Luis, one of my interlocutors 
from Los Angeles, explained:  
 
We have always been ignored by the municipal government. So many years have gone by 
without them carrying out any infrastructure projects here. So today a lot of things are 
lacking. Residents have a lot of anxiety over infrastructure development. In 2008 the 
government carried out the potable water project. Next is the gas project. There is also a 
drainage project, and a gutter project, which is currently underway. No past government 
administration did anything like this. And that’s because you don’t see it [no se ve]. 
These projects are invisible. Since people can’t see this infrastructure, they say the 
government hasn’t done anything. Governments like to do things that you can see: the 
visible projects. The invisible ones are neglected (Interview on November 24, 2012). 
 
The above quote demonstrates not only the historic neglect of the peripheries, but also 
that the visibility/invisibility discourse is firmly imprinted on the imaginaries of citizens. Indeed, 
it is not just the Radical administration that uses this binary. The discursive binary is part of a 
historic planning legacy in Santa Fe. The discourse reinforces and normalizes the skews created 
in the historic processes of planning by placing people vis-à-vis risky space and infrastructure 
development by providing infrastructure to those who are better off and already less at risk.  
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Figure 16. Residents cut off access to major roads to protest flooding. Photo courtesy of Nanci 
Ferino, 2007.  
 
Acknowledging the lack of progress in the provision of drainage infrastructure, the 
Radical administration made rain-related flood risk and its requisite infrastructure a state priority. 
Under the Radical administration of Barletta, the city took steps towards implementing the 
Drainage Master Plan (Plan Director de Desagües), which was developed in cooperation with 
the National Institute of Water (INA – Instituto Nacional del Agua), but had been shelved since 
2000. The Radical administration of Mayor José Corral took steps further in 2013, specifically 
recognizing the historic lack of infrastructure in the northern peripheries. In a statement to the 
press, he declared, “the most important thing is that we have a plan. The government has 
remembered the north of the city, which for many years was abandoned. And we are committed 
to continue working there so that we can have these infrastructure and services throughout the 
entire city” (Santa Fe Ciudad Videos 2013b). One of the mayor’s major infrastructure projects 
under the Drainage Master Plan involves culverting Larrea Ditch, an open ditch that crosses the 
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Los Angeles neighborhood. A highly anticipated project, residents believe it will “solve the 
problems of flooding in the neighborhood.”16 After being stalled for over a decade due to a lack 
of financial capital, the project started in early 2014. Upon initial assessment of the construction 
in April 2014, the mayor stated, “The project is part of a larger 300,000 US dollar drainage 
project that involves the provincial government since it transcends both the financial and human 
resources of the municipality. But in the meantime, it is necessary to relieve this area…with 
every month that passes, the city is better prepared [to face flooding], demonstrating that the 
problems of the past, no longer happen, especially in the north.”17 In July 2014, construction of 
the drains along Arenales Street was completed, bringing about 400 families in the neighborhood 
some relief from drainage problems. Since then, residents confirm that while runoff still collects 
in the depressions around the neighborhood, it “drains much quicker than before.”18  
As I mentioned earlier, there is a spatial logic to the municipal administration’s provision 
of infrastructure for urban public services like water, sanitation and sewage. Luis and other 
residents who told me they felt “abandoned” by the government live in the city’s peripheries. 
Although the land where they built their houses may have been officially incorporated into the 
city, it was not incorporated in terms of public infrastructure provision or service delivery. Nor 
were these newer neighborhoods worked into the politics of the city. Capitalizing on this 
opportunity, the Radical administration set out to expand their electoral base from the urban core 
to the peripheries. By aligning the needs and aspirations of residents at the peripheries with their 
own electoral needs and aspirations, the Radicals made residents’ and their solutions visible, 
which consequently made them feel like they belonged. Recognizing what stormwater 
infrastructure means to residents, the mayor said, “Once they are finished, they remain under the 
surface. But residents aren’t stupid. They know their importance and how they can 
fundamentally change a neighborhood” (Santa Fe Ciudad Videos 2013a). While not all 
stormwater infrastructure lies “under the surface,” the mayor deliberately employs a political 
discourse of invisibility to draw a distinction between what the Radical administration is doing 
and what the previous Peronist administrations did.  
                                                          
16
 Interview on November 29, 2012  
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Interview on October 28, 2014 
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The political stronghold for the Radical Party has historically been Santa Fe’s urban core. 
In contrast to supporters of the Peronist Party who are traditionally among the poor and working 
class and typically live in peripheral neighborhoods like Santa Rosa (see Chapter 4), Radical 
Party supporters are university-educated middle and upper class elites who live the city center. 
The Radical Party knew that they had the vote of residents living in the urban core, so the next 
logical step for them was to expand their electoral base to the peripheries. The administration did 
so by creating a positive feedback of infrastructure delivery and belonging between the residents 
in the peripheries and the Radical Party. By being responsive to what residents have long 
demanded – the “invisible” stormwater infrastructure – the Radical administration was able to 
expand their electoral base to the newly incorporated territories of the north. The Radical 
administration recognized these residents through both discourses and the materiality of 
infrastructure.   
Stormwater drains are less politically expedient in terms of winning votes than large-
scale monumental infrastructure like bridges or embankments, which tend to receive central 
government funding, are highly visible and centrally located. Hence, large-scale monumental 
infrastructure draw citizens’ attention and votes. They also appear to the technocrat as the 
obvious solution to flooding and thereby overshadow the more mundane infrastructural solutions 
until there is a political motive to get at them. Furthermore, infrastructure like stormwater drains 
require a massive amount of capital, which is difficult for a municipal government to fund 
especially when coping with the pressures of expansion and maintenance. The Radical 
administration’s focus on invisible infrastructure requires the disbursement of a great deal of 
public funds to the peripheries, which the electorate in the urban core would not be pleased 
about, if they knew. One high-ranking city official told me, “If residents living in the center of 
Santa Fe knew how much money the city invests in infrastructure in the peripheral 
neighborhoods, they would be furious!”19 So although the city invests in “invisible” 
infrastructure in the peripheries, it is electorally important that the visible infrastructure be 
located in the city center. Hence the Barletta administration’s rehabilitation of public spaces and 
historic public buildings in the city center as mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is electorally 
                                                          
19
 Interview on October 30, 2014.  
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important to further hide the patterns of public spending that lean towards the peripheral 
underground.  
 
5.5 Surfacing “Invisible” Infrastructure 
To bring political credit to their builders, the Radical administration had to make visible 
the invisible. Towards that end, the city employed a politics of visibility around the invisible 
infrastructure. The first step was to market the work the city has been doing since the Radicals 
took office in 2007. With the aim of drawing both local and international attention to their 
progress in flood risk reduction, the Radial administration publishes leaflets and books that 
document the administration’s progress, including the recent publication “Learning from the 
Disasters: Local Risk Management in Santa Fe, 10 years after the Flood of 2003.” In 2010, the 
city began a YouTube channel to showcase what they are doing to make the city better prepared 
for floods – notably rain-related floods. In 2011, it won the United Nations Sasakawa Award for 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Since then, the city launched a local Making Cities Resilient campaign 
called “una ciudad mejor preparada” (a better prepared city). Additionally, in 2015, the city 
announced that it became one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities.  
The second inventive step in making visible the invisible infrastructure is through the 
renovation of the city’s political machinery. Political campaigning in Santa Fe has long utilized a 
politics of visibility to win votes. With the ever-present risk of flooding, monumental flood 
control infrastructure has served an important means to gain political control over a territory 
because it demonstrates the government’s responsiveness to the needs of citizens. Now with the 
focus on rain-related flooding as well as increased political competition among political parties, 
the Radical administration responds to the needs of citizens by turning towards “invisible” 
infrastructure aimed at reducing rain-related flood risk. Once the Radical Party discursively 
labeled stormwater infrastructure as “invisible,” they needed a strategy that was distinct from the 
Peronist administrations. Hence, the Radicals pursued a politics of visibility through a clientelist 
political configuration that relies on the assemblage of labor. In 2010, the Radical administration 
created a program of municipal work crews (cuadrillas) to clean, maintain and construct urban 
infrastructure. Work crews provide the essential and very visible labor to keep up with the city’s 
needs for constructing and cleaning stormwater infrastructure. This infrastructure thus becomes, 
as Fredericks argues, “fleshed out through the living parts of labor” (2014: 532). While the work 
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crew program benefits the city and its citizenry, it also provides jobs to the under- and un-
employed. In fact, the majority of work crew members I spoke with hail from the poorer, 
peripheral neighborhoods where unemployment is high and clientelist relations shape access to 
goods, services and jobs.  
 
 
Figure 17. Pipes waiting to be installed by work crews. Photo by author, 2012. 
 
The incorporation of work crews into the Radical’s politics of visibility crystallizes 
around clientelist politics. Fredericks (2014: 535) argues that the “assemblage of bodies” to work 
on different urban projects gets articulated in politics – a politics that is specific to different city 
administrations. The Radical administration had to have a political strategy that first, set them 
apart from the Peronists, and second, made them more appealing to the electorate. Since the 2001 
economic crisis followed by the floods of 2003 and 2007, the impact of social policies on 
citizens’ well-being has become increasingly important. Improving things like the inflation rate, 
wages and, above all, jobs, were seen as essential factors to recover from previous decades’ 
extremely high rates of un- and under-employment. Hugo, one of my interlocutors, explained 
that “while the Radicals had political brokers, but they didn’t have political power – at least not 
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like the Peronists did back in the 80s and 90s. But the one kind of leverage they did have was 
that they could give you a job in the municipality.” 20 So the Radical administration employed a 
political strategy that created jobs by assembling work crews to work on a variety of urban 
infrastructure projects. They piggybacked on the remnants of old Peronist patron-broker-client 
relationships by targeting and co-opting former Peronist political brokers to work as the leaders 
of the work crews. Jairo, another interlocutor from the neighborhood of Santa Rosa, became a 
leader of one the work crews. Since the late 1990s he had worked as a political broker for the 
Peronist Party, but when he saw that the Radicals were offering jobs – jobs that the Peronists 
promised but never seemed to deliver on, he told me, “Here in the neighborhood, there aren’t a 
lot of jobs so I’m happy that this administration is doing something about it.”21  
Perhaps the most iconic example of the strategic recruitment of a work crew leader is that 
of El Gitano. In addition to being the lead singer in a local cumbia band, El Gitano is founder of 
a civil society organization, Jehová Gire (God Provides), which teaches music and sports to 
underprivileged youth. El Gitano’s parents worked, rather unsuccessfully, as the only political 
brokers for the Radical Party in the Peronist stronghold of Santa Rosa. The Radicals recruited El 
Gitano as a political broker because, outside of his family, the Radical Party had no substantial 
political territorial ties to Santa Rosa, and he already had enough social clout to influence voter 
behavior. In an interview, El Gitano told me that he was the reason the Radical Party won over 
the electorate in Santa Rosa in 2007. He said, “Before me, no one here ever voted for the 
Radicals.”22 Exaggeration aside, El Gitano excels at constructing a politics that speaks to 
residents’ everyday experiences and the Radicals needed someone with pugnacity and 
persuasiveness to conquer the Peronist electorate of Santa Rosa. In 2010, when the Radical 
administration established the work crew program, El Gitano became the leader of two of them.  
In the process of “doing politics” (hacer la politica), El Gitano performs a political 
juggling act “in order to generate fear, loyalty and legitimacy” (Ranganathan 2014: 92). He is 
well known among residents of Santa Rosa, many of whom told me that he “does politics” just 
like any other political broker: by cultivating a relationship that resonates with residents’ 
everyday needs and aspirations in order to recruit people as subordinate members of his work 
                                                          
20
 Interview on October 28, 2013.  
21
 Interview on November 3, 2013.  
22
 Interview on October 26, 2012. 
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crews. He does so by using a contradictory discourse with which he makes a superficial 
separation between his “social” work with work crews and his involvement in politics. Although 
he wants political credit for the Radical victory in winning over the Peronist electorate in 2007, 
El Gitano refuses to admit that he “does politics” for the Radical Party. Instead, he claims that he 
is not involved in politics and that his work crews are a way to “give back to the community.”23 
In 2012, the mayor gave him “official recognition” for his leadership role in the community, 
specifically for promoting cumbia santafesina – the musical style particular to Santa Fe. But it was 
not a coincidence that he was given recognition at the city’s first annual cumbia festival or that 
said festival took place in Santa Rosa, El Gitano’s neighborhood. When I asked El Gitano if 
municipal officials would preside over the festival, he said, “Oh yes, yes, the mayor is coming. 
Everyone’s coming. All the power is coming. They have made it official municipal interest.”24   
Just as El Gitano refuted “doing politics,” the municipal officials I interviewed refused to 
admit that El Gitano was a political broker for the Radical Party. Admitting this would damage 
their reformist image – as purveyors of modernity and progress. However, it was clear that the 
Radicals use the same clientelist relations as the Peronist administrations, only they have 
institutionalized them in the work crew program. In the new configuration, the Radicals replaced 
the political broker with the work crew leader and access to social plans with access to jobs. In 
doing so, they moved away from using terms like “punteros” due to the negative connotations 
with clientelism. Instead, they preferred to call their work crew leaders “referentes” (leaders). 
Despite the differences in terminology, there is little distinction between the clientelist relations 
of the past and those of the present. One of my interlocutors, Beatriz, said that the new 
configuration is actually quite similar to the old one. Similar to how political brokers distributed 
social plans whereby he or she used a roster of clients to determine who gets what, the leader of 
the work crew has a roster of subordinate workers and decides how to pay them. Beatriz 
explained:  
 
The municipality goes to Santa Rosa de Lima, looks for referentes. The municipality pays 
a referente so that he can pay 10 people – it varies, but say 10 people – and then the 
referente goes to their people and say, ‘look the municipality gave me 1000 pesos to pay 
each of you. I am going to take 200 pesos and pay you 800 pesos, but you must work.’ 
                                                          
23
 Interview on October 26, 2012. 
24
 Ibid. 
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They work for 800 pesos and the referente pockets the 200 pesos. You multiply that by 
10, 15, or 20 and that is a lot of money. It is a very good salary for a referente (Interview 
on October 12, 2012). 
 
Radical political officials, however, distance themselves from accusations of corrupt 
payment procedures because the work crew leader must establish a civil society organization 
with an associated bank account for which he or she is the sole beneficiary. So the municipal 
government pays the work crew leader in exchange for the services of the entire crew. Although 
the payments are transparent on the surface, the distribution of payments to work crew laborers 
depends on their leaders. Since the leader of the work crew is the only one able to access the 
payments, he or she distributes the payments, skimming a little off the top of each laborer’s 
“salary” or even withholding payment as punishment for lack of political loyalty, just as the 
political brokers of the past did.  
When I asked a lower level municipal employee
25
 if there was a significant change in the 
clientelist relations since the Radicals took office, he scoffed, “The Radicals would like us to 
think so, but there hasn’t been. Radicals continue to use clientelism just like the Peronists.” 
While the city has undergone a significant political transformation, which the political impacts of 
the floods of 2003 and 2007 made clear, the overall logic underlying political clientelism has not 
changed. On paper, work crews were born out of the need for infrastructure delivery and 
maintenance, but in practice, work crews provide the means for Radical political officials to 
maintain dominance at a territorial level – something they previously did not have. Also, with the 
increasingly robust political competition, the Radicals are forced to utilize their politics of 
visibility to appeal to more voters. So as part of their politics of visibility, the Radical 
administration uses the visibility of the work crews’ labor as a way of cultivating their presence 
in the peripheral neighborhoods which have not traditionally been their electoral strongholds. In 
this case the municipal government is able to legitimate itself by delivering infrastructure and 
creating jobs while institutionalizing clientelist relations and expanding their electoral base. 
Thus, clientelism is not changing from regime to regime. Instead, it coexists with and supports 
democracy, with the main difference being that it is re-territorialized through the provision of 
urban infrastructure and creation of jobs.  
                                                          
25
 Non-politically appointed positions are among those of the planta permanente or permanent staff.  
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5.6 Conclusion: Invisibility and Vulnerability  
 Beyond just the mundane mechanical arrangements of pipes and cement, infrastructure 
comprise a complex mix of “material objects and human labor” bound together by politics and 
reinforced through citizens affective responses (Fredericks 2014: 544). The politics of visibility 
reveals the life of infrastructure – not only that it is used as a performative and electoral vehicle 
to advance political agendas and gain electoral advantage, but also because there is meaning 
behind the infrastructure.  
Although there is a false dichotomy between visible and invisible infrastructure, the idea 
of visibility is an important one, and works in relation to both the monumental and the 
underground. The case of Santa Fe shows that visibility is beneficial when it is used to service 
people and respond to their demands. It can also be destructive when it is used as 
monumentalism – when the monuments of state power, like embankments, fail to be durable or 
productive to citizens; when they are symbols without substance. In the past, the city’s leaders 
used this monumental infrastructure as a way to win votes. But with the growth of the city and 
the incorporation of new neighborhoods in northern and northwestern peripheries – not yet 
worked into the politics of the city – there was also a massive responsibility to provide basic 
drainage infrastructure to provide real protection against floods.   
When the Radical administration turned their focus on stormwater infrastructure, they 
harvested it by making their delivery of infrastructure visible through labor and meaningful and 
by leveraging a discourse of invisibility. By making their work visible, linking the party to 
protection from rain-related flooding, the Radicals consolidated political power. They were able 
to do so because they recognized that the relational property of having versus not having 
stormwater infrastructure not only shapes well-being and everyday life; it also very much 
influences how residents sense themselves as citizens and attribute their political belonging. In 
the process, the Radical administration used the discursive tactic of invisibility to respond to 
citizens’ demands and differentiate themselves from previous Peronist administrations. The key 
to their political strategy was their understanding that citizens’ sense of belonging is cultivated 
through infrastructure. So by providing residents with the much-needed infrastructure, the 
Radical administration not only protected them, but also recognized them as citizens worth 
serving. Indeed, residents’ vulnerability stemmed from their inability to influence government to 
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respond to their demands. When the Radical administration did, they made residents feel more 
cared for and therefore, less vulnerable. Further, they cultivated an affective relationship with the 
disaffected residents of the northern peripheries by linking “invisible” infrastructure with the acts 
of the Radical Party. The Radicals legitimated themselves by providing infrastructure and 
reconfiguring clientelist relations in those neighborhoods through the visible labor of work 
crews. They made the reduction of vulnerability a form of recognition. Their politics of visibility 
is, in fact, a positive example of how politics and the public interest can align to deliver needed 
urban infrastructure and services.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary of Arguments 
This dissertation investigated the government and individual responses to flood risk in 
Santa Fe, Argentina. In doing so it makes important contributions to human-environmental 
geography, particularly to vulnerability studies, the geographic literature on infrastructure and 
the politics of representation and citizenship. It also represents a significant contribution to 
geographic knowledge on Santa Fe and to applied knowledge risk mitigation and vulnerability 
reduction. In this concluding chapter I review the central purpose and motivations for this study, 
outline the key findings and summarize my arguments. This is followed by some reflections on 
this research and its implications for policy and practice.  
The overall goal of this study was to advance our understandings of how vulnerability is 
produced and reproduced in the city, the reasons why particular framings of risk, and hence their 
solutions, are chosen over others, and the implications for vulnerability research particularly in 
the context of cities and global environmental change. It is clear that the technocratic framing is 
a the standard approach in risk management, which shapes the solutions available to politicians 
and state experts – as exemplified by a suite of infrastructure projects aimed at controlling the 
rivers over the last century. I was interested in the factors that shaped those solutions – how was 
risk framed and acted upon by government officials and experts – as well as the material and 
discursive implications surrounding their implementation. 
I was also concerned with how these solutions play out in neighborhoods in Santa Fe, 
particularly how people experienced infrastructure. With the swell of both large- and small-scale 
infrastructure projects being implemented in the city over the last decade, particularly at the 
peripheries, Santa Fe is a dynamic arena for new configurations of politics centered on the 
reorganization of the municipal infrastructure provision and delivery system. It is precisely at the 
peripheries where the material and discursive dimensions of risk are manifest. I also argue that 
peripheries are where citizens fight to be made visible. My research was motivated by the need 
for critical social science research on the causes of vulnerability, particularly how social, spatial, 
political, economic, material and discursive factors combine at the citizen-state interface. My 
contribution was to explore the under-investigated, yet fundamental relations between people and 
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government, and how this relation shapes people’s protections and vulnerabilities, and how, in 
particular, the urban poor perceive those relations on which they are deeply dependent.  
 
The key findings are as follows:  
 
(1) The technocratic framing is shaped by a conceptualization of risk as something that 
flows in the rivers and falls from the sky. By directing attention to the biophysical 
phenomenon of the flood, the solutions that emerge from the framing rely on a reduction 
of physical exposure which eclipses the predisposition to damage that resides within 
society.  
 
(2) The infrastructural solutions that emerge from the framing occlude social and political 
causes of vulnerability, hence potential vulnerability reduction strategies. This is, in part, 
a result of the politics of visibility – the practice of conjuring, codifying, promising and 
utilizing the visibility of infrastructure projects to influence citizens and maintain 
political dominance. Government’s need for monumental display de-incentivize 
government from providing other non-infrastructural solutions. Politicians choose 
solutions that are ‘visible’ – or the solutions they can make visible (through discourse and 
labor) for their political purposes. They show that government is doing something. 
Citizens, too, like infrastructure for the order, security, mobility and sense of pride that 
infrastructure evokes. Infrastructural solutions, then, become ways in which the 
government or a political party legitimizes itself and builds its relation with citizens.  
 
(3) The paradox of risk, which describes how infrastructure aimed at reducing risk actually 
increases it, results in an immoral hazard because the infrastructure creates a set of 
protections that redistribute risk unevenly. Through the paradox of risk, infrastructure 
encourages the poor and lower classes to settle in areas where they think they are secure, 
but are actually not. This further exposes the poor to risk, while protecting the well-off. 
Unlike the moral hazard where the availability of insurance protection encourages 
insured persons to build in unsafe areas, here the poor move to unsafe areas precisely 
because they cannot afford safety. Hence, in the name of risk reduction, infrastructure 
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redistributes risk in such a way that further marginalizes the poor, whereby they bear a 
disproportionate burden and ultimately the brunt of human suffering when the 
infrastructure fails to protect them. 
 
(4) The paradox of the infrastructural fix plays an important role in shaping residents’ 
responses to risk. It demonstrates that because of the ideological, philosophical and 
psychological sensibilities, people still believe infrastructure will protect them even if 
their actual experience of infrastructure has proven otherwise. Infrastructure generate a 
powerful affective response in terms of their sense of security and belonging, which also 
gives other non-infrastructural solutions less saliency. Because infrastructure shapes 
people’s views of risk in such a way that even those marginalized by infrastructure 
through the immoral hazard, return, often more certain, to the original belief that having 
infrastructure makes them better off.  
 
(5) The clientelism effect is when small and needed, but only palliative, relief from political 
patrons prevents citizens from demanding policies to address root causes of risk. 
Clientelism, as an access-granting institution, acknowledges residents’ vulnerabilities 
through temporary assistance, but does not have the resources – nor is it meant to – invest 
in addressing underlying causes. Clientelist relations shape security because people are in 
a relationship through which they can claim support and assistance, but the contingency 
in clientelist relations simultaneously limits the choices available and constrains 
residents’ agency in making demands on government. In effect, it reduces security by 
enabling government to get away with making small investments without having to deal 
with the redistributive issues. 
 
(6) The discursive production of risk is a key practice not only of government, but also of 
its subjects. Discourse has material consequences – those of otherness and exclusion. It 
also leads to the normalization of risk for the poor as well as those who live on the islands 
of the rivers and along their banks. Discourse on risk becomes part and parcel of the 
construction of the material world of the contemporary city. 
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6.2 Implications for Policy and Practice 
The results of this research have important policy and practical implications for the 
reduction of vulnerability at local and international levels. The fact that Santa Fe has been 
internationally recognized for its efforts at risk reduction is significant. On one hand it shows that 
the city’s solutions to the problem of flooding are working, at least to reduce risk (although risk 
mitigation is not the same as vulnerability reduction). On the other hand, it shows that the 
solutions are also part of the problem: they occlude social and political causality on the 
vulnerability side of risk. And this needs to be addressed rather than avoided. 
 The first step starts with recognizing the framing of risk. How it is framed will shape the 
selection and implementation of solutions – adaptive (and potentially maladaptive) measures – 
that can reduce or deepen vulnerability. Importantly, framing also leads to the attribution of 
responsibility and ultimately blame. When social, political or economic causes are occluded, 
those responsible and able to respond are often the ones shielded from responsibility and blame 
(Ribot 2013). As this dissertation demonstrates, by declaring that the flood of 2003 was a natural 
disaster, government officials attempted to shirk responsibility by attributing cause to the rise in 
the rivers. Likewise by claiming that “no one warned him” that a flood was imminent, Governor 
Reutemann avoided blame. Finally, the lack of risk communication, or rather the disinformation 
provided by government officials greatly increased suffering and loss. The combination of these 
occlusions shows how these injustices, discursively exacerbated material vulnerability by the 
lack of representation and redress. It is important then, that, as this case as well as the case of 
L’Aquila, Italy illustrates, bad weather forecasting does not kill people, but poor risk 
communication might. Understanding framing in order to trace cause is a critical process because 
the attribution of responsibility and blame for the production of crisis can leverage risk 
reduction.  
The second step in addressing social and political causality is to recognize the synergies 
between the local and global realms that make dominant and sustain the technocratic framing. 
The unwillingness of city officials to acknowledge and internalize vulnerability’s social and 
political dimensions and explore a range of options to reduce it is not limited to the local level. 
The city’s main departments and policy making bodies that deal with risk – with the exception of 
the Director of Risk Management – consist of scores of engineers, architects, lawyers and 
accountants, but not one city planner or social scientist. This is not extremely different and, I 
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argue, mirrors the composition of experts who sit on the scientific working groups of the IPCC. 
The IPCC, for instance, has achieved much success in emphasizing the importance of 
vulnerability reduction as part of global, national and local policy-making agendas. Yet, the 
framings are still skewed towards risk-hazard models because the workings groups remain 
dominated by physical scientists, engineers and economists, which is precisely why the lack of 
social and political causality is not considered as a gap in knowledge. The international 
recognition that Santa Fe received is positive, but it also reinforces its use of the technocratic 
framing and thereby discourages other approaches to vulnerability reduction. New approaches 
must be developed at both the local and international levels, which should allow for the inclusion 
of more social scientists and a deeper understanding of the causes of vulnerability, especially 
considering that “the meanings we attach to climate and hazards are often a more powerful 
influence on the action than scientific evidence” (Jeffers 2011: 309). 
In the development of new approaches, we need to move beyond the horizons of a 
framing that decontextualizes and depoliticizes risk and reduces it to a technical realm. A more 
balanced set of knowledges about causality is particularly crucial in order to identify the factors 
in vulnerability production and, as Ribot (2014: 696) argues, “to identify which are amenable to 
redress.” While many methods can be used to identify the most effective means of vulnerability 
reduction, ethnography has a valuable role to play in triangulating complex urban interactions 
between the state and citizens, among individuals in different social and political groups, and 
relations surrounding access to resources. In the struggle to represent the social, ethnography 
gives people a voice and helps to tell their stories.  
Rather than confining ourselves, then, to a narrow technical framing of risk and solutions 
to “fix” problems of flooding, we must broaden our understanding to include the wider relations 
between people and government, political projects and institutions (like clientelism) associated 
with vulnerability. A good starting place is to recognize that vulnerability is a process shaped by 
“constantly evolving and interacting material and political factors” (Simon and Dooling 2013: 
1411). But the solutions employed– the infrastructure – approach vulnerability as an outcome, a 
point-in-time condition. These solutions, then, create maladaptive outcomes – those that increase 
risk of harm and exacerbate existing conditions of vulnerability; people used to adapt to the 
environment, whereas now, they adapt the environment to themselves. 
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Struggles over voice and visibility – to be heard and seen – are as much about the right to 
the city and claims of citizenship and belonging as they are about the predisposition to damage. 
It is therefore crucial that we revalorize the “discursive associations of politics and the political” 
(Ranganathan 2010: 199). Representation is one of the ways that people can gain voice and 
visibility. Through representative democracy, people can begin to influence those who govern 
and make decisions about their own security that can buffer them against hazards, stressors and 
crises. Of course representatives must be responsive to people’s needs and aspirations (Ribot 
2014). Lemos et al. (2007) suggests that there needs to be a balance between meeting the 
immediate needs in the face of hazards and the long-term urban development strategies designed 
to reduce future needs. While I do not believe that clientelism will disappear as an institution, I 
do think people, the clients, have the potential to reconfigure it in ways that give them more 
agency in demanding greater security. Fundamentally, we need to recognize people’s 
subjectivities and make them feel included in the city. We can do this by changing or expanding 
the frame, thus making people’s lives, livelihoods, and beliefs matter instead of the hazard itself. 
What happens if, as one of my informants questioned, we start asking how people want to live?  
For the people of Santa Fe, vulnerability persists despite the now internationally 
recognized “solutions” for risk reduction. In response, this dissertation reveals how narrow focus 
of the technocratic framing has resulted in a disconnect between the promise and materiality of 
vulnerability reduction. The dissertation indicates the likelihood of the continued use of the 
technocratic framing and the solutions that emerge from that framing until there is a realignment 
of the goal of vulnerability reduction with the broader goals of representation.  
 
6.3 Future Research  
There of course is more theoretical and empirical work to be done on vulnerability. There 
is room for much more research on the factors that underlie why certain framings of risk are used 
over others. We have some good ideas about the factors that make the technocratic framing of 
risk more appealing, but there is more to discover. For example, what factors can lead to 
framings that facilitate effective climate change adaptation? Of course, the notion of adaptation 
requires further investigation and unpacking as to what is deemed effective, in addition to who 
makes those decisions and on what basis (Jeffers 2011). Scale, too, is particularly important for 
adaptation. Within the category of urban adaptation to flooding, what factors drive city 
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government responses to flood risk? What is the degree to which needs or constraints pertinent to 
flooding are locally or regionally specific, what needs or constraints are informed by the larger 
regional context, and what the implications are for cross-jurisdictional cooperation? At the 
neighborhood and individual scale, what is the threshold of different urban populations before 
they undertake voluntary adaptive measures such as relocation? This research can help to 
identify ways that local governments can develop more robust and politically feasible 
governance arrangements as well as policies and programs to help vulnerable groups better adapt 
in the face of change.  
One of the most productive, yet perhaps difficult, lines of inquiry is that which deals with 
the relations between people and government. As the city continuously changes vis-à-vis 
infrastructure, the outcome of those changes indicates a kind of achievement. However, as 
McFarlane (2011:668) argues it is an achievement “that is deeply unequal and dependent on a 
whole range of exclusions, resources, histories, and forms of power.” How can infrastructure 
development and planning practices produce a more equitable distribution of risk? How can 
affective responses to infrastructure articulate with a politics of representation to reduce risk? 
Can a more representative politics produce a more secure and just city?  
Future research might also explore mechanisms linking vulnerability to the institution of 
clientelism. The literature suggests several possible causal mechanisms between poverty and 
clientelism, but little has been done to further tease out the relationship between vulnerability 
and clientelism. For example, what factors shape people’s access to resources to productively 
meet their needs? To what degree does the specific need (for goods, jobs or services) shape the 
configuration of clientelist relations? How can clientelism allow residents to access more secure 
spaces in the city? Seriously considering how clientelism can articulate with a politics of 
representation could yield interesting new theoretical and empirical insights on vulnerability. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Semi-structured Interview Protocol
1
  
 
Sample questions for municipal and provincial government officials and other governmental 
experts 
 
 Could you please describe your professional background? What kind of training did you 
receive?  
 Please describe your current job. Do you take part in professional development seminars, 
workshops, etc. to keep up-to-date on the newest trends in your career? If yes, where do 
you take them, who gives them? 
 What are the current institutional priorities? 
 How do you define risk?  
 How do you define vulnerability? 
 Who and what kind of analysis is involved in decision-making on flood risk?  
 What are the criteria that make a risk-related intervention feasible?  
 How would you evaluate the success of past responses to floods and flood risk? Have 
lessons learned from the floods of 2003 and 2007 been incorporated into current 
responses?  
 With respect to risk reduction, what are the greatest achievements of your institution to 
date? What can be improved? Who can do it?  
 Describe the current administration’s projects aimed at risk reduction. Who is involved?   
 Do citizens participate in those projects?  
 What are the most serious risk-related demands made by citizens? Which areas of the city 
do they come from? 
 Which parts of the city does the current municipal/provincial administration draw the 
most support?  Is this different from previous administrations? How?  
 How does the municipal government communicate risk? How is information made 
available to the public?  
 What is your institution’s budget for flood control infrastructure? For structural 
measures? For non-structural measures?  
 Is the budget contingent on other policy mechanisms or other levels of government?   
 What is the logic behind stormwater drain constructions? Which areas are prioritized and 
why?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
  Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, not all questions were used in every interview.  
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Sample questions for residents, neighborhood association members, and other non-governmental 
actors 
 
 How do you define risk?  
 Is there flood risk in your neighborhood?  
 How do you define vulnerability?  
 Are you vulnerable in the face of floods? How are you vulnerable? Why are you 
vulnerable? Who else is vulnerable?  
 How long have you lived in this neighborhood?  
 Was there flooding in the neighborhood before you moved here? What caused past 
floods?  
 Have you experienced flooding here? When? What was the cause of the flood(s)?   
 During and after the flood, what happened to you?  
 Tell me about the days after… The weeks after…. The year after…. What did you do? 
Where did you go? Who did you live with? Who lived with you?  
o Did you need help? Did you get help? Did you help others? From whom did you 
receive help?  
 What governmental and non-governmental institutions were involved? What did they do?  
 After the 2003 flood, did you receive reparations from la Unidad de Recuperación de la 
Emergencia Hídrica y Pluvial (El Ente)? When did you receive them? How did you use 
them? What is your opinion about the way reparations were made?  
 Are you better off today? How? Could you describe what changed (material 
conditions/social conditions) from before to after to now?  
 Do you feel that the flood experience(s) increased or decreased neighborhood cohesion?  
 Did your experience of flooding change your perspective of the municipal government? 
The provincial government? How?  
 Are you affiliated with a political party? Which one? For how long?  
 Did the change in political parties in 2007 who you rely on for help finding a job or 
coping with flooding?  
 How satisfied are you about your neighborhood? Do you feel secure? Protected?  
 What can be done to improve the situation of your neighborhood in order to effectively 
reduce risk? Who can do it? Do they do it? Why do they do it? Why do they not do it?  
 What are your major grievances with respect to your neighborhood (where does flooding 
and flood risk fit in those priorities)?  
 Is the municipal or provincial government currently implementing any risk-reduction 
projects in your neighborhood? What are they? What is your perception of this project? 
Will people benefit (or how have they benefited)?  
 How does the government communicate information to you about this project(s)?   
 Were you/are you able to participate in decision making, such as the design or approval 
of the project for your neighborhood?  
 
